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Summary
This thesis consists of three independent chapters on monetary policy.1
Chapter 1 analyses the welfare implications of diﬀerent monetary policy strate-
gies in the empirically-validated business cycle model of Smets and Wouters.
In contrast to the recent literature, we investigate policies under commitment
and discretion when the policymakers objective function does not coincide
with the preferences of the representative consumer. Once the preferences do
not coincide with each other, discretionary policies that target the price-level
or the change in the output gap outperform the standard loss function that
assigns weight to deviations of inflation and the output gap from their target
values. Furthermore, discretionary policies perform better than commitment
policies under the simplified objectives. The intuition for this finding is simple.
Consider a cost push shock that pushes up price markups. In the near term,
the optimal commitment policy (under the preferences of the representative
agent) calls for an inflation rate above its long-run target value that raises the
price level before implementing an episode of below target inflation that in
part drives back the price level. Although the (balanced growth path of the)
1All three chapters are co-authored with my supervisor, Professor Martin Bodenstein.
ix
price level may not be fully restored, the permanent change to the price level
is small. If policy acts under discretion and the objective of the monetary au-
thority does not coincide with the preferences of the representative consumer,
incorporating the price level in the monetary policy objective can eﬀectively
mimic the optimal policy.
Chapter 2 investigates optimal monetary policy when the policymaker con-
siders both a model with search and matching frictions in the labor market
and a model with sticky nominal wages to be good approximations of the true
data-generating process. Although the models imply similar impulse response
functions for common variables under an estimated interest rate rule, these
responses diﬀer importantly when policy is set optimally in each model. Price
inflation is stabilized in the search and matching model at the expense of wage
inflation, with the reverse being the case in the sticky wage model. Employing
the concept of optimal targeting rule, we show that a policy optimal in one
model is far from optimal in the other model. When monetary policy reflects
uncertainty over the true model, wage inflation stabilization features impor-
tantly as long as the policymaker assigns a moderate probability to the sticky
wage model. This finding provides all the more reason for central banks to
respond directly to wage inflation contrary to their public statement.
x
Chapter 3 discusses aspects of the optimal monetary policy in a New Keynesian
model with search and matching frictions. Going beyond the existing literature
we assume that the steady state of the model may be ineﬃcient. Within
this framework, we characterize the optimal policy using a purely quadratic
approximation to the utility function of the representative agent and derive
the optimal targeting rule. The optimal targeting rule places weight on lead
and lags of output, employment, and the price level, as well as on weighted
historical averages of output, inflation and employment. Moreover, optimal
targeting rules seem to be more robust across models than loss functions.
xi
List of Figures
1.1 Targeting frameworks in the textbook New Keynesian Model . 66
1.2 Welfare evaluation of targeting frameworks in extensions of the
textbook NKM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
1.3 Welfare evaluation of targeting frameworks in the model of
Smets and Wouters (2007) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
1.4 Understanding the welfare rankings in the SW model under
discretion: introducing frictions sequentially . . . . . . . . . . 69
1.5 Welfare evaluation of targeting frameworks in SW2007 model
under Parameter Uncertainty: optimal CEV . . . . . . . . . . 70
1.6 Welfare evaluation of targeting frameworks under parameter un-
certainty: optimal targeting weight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
1.7 Welfare evaluation of targeting frameworks in SW2007 model
under Parameter Uncertainty: fixing optimized weight . . . . . 72
1.8 Welfare evaluation of targeting frameworks in SW2007 under
Parameter Uncertainty: exchange discretion and commitment 73
1.9 Welfare evaluation of targeting frameworks under estimation
with Euro area data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
1.10 Welfare evaluation of targeting frameworks: labor supply shock 75
xii
2.1 Impulse response function matching under neutral technology
shock . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
2.2 Impulse response function matching under neutral technology
shock with wage indexation in the sticky wage model . . . . . 145
2.3 Targeting rules in the search and matching model: neutral tech-
nology shock . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
2.4 Targeting rules in the search and matching model: price markup
shock . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
2.5 Targeting rules in the sticky wage model: neutral technology
shock . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
2.6 Targeting rules in the sticky wage model: price markup shock 149
2.7 Impulse responses under optimal simple rules . . . . . . . . . 150
2.8 Targeting rules with wage indexation in the sticky wage model:
price markup shock . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
2.9 Targeting rules with simple loss function: price markup shock 152
3.1 IRFs of NKMwith search and matching frictions after persistent
technology shock . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 190
3.2 IRFs of NKM with search and matching frictions after transi-
tory price markup shock . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191
A.1 IRFs to Transitory Costpush Shock under Discretion for EHL
Model at ιp = 0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 249
A.2 IRFs to Transitory Costpush Shock under Discretion for EHL
Model at ιp = 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 250
xiii
A.3 Welfare evaluation of targeting frameworks in Walsh(2003) . . 259
xiv
List of Tables
1.1 Policy Performance under Parameter Uncertainty . . . . . . . 65
2.1 Calibrated Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
2.2 Estimated Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
2.3 Optimal Simple Rules: transitory markup shock ρu = 0 and no
habit h = 0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
2.4 Restricted Optimal Simple Rules: ρu = 0 and h = 0 . . . . . . 140
2.5 Euclidean Distance of IRFs under robust Taylor rules . . . . . 141
2.6 Optimal Simple Rules: persistent markup shock ρu = 0.2 and
no habit h = 0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
2.7 Optimal Simple Rules: transitory markup shock ρu = 0 and
habit h = 0.6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
3.1 Parameterization of NKM with Search and Matching frictions 187
3.2 Comparison for coeﬃcients of optimal targeting rules . . . . . 188
3.3 Welfare losses and CEV under diﬀerent policy regimes . . . . 189
A.1 Parameter Values for Walsh(2003) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 258
xv
A.2 Parameter values for Smets and Wouters (2007) . . . . . . . . 276
xvi
Chapter 1
On Targeting Frameworks and
Optimal Monetary Policy
1.1 Introduction
A leading strand of the optimal policy literature assumes that the central bank
adopts the preferences of the representative household and chooses policies to
maximize social welfare. Following Woodford, ed (2003), the objective func-
tion of the central bank can then be expressed as a purely quadratic function
in terms of policy-relevant variables using local approximation techniques. In
practice, however, policymakers often appear to resort to simple quadratic
objective functions that characterize the policymaker’s preferences over infla-
tion and a measure of resource utilization.1 Typically, such simple objective
functions are independent from the model under consideration.
1For example, the Federal Reserve staﬀ assumes such a characterization in its pub-
licly available version of the optimal-control monetary policy in the Federal Reserve’s
FRB/US model; the objective also includes a term measuring the change in the policy
interest rate. See https://www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/notes/feds-notes/
2014/optimal-control-monetary-policy-in-frbus-20141121.html.
1
One explanation for this tension between theory and practice relates to
transparency, accountability, and legal mandate of the central bank. An ob-
jective function that is stated in terms of policy-relevant variables and is con-
sistent with household preferences is unwieldy for empirical DSGE models due
to the large numbers of variables. To simplify its communication, the cen-
tral bank may want to eliminate variables from the objective that appear to
be of minor importance. Similarly, a simple objective function can also be
viewed as providing flexibility in implementing a central bank’s mandate such
as price stability, see Svensson (2010). Unfortunately, even under a simplified
objective function, a full characterization of the optimal policy involves a set
of additional conditions that may be hard to communicate.
An alternative motivation for the central bank’s preferences to diﬀer from
those of the representative household arises from the time-inconsistency prob-
lem. As in Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro and Gordon (1983), the
socially optimal (fully state contingent) commitment policy announced in pe-
riod t may no longer be viewed as optimal in period t+1. When allowing the
policymaker to re-optimize the policy plan each period, the resulting optimal
discretion policy does not achieve the social optimum. Rogoﬀ (1985) suggests
distorting the policymaker’s preferences (away from those of the representative
household) to place a larger weight on inflation. In this case, the inflation bias
2
arising from policy discretion is much reduced and welfare is closer to optimal
in the Barro-Gordon model.
We analyze social welfare when the policymaker’s objective function is not
derived from the preferences of the representative household in a sequence of
microfounded New Keynesian models (NKM) ranging from the textbook ver-
sion in Woodford, ed (2003) and Gali, ed (2008) to the full empirical model
in Smets and Wouters (2007). We focus on three simple objective functions
that have received most of the attention in the literature. The first objective
is referred to as the inflation targeting (IT) framework. The central bank
minimizes the expected discounted sum of squared deviations of inflation from
its long-run target and of the output gap.2 Under the second objective, the
price level targeting (PLT) framework, the central bank’s dislike for infla-
tion is replaced by a dislike for price level deviations from its long-run trend.
The speed limit targeting (SLT) framework, this third objective dates back to
Walsh (2003), assumes that the policymaker is averse to deviations of inflation
from its long-run target and the growth rate of the output gap.
We consider these three targeting frameworks when the policymaker acts
under full commitment or under full discretion. To focus on the implications
2Svensson (2010) views this formulation as summarizing the preferences of a flexible
inflation targeting central bank and so do some of these institutions themselves as expressed
in Hammond (2012).
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of the choice of targeting framework for stabilization policy, we assume that
the policymaker’s objective function reflects a commitment to price stability
expressed in terms of a long-run inflation target, or equivalently, a fixed drift
in the price level to provide a clear nominal anchor. In other words, our
setting abstracts from the inflation bias (see Barro and Gordon (1983)), but
leaves room for the stabilization bias under discretionary monetary policy
(see Clarida et al. (1999)). In an optimal targeting framework, the objective
function of the central bank is parameterized so that the expected welfare
loss under the simple objective relative to the social optimum is minimized.
The social optimum is defined by the economic outcomes under the optimal
commitment policy when the policymaker’s preferences are consistent with
those of the representative household. Following Woodford (1999), we adopt
the concept of “optimality from a timeless perspective” to derive commitment
policies throughout this paper.
If the policymaker can commit to future policy actions, the optimal IT
framework outperforms the other frameworks with few exceptions, albeit the
SLT framework is always close. However, if the policymaker acts under dis-
cretion the ordering is reversed: the optimal IT framework almost always falls
behind the other two by considerable margins. The relative performance of
the SLT and the PLT framework depends on the exact model setting. In the
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estimated Smets and Wouters model, welfare under the optimal SLT frame-
work exceeds welfare under the optimal IT framework by more than 0 .30% of
steady state consumption, whereas the advantage of the optimal PLT frame-
work over IT is a bit smaller with 0.25%. In both cases, however, the lead
exceeds several times the welfare costs of business cycle variations advertised
by Lucas (2003). Even more consequential for the conduct of monetary policy
may be the finding, that the optimal SLT framework under discretion often
achieves outcomes that are closer to the social optimum than those obtained
from the optimal IT framework under commitment.
The ranking of the targeting frameworks depends on the desirability of
driving back nominal prices and wages to their pre-shock levels (or their long-
run trends) under the optimal timeless commitment policy. In the textbook
NKM, in response to a shock that raises price markups, the optimal commit-
ment policy allows inflation to increase above its long-run target first followed
by a period of below-target inflation until the price level is again consistent with
its long-run target value. The output gap turns negative and recovers slowly
over time. Following Woodford, ed (2003), the second-order approximation
to the preferences of the representative household can be written to coincide
with the objective function of the IT framework. Trivially, if the policymaker
acts under commitment, the optimal IT framework and the optimal timeless
5
commitment policy coincide in the textbook NKM. Yet, under discretion, the
optimal IT framework treats past deviations from the long-run inflation target
as bygones and stabilizes inflation (and closes the output gap) prematurely.
Consequently, the price level permanently departs from its pre-shock trend.
Borrowing the idea of the “(weight-) conservative central banker” from Rogoﬀ
(1985), Clarida et al. (1999) show that assigning the central bank an objective
that puts a lower weight on the output gap than society mitigates, but does
not fully eliminate, the negative welfare consequences of the IT framework
under discretion.
Svensson (1999), Vestin (2006) and Walsh (2003) argue that further wel-
fare improvements can be obtained by changing the functional form of the
policymaker’s objective function. The desire to stabilize the price level along
its long-run trend under the PLT framework leaves inflation to fall below its
long-run trend under discretion to compensate for the earlier burst in inflation
thereby overcoming the key shortcoming of the IT framework under discretion.
Under the SLT framework the price level is not steered towards its long-run
trend by construction. The policymaker’s (assigned) dislike for changes in the
output gap (as opposed to the level) under the SLT framework induces lower
inflation in the short to medium term. The negative output gap caused by the
markup shock closes slowly even after the shock has dissipated and, in prin-
6
ciple, inflation and the output gap could be at their respective target values.
This indirect mechanism for (partially) oﬀsetting changes in the price level,
makes the SLT framework desirable. The framework is flexible to deliver good
outcomes under both discretion and commitment whereas the PLT framework
may perform poorly under commitment.
Whether it is desirable to undo earlier changes to the price level depends
on the degree of price and wage indexation in the economy. Again deriving
intuition from the textbook NKM, if prices are fully indexed, all changes to
the price level are permanent under the optimal timeless commitment policy.
In this extreme case, the IT framework will not implement the optimal time-
less commitment policy when the policymaker acts under commitment.3 But,
analogous to the PLT framework without price indexation, the optimal IT
framework under discretion can replicate the social optimum in some circum-
stances. In general, the IT framework (under commitment and discretion) is
more likely to perform better than the SLT and the PLT framework under a
high degree of price indexation as long as wages are fully flexible. This con-
clusion no longer applies when wages are sticky: For a given degree of wage
inflation indexation, a higher degree in price indexation implies that inflation
3Under indexation, the approximation to the preferences of the representative household
no longer coincides with the IT objective. A quasi diﬀerence in inflation replaces the current
inflation rate in the approximation.
7
deviates from its target more persistently under the optimal commitment pol-
icy and that most of these deviations will be be reversed in the future to a
large extent in order to realign prices and wages with their long-run paths.
The optimal IT framework can deliver on the first part, but fails along the
second dimension. The optimal SLT framework, and in particular the optimal
PLT framework, implement both aspects of the optimal commitment policy
as discussed previously.
Finally, we turn to the relevance of habit persistence in consumption for
our findings. Under habit persistence, the household’s period utility function
depends on a quasi-diﬀerence of consumption. The quadratic approximation
to such preferences features the level and a quasi-diﬀerence of the output gap;
for a high degree of habit persistence, this quasi-diﬀerence of the gap is close to
the change of the gap. The objective function in the IT framework features the
level of the output gap, whereas the objective function in the SLT framework
features the change of the output gap. Under commitment, the SLT and IT
framework perform equally well. Under discretion, the IT framework reveals
again its old weakness of not pushing the price level back towards its long-run
trend; additional welfare losses occur under this framework as it disregards
the social desire to close the output gap in a smooth fashion. The SLT and
the PLT framework outperform the IT framework under discretion: the slow
8
adjustment of the output gap built into the SLT framework translates into
a period of lower inflation while the desire to align the price level with its
long-run trend under the PLT framework induces a slow closing of the output
gap under discretion, respectively.
The empirical model in Smets and Wouters (2007) features a rich set of
nominal and real rigidities.4 To obtain a full picture about the desirability of
each targeting framework from a quantitative perspective, we solve for the op-
timal targeting frameworks under commitment and discretion when the model
is parameterized (i) at the mode of the posterior distribution, (ii) under any
one of 30000 draws from the Laplace approximation to the posterior distribu-
tion, and (iii) at the posterior mode when the model is estimated with euro
area data. The SLT framework emerges as our most preferred setting. Across
parameterizations, the optimal SLT framework strictly outperforms the IT
and the PLT framework under discretion; under commitment the SLT frame-
work is a very close second to the IT framework; the optimal SLT framework
implemented under discretion delivers higher social welfare than the optimal
IT under commitment. Finally, the SLT framework is more robust with re-
gard to another aspect of parameter uncertainty: if we fix the parameters of
4In addition to sticky nominal prices, the full empirical model features investment, cap-
ital accumulation, capacity utilization, investment adjustment costs, consumption habits, a
variable demand elasticity, and sticky nominal wages.
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each targeting framework at the values that are optimal under the posterior
mode parameterization of the Smets and Wouters model and consider welfare
outcomes for the same 30000 draws from the Laplace approximation to the
posterior distribution, the SLT framework performs stronger relative to the
other frameworks compared to the case of re-optimizing the frameworks for
each draw of parameters. If in addition we exchange the optimal targeting
frameworks derived for commitment and discretion, the SLT framework per-
forms best both under commitment and discretion with probability close to
1.
How do our results relate to the practice of monetary policymaking? Bernanke
and Mishkin (1997) and King (2004) describe contemporary monetary policy-
makers as exercising “constrained discretion.” The central bank has a specific
mandate, but it implements its policy period by period — not according to
some optimal state-contingent plan or a fixed policy rule. In our framework,
the case of optimal policy under discretion captures the essence of this as-
sessment: The long-run targets embedded into the simple objective functions
reflect specific mandates assigned to the central bank (such as price stability
or stable inflation); implementation of the targets is not strict but flexible in
the sense that variables other than the target variables enter the objective
function (such as measures of real economic activity); policymakers revisit the
10
optimality of their policy each period. Adopting the view of monetary pol-
icy as constrained discretion, our results strongly support replacing the IT
framework by the SLT framework.
Previous literature has focused on the comparison between the IT and the
PLT framework. Reis (2013) provides a pointed summary of the debate. From
a theoretical perspective, the arguments in favor of targeting the price level
trace back to the fact that a long-run commitment to stable prices reduces
inflation variability in the short and long-term even if the central bank cannot
resist the temptation to exploit short-run opportunities. If inflation variability
is socially undesirable, as is the case in a wide range of contemporary general
equilibrium models, the case for targeting the price-level is made. The strong
performance of the IT framework under commitment in our analysis does not
contradict this view; despite expressing the central bank’s objectives in terms
of inflation and the output gap this policy is a price-level targeting policy
in disguise.5 Objections against price-level targeting stress practical aspects
about the measure of the price level to target and how to communicate ever-
changing short term inflation goals.
Our findings suggest that the focus of the debate on targeting frameworks
has been misplaced. The objective function underlying the SLT frameworks
5Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) extend this point also to the case when taking explicit
account of the zero lower bound on the nominal interest rate.
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with its long-run commitment to stable inflation and its short-run focus on
inflation and smooth changes in the output gap leads consistently to better
outcomes than the other frameworks and appears to be more robust to pa-
rameter uncertainty. From a practical perspective, monetary policy is still
formulated in terms of inflation. Furthermore, the SLT framework is less vul-
nerable to inaccuracies of the real-time estimates of the output gap discussed
in Orphanides (2003) in contrast to the IT and PLT framework.
To the extent applicable, our analysis confirms and generalizes key results
in Walsh (2003) and Debortoli et al. (2015). Walsh (2003) illustrates the po-
tential advantages of the SLT framework in a simple NKM with sticky prices
and backward looking elements in the form of lagged inflation and lagged out-
put gap that could be motivated by price indexation and habit persistence.
Restricting attention to the case of discretion, the SLT framework is shown
to outperform the IT framework for low to moderate degrees of inflation per-
sistence. As the model is not fully micro-founded social welfare is measured
by an adhoc loss function of the same function form as the objective function
under the IT framework. The model is calibrated rather than estimated and
lacks many of the features found to be of empirical relevance. While Debortoli
et al. (2015) show that the optimal IT framework performs better than the op-
timal SLT and PLT framework under commitment in the model of Smets and
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Wouters (2007), their analysis is completely silent with regard to the case of
discretion. However, it is under discretion when the SLT framework unleashes
its full power. Neither Walsh (2003) nor Debortoli et al. (2015) consider the
role of parameter uncertainty.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 lays out our
methodology. Section 3 analyzes the IT, PLT, and SLT frameworks in a se-
quence of simple New Keynesian models (distorted steady state, habit persis-
tence, sticky nominal wages). The analysis is extended to the empirical model
by Smets and Wouters (2007) in Section 4. We study the sensitivity of our
results in Section 5. Concluding remarks are oﬀered in Section 6.
1.2 Methodology
Given a fully-specified model our analysis proceeds as follows. First, we ob-
tain a purely quadratic approximation of the welfare function that describes
the preferences of society (in standard applications the utility function of the
representative household). This approximation is summarised by the matri-
ces (A(L), B(L)). At the second step, we assume that the central bank op-
timises a given, yet arbitrary, quadratic objective subject to the linearized
structural equations of the underlying model of the economy. The linearized
economy is summarized by the matrices (C(L), D(L)). Solving the system of
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first order conditions delivers linear decision rules that describe the behaviour
of the economy under the given objective for monetary policy. Finally, we
use the matrices (A(L), B(L)) and the linear decision rules to measure the
welfare implications of a policy objective. While we restrict our analysis to
linear-quadratic frameworks, i.e., quadratic objective functions and linear con-
straints, for comparability with the existing literature, our approach can be
implemented at higher orders of approximation without restrictions. Within
each class of policy objectives we search for its welfare-maximising parameter-
ization.
1.2.1 Welfare criterion
For a given model, let the N × 1 vector of endogenous variables be denoted
by xt, with the partition xt = (x˜′t, it)
′. The variable it is the policy instrument
of the central bank, typically a short-term interest rate. The vector ζt refers
to the complete set of exogenous variables. Given the central bank’s choice
of the policy instrument for all periods t ≥ t0, {it}∞t=t0 , the remaining N − 1
endogenous variables satisfy the N − 1 structural model equations
Etg(xt−1, xt, xt+1, ζt) = 0 (1.1)
in equilibrium. The system of equations in (1.1) is assumed to be diﬀerentiable
up to the desired order of approximation. We refrain from splitting g(·) into
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equations that contain no forward-looking variables and equations that do con-
tain forward-looking variables for ease of notation and proceed as if each equa-
tion in g(·) contained at least one forward-looking variable.6 The intertemporal
preferences of society are described by U = E0
∑∞
t=t0
βt−t0U(xt−1, xt, ζt) with
the utility function U(xt−1, xt, ζt). Within this setting, the optimal monetary








Etg(xt−1, xt, xt+1, ζt) = 0. (1.2)
As is well understood, the problem stated in (1.2) is not recursive given the
general inability of the policymaker to commit to policies prior to time t = 0,
even if the policymaker can commit to future paths of the policy variables.
Following a large body of the literature, we opt for the optimal monetary
policy under commitment from a timeless perspective as the reference point
to evaluate the performance of diﬀerent policies. Optimality from a timeless
perspective assumes that the policymaker can “pre-commit” and converts the
problem into a recursive structure as shown in detail in Benigno and Woodford
(2012). The original problem stated in (1.2) is therefore augmented by the
6When implementing our numerical procedure, however, we carefully separate the equa-
tions into those with and without forward-looking variables as in Benigno and Woodford
(2012).
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initial pre-commitment of the form
g(xt0−2, xt0−1, xt0 , ζt0−1) = g¯t0 (1.3)








Etg(xt−1, xt, xt+1, ζt) = 0
g(xt0−2, xt0−1, xt0 , ζt0−1) = g¯t0 . (1.4)
If not all equations in g(·) contain forward-looking variables, pre-commitments
only need to be specified for those equations with forward-looking variables.
As stressed in Benigno and Woodford (2012) and Debortoli and Nunes
(2006) assuming that policy is conducted under suitable pre-commitments is
generally key in obtaining a purely quadratic approximation of the welfare
function.7 Two important remarks are in order:
1. Including the pre-commitment constraints (1.3) into problem (1.2) changes
the original optimization problem.
2. Policies that violate the initial pre-commitments (1.3) are penalised with
regard to welfare in accordance with the severity of the violation. In
7Most prominently, assuming optimality from a timeless perspective is necessary if the
deterministic steady state of the model is ineﬃcient. Compare Benigno andWoodford (2005)
for details.
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particular, the path of the endogenous variables derived from the original
problem (1.2) may no longer be deemed optimal under the new program
(1.4).
There are two equivalent approaches to obtain the correct linear-quadratic
approximation of the optimization problem stated in (1.4). The first ap-
proach (LQ problem), described in Benigno and Woodford (2012), is gen-
erally followed to obtain a compact characterization of the policy problem
in small-scale models. Starting from a second-order Taylor-series expansion
of the utility function U(xt−1, xt, ζt), second-order Taylor-series expansions of
the structural equations Etg(xt−1, xt, xt+1, ζt) = 0 and the pre-commitment
constraint g(xt0−2, xt0−1, xt0 , ζt0−1) = g¯t0 are used to substitute out the linear
terms in the former. As a result, the approximation to the welfare function
involves quadratic terms only which can be maximised subject to the linear
approximation of the constraints in (1.1) and (1.3) to get a first-order accurate
approximation to the problem in (1.4). The alternative approach computes the
first order conditions of the problem in (1.4) and then seeks the approximation
of the resulting system of equations to the desired order.
Both approaches can be implemented numerically. We utilise the tool-
box developed in Bodenstein et al. (2014) which follows the second approach.
Given the equivalence of the two approaches, the first-order approximation to
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EtC(L)xˆt+1 +D(L)ζt = 0
C(L)xˆt0 = dt0
ζt = Γζt−1 +Υξt (1.5)
where xˆt0 measures the (log-) deviation of variable “x” from its value as-
sumed in deterministic steady state. The matrices (A(L), B(L)) capture the
second-order approximation of the welfare function, where “L” denotes the
lag-operator. The matrices C(L) and D(L) capture the linear approximation
of the constraints. The linear constraints C(L)xˆt0 = dt0 implement the time-
less perspective through the appropriate choice of dt0 . The model description
is completed by the evolution of the exogenous variables, the last equation in
(1.5). The innovations ξt follow iid standard normal distributions. The details














outcomes {xt}∞t=t0 obtained from policies that satisfy the initial pre-commitment
constraints C(L)xˆt0 = dt0 . However, if the policies considered do not respect
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the initial pre-commitment constraints by construction, the criterion needs to
be augmented to include a penalty in accordance with the violation of the ini-
tial pre-commitment. As discussed in detail in Benigno and Woodford (2012),
the correct criterion that allows for meaningful welfare comparisons of arbi-












+ β−1ϕˆ∗′t0−1C(0)xˆt0 . (1.6)
ϕˆ
∗′
t0−1 denotes the values of the Lagrange multipliers associated with the pre-
commitment constraints under the optimal policy from a timeless perspective.
C(0) is the coeﬃcient matrix going along with the forward-looking variables in
the first order approximation of the equations in g(·). Finally, xˆt0 contains the
values of the endogenous variables at time t0 under the policy that is actually
implemented.8 Details on computing unconditional welfare under an arbitrary
policy using the criterion in (1.6) are provided in Appendix A.1.2.
1.2.2 Targeting frameworks
Broadly speaking, the analysis of monetary policy regimes distinguishes two
categories: targeting frameworks and instrument rules. Under a targeting
8Intuitively, insuring that the optimal policy under timeless perspective is the best pol-
icy among all feasible policies requires a change in preferences. Rather than viewing pref-
erences as being described by E0
∑∞
t=t0




βt−t0U(xt−1, xt, ζt) + β−1ϕ′t0−1 (g(xt0−2, xt0−1, xt0 , ζt0−1)− g¯t0). The optimal
policy problem is then to maximize the augmented utility function subject to the original
set of constraints, Etg(xt−1, xt, xt+1, ζt) = 0. Approximating this problem following the
same steps as in Appendix A.1.1 yields the criterion function in (1.6).
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framework, the central bank is assigned an objective function (or goal) against
which its performance is assessed. An inflation-targeting central bank, for
example, is instructed to keep a selected inflation measure in the neighborhood
of its target value. In pursuing its goals, the central bank is granted some
flexibility to buﬀer temporarily the impact of its policy on other (welfare-
relevant) variables.9 Targeting frameworks are fundamentally diﬀerent from
instrument rules, such as Taylor (1993). Under the latter, the actions of the
central bank are a direct function of the state of the economy and adherence
to the rule becomes the relevant performance measure eliminating most if not
all room for a discretionary policy response.
For the purpose of model-based policy analysis, the central bank’s objec-
tive function under a targeting framework needs to specify the variables that
characterize the overall goal(s) of the central bank and the weights assigned
to each of these variables. Following Walsh (2003), we consider five targeting
frameworks each represented by a quadratic loss function:









9In practice establishing a targeting framework goes beyond simply assigning an objective
function to the central bank. State of the art inflation targeting is commonly characterised
as featuring the following elements, see Hammond (2012): (1) price stability as the main
goal of monetary policy, (2) public announcement of a quantitative target for inflation,
(3) policy based on inflation forecast, (4) mechanisms for transparency and accountability.
Suitably adapted, these elements would also be present in other targeting frameworks.
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x (πt + yˆt − yˆt−1)2 (1.10)




2 + λNIT−IIx (πt + yˆt − yˆt−1)2 (1.11)
where πt denotes deviations of the inflation measure from its value along the
balanced growth path, pˆt is the log-deviation of the price level from its value
along the balanced growth path, and xgapt measures the output gap. We follow
Smets and Wouters (2007) and define the output gap as the diﬀerence be-
tween actual output (in deviations from the balanced growth path), yˆt, and the
output level that would have prevailed absent nominal rigidities and markup
shocks.10 Each targeting framework TF = {IT, PLT, SLT,NIT,NIT − II}
10We discuss the limitations of this definition of the output gap as the need arises.
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is considered for the case of the central bank optimising its assigned objec-
tive under full commitment from a timeless perspective and for the case of
optimization under discretion.
Following Svensson (2010), “The objectives under flexible inflation targeting
seem well approximated by a quadratic loss function consisting of the sum of
the squared inflation deviation from target and a weight times the squared
output gap, and possibly also a weight times the squared policy-rate change
(the last part corresponding to a preference for interest-rate smoothing).” The
remaining four frameworks are formulated analogously.
Characterising inflation targeting through the objective in (1.7) is theoreti-
cally appealing since in simple models an approximation to the utility function
of the representative household yields this very same quadratic objective. 11 A
high weight on inflation, i.e., a small value of λIT , captures the emphasis on
price stability through keeping inflation low. But as long as λIT > 0, the
central bank has some flexibility to accommodate other concerns.
A characteristic feature of inflation targeting is to let changes in the price
level be bygones. Traditionally, this feature has been viewed as an advantage
of inflation targeting over price level targeting. If the price level exceeds its
target value, the central bank is required to reduce the inflation rate below
11For derivations see Woodford, ed (2003) and Gali, ed (2008) or Section 1.3.
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the level consistent with its target path for the price level. Such a policy can
turn out to be quite contractionary.12 However, as argued in Vestin (2006)
price level targeting can outperform inflation targeting if the central bank
lacks commitment in a model with forward-looking variables. To date the
analysis of price level targeting under such settings has been restricted to very
basic models of the business cycle. Interest in price level targeting has also
been nourished by the recent experience of zero nominal interest rates and low
inflation rates in many developed economies.
Similar to price level targeting, the objective in (1.9) induces inertia in
the response of a central bank acting under discretion. Walsh (2003) shows
that speed limit targeting performs well under a moderate or high degree of
forward-looking behavior of the economy.13 As with price level targeting, this
policy proposal has not been evaluated in empirically validated models under
favorable settings.14
Finally, we add the two nominal income targeting regimes investigated in
Walsh (2003) for comparability. In Walsh (2003) both frameworks, (1.10) and
12On a more fundamental level, price level targeting can be interpreted as an extreme
case of average inflation targeting. For a detailed analysis of average inflation targeting see
Nessen and Vestin (2005).
13An additional potential advantage of speed limit policies that is neglected in the sub-
sequent analysis is due to Orphanides (2003). Under persistent mis-measurement of the
output gap due to information frictions including the change rather than the level of the
output gap in the objective function could enhance welfare.
14Although Debortoli et al. (2015) analyze the case of price level and speed limit targeting
in the model Smets and Wouters (2007) under commitment the authors do not investigate
the case of discretion.
23
(1.11), induce policy inertia similar to the speed limit targeting. Not unlike
the speed limit framework, the targeting framework NIT1 can be viewed as a
modified inflation targeting framework that allows for a diﬀerent interpretation
of “flexibility.”
Targeting frameworks under commitment
For a given parameterization of a targeting framework, a central bank, that
formulates policy under commitment and respects the same pre-commitments












EtC(L)xˆt+1 +D(L)ζt = 0
C(L)xˆt0 = dt0
ζt = Γζt−1 +Υξt. (1.12)
The matrix ATF (L) is parameterized to reflect the loss function that charac-
terizes the targeting framework under consideration with TF = {IT, PLT, SP
,NIT1, NIT2}. In going from a loss function to a maximization problem we
multiplied the loss function by −1. The entries into ATF (L) are zero except
for those diagonal elements that correspond to the positions of the targeting
variables in the vector xˆt for the targeting regime TF . Thus, the problem
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resembles the one of obtaining the optimal monetary policy with commitment
under the timeless perspective in (1.5) with (A(L), B(L)) being replace by
ATF (L).
The first order conditions associated with this linear quadratic program
can be solved using standard algorithms to obtain the decision rules of the
endogenous variables and the Lagrange multipliers. These decision rules are
then used to compute the relevant variance-covariance matrices to evaluate the
welfare criterion (1.6). In presenting results, we express welfare diﬀerences be-
tween the targeting framework and the optimal policy in terms of consumption
equivalent variation.15 Details are provided in Appendix A.1.2 and A.1.3.
Targeting frameworks under discretion
To find the (Markov equilibrium) decision rule of a central bank acting under
discretion we follow the methodology suggested in Dennis (2007). Today’s
central bank is viewed as the Stackelberg leader; households and firms as well
as future policymakers are the Stackelberg followers.
In analogy to the notation in the original model, let ˆ˜xt contain all the
elements of xˆt except for the sole policy instrument iˆt. The linearized structural
15More specifically, we compute welfare under the targeting regime WTF and the optimal
policy (under commitment from a timeless perspective) W ∗ and measure the consumption




. In the presence of consumption habits we
follow Otrok (2001) and require increases in both current and past consumption.
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+c(1)ˆit + c(0)Etiˆt+1 +D(0)Υξt (1.13)
where C\i(1) is derived from C(1) by eliminating from C(1) the column c(1)
which is associated with the policy instrument, iˆt, and similarly for C(0) and
C(2). We assume c(2) to be a vector of zeros. Given the focus on Markov





























































+ c(1)ˆit +D(0)Υξt. (1.17)
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The matrices M¯ and NTF are defined as











Taking first order conditions with respect to the policy instrument, iˆt,
rearranging terms and applying the method of undetermined coeﬃcients yields
the matrices H1, H2, F1, andF2. The welfare implications of the (Markov)
equilibrium decision rules are again obtained from evaluating the criterion in
equation (1.6).
Considering discretionary policy for objectives (1.7) - (1.11), does not re-
quire us to characterize the optimal policy under discretion; nor do we need to
derive a second-order welfare approximation to the preferences of society under
discretion. Each policy derived under discretion can be evaluated by applying
the criterion stated in (1.6) — the second-order approximation of society’s
preferences for optimal policy under commitment from a timeless perspective.
The reason for condition (1.6) to suﬃce for welfare evaluations lies in the fact
that absent shocks the central bank chooses the same policy path under each
objective regardless of policy being conducted under commitment or discre-
tion. With the deterministic steady state (or the balanced growth path) of a
policy regime to coincide with the steady state under the optimal policy from
a timeless perspective, condition (1.6) is the appropriate welfare criterion. In
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particular, an inflationary bias cannot arise in our setting even if the steady
state is not eﬃcient.16
1.3 Baseline New Keynesian Model
Ultimately we are interested in the performance of the various targeting regimes
in empirical DSGE models of the business cycle such as the model by Smets
and Wouters (2007). Yet, simple models in the New Keynesian tradition pro-
vide the intuition behind the many channels at play. For the purpose of this
paper, we refer to the NKM presented in Woodford, ed (2003), Gali, ed (2008)
or Walsh, ed (2010) as the textbook model. This model features sticky nomi-
nal prices as in Calvo (1983) and a production technology that requires only
labor as input. Sales subsidies oﬀset the distortions arising from monopolistic
competition in the steady state. Finally, the economy experiences technology
and cost push shocks. One at a time, we consider the role of (i) inflation iner-
tia, (ii) steady state distortions, (iii) consumption habits, and (iv) sticky wages
— features commonly present in empirical DSGE models. Throughout this
section, the numerical results are derived from the original (nonlinear) model
as explained in Section 1.2. The discussion, however, is organized around the
16As pointed out in Woodford, ed (2003), Chapter 7, page 470, footnote 4, characterizing
the optimal policy under discretion is a complicated task, in particular when the steady
state is distorted. Assigning to a central bank acting under discretion the objective in (1.6)
does not yield the optimal policy under discretion as the derivations underlying expression
(1.6) assume that policy is conducted under commitment from a timeless perspective.
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linear-quadratic approximations to each model version. The model details and
the derivations of the linear-quadratic frameworks are provided in Appendix
A.2.1.
In their reduced form the models considered in this section share important
features with the linear model in Walsh (2003). As stressed previously, the wel-
fare criterion used to assess the performance of diﬀerent targeting frameworks
in Walsh (2003) is not consistent with the underlying model — a limitation
that our analysis overcomes.17.
1.3.1 Targeting frameworks in the textbook NKM
At the core of the linear version of the textbook NKM rests the New Keynesian
Phillips Curve (NKPC) which links inflation, πp,t, to the (welfare-relevant)
output gap, x∗t ,
(πp,t − ιpπp,t−1) = κp(σL + σC)x∗t + βEt (πp,t+1 − ιpπp,t) + upt . (1.18)
Here and subsequently, all variables are expressed in deviation from their
steady state values (relative if carrying a “hat”, absolute otherwise). The
cost push shock, upt , follows a known stochastic process. The composite pa-
rameter κp(σL + σC) is known as the slope of the NKPC and the parameter
ιp represents the degree of price indexation to past inflation as in Christiano
17In departure from Walsh (2003) we exclude the two nominal income targeting regimes
for now as they turned out to be strictly outperformed by the optimal inflation targeting
framework. However, all five frameworks (1.7)-(1.11) are considered in Section 1.4
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it − Etπt+1 − g∗mu,t
)
(1.19)
provides the connection between the output gap, inflation, the nominal interest











is obtained from a counterfactual economy without nominal rigidities and with-
out cost push shocks, but with technology shocks; the output gap is defined as
the diﬀerence between actual output and yˆ∗t . As in Woodford, ed (2003), the
preferences of the representative household (or equivalently the social welfare










with the period loss function Lt satisfying
Lt = (σ




(πp,t − ιpπp,t−1)2 . (1.22)
σL, σC , θp are known parameters. See Appendix A.2.1 for details on the
derivations.
To fix ideas, we consider first the performance of inflation targeting (IT ),
price level targeting (PLT ), and, speed limit targeting (SLT ) in the fully
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forward-looking NKM, i.e., ιp = 0. Each targeting framework is evaluated for
a range of weights on the output gap measure, λITx , λ
PLT
x , and λ
SLT
x , respec-
tively, both under commitment and discretion. Figure 1.1 plots the uncondi-
tional welfare loss of the frameworks relative to the optimal monetary policy
under commitment from the timeless perspective expressed as consumption
equivalent variation (CEV). The weight on the output gap for which the wel-
fare loss is minimized under a targeting framework is indicated by“∗” under
PLT, “◦” under SLP, and “⋄” under IT. The optimal weight on the output
gap measure is low relative to the weight of on the inflation measure (which
is normalized to 1) and the welfare losses of not implementing the optimal
policy are small both under commitment and discretion for all frameworks
considered.
Figure 1.1 reproduces some well-known results. Under the IT framework,
a central bank acting under commitment can replicate the optimal monetary
policy under commitment from the timeless perspective; the solid line in the
top panel assumes the value of zero at the optimal parameterization. In the
textbook New Keynesian model without indexation, the social welfare function
(1.22) is written solely in terms of contemporaneous inflation and the welfare-
relevant output gap. The central bank’s inflation targeting objective thus
coincides with the preferences of society over inflation and the output gap,
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if λITx = λx ≡ (σC + σL)κp θp1+θp , and the welfare loss under optimal inflation
targeting relative to the optimal monetary policy must be nil. By construction,
price level targeting and speed limit policy deliver suboptimal outcomes under
commitment. Yet, as all three frameworks mimic the distinguishing feature
of the optimal monetary policy under commitment of driving the price level
back to its long-run path over time the welfare diﬀerences are small.
The equivalence result for inflation targeting and the optimal monetary
policy breaks down for any change in the model environment. Continuing
with the case of inflation targeting, a central bank acting under discretion
can improve its performance by adopting preferences over inflation and the
output gap that diﬀer from those of society. Borrowing the idea of a “(weight-
) conservative central banker” from Rogoﬀ (1985), Clarida et al. (1999) show
that assigning the central bank an objective that puts a lower weight on the
output gap than society does, i.e., λITx < λx, mitigates the negative welfare
consequences of the stabilization bias under discretion, but does not eliminate
it. The CEV is positive.18
18Rogoﬀ (1985) formulates the idea of a conservative central bank to overcome the in-
flation bias that arises under policy discretion in a model with product or labor market
distortions akin to Barro and Gordon (1983). A subsidy to oﬀset market distortions also
eliminates the inflation bias under discretionary policy in this setting. Yet, in the NKM,
even with an eﬃcient steady state due to such subsidies, the optimal policy under com-
mitment continues to be time inconsistent and cannot be implemented by a central bank
acting under discretion. For example, in response to a transitory markup shock, the optimal
policy under commitment allows for an intertemporal trade-oﬀ: inflation and output gap
deviations from target are reduced in the impact period of the shock while these variables
deviate from their target values in future periods. However, a central bank acting under
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Although lowering the weight on the output gap measure in the IT ob-
jective improves welfare under discretion, Svensson (1999), Vestin (2006) and
Walsh (2003) argue that further welfare improvements can be obtained by
changing the functional form of the policymaker’s objective function. Under
discretion, the IT framework treats past inflation realizations as bygones and
fails to stabilize the price level along its long-run trend. The built-in desire
to stabilize the price level along its long-run trend under the PLT framework,
however, forces inflation to fall below its long-run trend to compensate for
the earlier burst in inflation and vice versa. Under the SLT framework the
price level is not steered towards its long-run trend by construction. With the
assigned dislike for changes in the output gap (as opposed to the level) un-
der the SLT framework, the policymaker refrains from closing the output gap
prematurely and thereby allows inflation to deviate from its long-run target
even after the shock has dissipated and, in principle, inflation and the output
gap could be at their respective target values. This indirect mechanism oﬀsets
earlier changes in the price level from its long-run trend. The welfare losses
discretion will find it optimal to eliminate the deviations of inflation and the output gap
from target in future periods once time has moved beyond the impact period. Expected
to fail implementing the policy path derived under commitment in future periods, the dis-
cretionary central bank will not be able to reap the benefits of the optimal policy under
commitment in the impact period. Under discretion, the economy experiences the full eﬀect
of the transitory shock in the impact period and returns to its steady state immediately
thereafter. Policy under discretion experiences a bias towards stabilization.
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under PLT and SLT relative to the optimal policy appear to be negligible.19
1.3.2 Extensions to the textbook NKM
The welfare ordering of the targeting frameworks in the textbook NKM is in
principle robust to the addition of other features. Inflation targeting is the
preferred framework under commitment; price level and speed limit targeting
outperform inflation targeting under discretion. Figure 1.2 explores more sys-
tematically the performances of speed limit and price level targeting relative
to inflation targeting as a function of the degree of price indexation, ιp, for the
textbook NKM, the textbook NKM with a distorted steady state, a model with
external consumption habit, and a model with sticky nominal wages. With
the inflation targeting framework set to be the point of reference, a negative
CEV indicates that the framework under investigation is inferior to inflation
targeting and superior otherwise. We turn to a detailed discussion of each
model variation. The derivations of each model and the accompanying loss
function are provided in Appendix A.2.1.
19Appendix A.2.5 oﬀers analytical details. Vestin (2006) proves that for purely transitory
markup shocks the optimal PLT framework under discretion replicates the optimal policy
under commitment from the timeless perspective. Walsh (2003) shows that SLT induces
inertia and selects paths for inflation and the output gap that are close to those under the
optimal monetary policy. Numerical analysis of the impulse responses to markup shocks
shows that optimal PLT and SLT deliver paths of the endogenous variables close to those
under the optimal policy even when the shock is persistent.
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The role of price indexation in the textbook NKM
The textbook NKM with price indexation is given by equations (1.18)-(1.22)
with 0 < ιp ≤ 1. The lagged inflation rate enters equation (1.18) through the
assumptions about the behavior of firms that have not been selected to reset
prices optimally in the current period. Following the literature, we assume
that these non-selected firms adjust prices by the geometric average of steady
state inflation (weight 1− ιp) and inflation in the previous period (weight ιp).
The weight ιp governs the desirability to undo earlier changes to the price
level under the optimal monetary policy under commitment and thus impacts
the ordering of targeting frameworks. If non-selected firms adjust prices by
the steady state inflation rate (ιp = 0), prices of these firms grow along the
long-run trend path of the price level. The optimal monetary policy in aiming
to drive the price level back to its long-run target can reduce in the medium
run the costly price dispersion which primarily stems from firms that have not
been called to reoptimize prices for a long time interval. In other words, this
behavior for adjusting prices implicitly assumes that the private sector expects
inflation to be at its target value on average — allowing periods of above
target inflation to be followed by periods of below target inflation to maintain
the long-run average of inflation at the target value. If non-selected firms
adjust prices by the inflation rate prevailing in the previous period ( ιp = 1),
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prices of these firms incorporate the deviations of the price level from its
long run drift. Monetary policies that attempt to revert the price level to its
drift path would cause additional price dispersion in future periods. Under
ιp = 1, the optimal monetary policy under commitment therefore considers
past deviations of inflation from its long-run target value bygones and all
changes to the price level are permanent. If the degree of price indexation
falls strictly between 0 and 1, the optimal monetary policy partially oﬀsets
previous deviations of inflation from its long-run target.
Turning to the evaluation of our three targeting frameworks, we first note
that in the presence of indexation to past price inflation, the IT objective
can no longer be parameterized to match the preferences of society (1.22).
Nevertheless, as shown in the first row of panels in Figure 1.2, optimal inflation
targeting outperforms optimal price level and optimal speed limit targeting
under commitment for any degree of price indexation, ιp. This dominance
is most striking when inflation inertia is high and backward-looking behavior
shapes the dynamics importantly.
Under our parameterization of the stochastic shocks, the paths of inflation
and the output gap implemented under optimal inflation targeting are close to
those under the optimal monetary policy under commitment from the timeless
perspective; a comparison of the targeting rules implied by the two policies
36
reveals the reason for this finding.20 Under the optimal policy, the targeting
rule can be shown to satisfy
πp,t = − θp
1 + θp
(xt − xt−1) + ιpπp,t−1 (1.23)
whereas the targeting rule under the IT objective satisfies
πp,t = − 1
λITκp (σL + σC)
((xt − xt−1)− βιpEt (xt+1 − xt)) . (1.24)
Under the optimal policy, the monetary authority accepts deviations from the
long-run inflation target, i.e., the steady state value of inflation, that depend
on the change in the output gap and past inflation. An inflation targeting
policymaker also aspires to set inflation in accordance with the change in the
output gap; but such a policymaker also responds to expected changes in
the output gap while discarding concerns for past inflation. The equilibrium
paths of inflation and the output gap under the two policies diﬀer for ιp > 0
even if λIT is set to minimize the welfare losses under the IT framework
relative to the optimal policy. Yet, the magnitude of these diﬀerences depends
on the dynamics of the output gap under the optimal policy. Consider the
case of a cost push shock with a strong transitory component as under our
20Following Svensson (1999) and Giannoni and Woodford (2004), we combine the poli-
cymaker’s first-order conditions with respect to the endogenous variables into a single re-
lationship by eliminating the Lagrange multipliers. This relationship between endogenous
variables is referred to as targeting rule or targeting criterion. The system consisting of
the structural equations of the model and the targeting rule fully summarizes the dynamics
under the optimal policy.
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paramterization. Initially, the shock pushes up inflation and causes the output
gap to turn negative under the optimal policy. During the subsequent recovery
period, inflation turns negative to partially undo the initial rise in the price
level for 0 < ιp < 1 and the expected growth rate of the output gap is positive.
Thus, the second terms on the right hand sides of equations (1.23) and (1.24)
will eventually be of the same sign and inflation will return to its steady state in
a similar manner for the two policies.21 As in the textbook NKM without price
indexation, the price level targeting and speed limit targeting framework imply
larger departures from the social loss function in (1.22) and distort the implied
policy paths relative to the optimal policy by more than the inflation targeting
framework when the central bank acts under commitment. In particular, the
PLT framework induces a (suboptimal) full and rapid return of the price level
to its long-run trend.
Under discretion, price level and speed limit targeting deliver better out-
comes than inflation targeting for low and moderate degrees of price indexation
(ιp < 0.8). However, for a high degree of indexation inflation targeting be-
comes the most preferred framework. To understand how the switch in the
relative ranking depends on the degree of price indexation, we consider the
21A highly persistent cost push shock, however, would induce inertia in the output gap
with negative expected growth in the output gap over several periods under the optimal pol-
icy, and in turn making it more diﬃcult for the inflation targeting central bank to implement
a policy that closely resembles the optimal policy.
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two extreme points of no indexation, ιp = 0, and of full indexation, ιp = 1.
As argued at the onset of this section, the desirability to oﬀset changes in the
price level relative to its long-run trend under the optimal policy diminishes
for higher degrees of price indexation. Thus, inflation targeting under discre-
tion — which does not seek to stabilize the price level — improves its relative
performance for higher degrees of price indexation.
This intuition can be reinforced by revisiting the algebraic relationships
of the model. Recall that absent price indexation, the optimal price level
targeting framework under discretion implements a policy that is close to the
optimal monetary policy; for transitory shocks the two policies coincide. Given
the stabilization bias when the central bank operates an inflation targeting
framework under discretion, PLT continues to dominate IT for values of ιp
larger than, but close to, zero. Turning to the case of full indexation, it
becomes apparent that inflation targeting under discretion in the model with
ιp = 1 is isomorphic with price level targeting under discretion in the model








2 and faces the NKPC of the form
(pˆt − pˆt−1) = κp(σL + σC)x∗t + βEt (pˆt+1 − pˆt) + upt . (1.25)
where in the former case of ιp = 1, the inflation targeting central bank adopts
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2 and faces the NKPC of the form
(πt − πt−1) = κp(σL + σC)x∗t + βEt (πt+1 − πt) + upt . (1.26)
Thus, for ιp suﬃciently close to 1, inflation targeting dominates the other
targeting frameworks under discretion.22
The preceding discussion also reveals that for a given targeting framework,
the policy path derived under discretion may be preferred to the one derived
under commitment when evaluated under the true loss function of society. 23
For the case of full indexation and a purely transitory cost push shock, the
(optimal) inflation targeting central bank implements the optimal policy under
commitment from the timeless perspective consistent with the loss function
stated in equation (1.22); the inflation targeting central bank acting under
commitment, however, does not implement the optimal policy as can be seen
from the diﬀerences in the targeting rules (1.23) and (1.24). Although not
general, this finding raises the question under what conditions it is desirable
to assign the central bank a (simple) loss function that departs from the true
social loss function when policymakers can fully commit to future actions.
22This isomorphism requires the assumption that policy is not constrained by the zero
lower bound on the nominal interest rate. With this assumption in place, equation (1.19)
does not influence the central bank’s choices of inflation and the output gap under a given
objective function.
23This statement does not imply that for a given parameterization of the objective func-
tion associated with a targeting regime the central bank’s measured loss according to this
objective function is smaller under discretion than under commitment.
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Ineﬃcient steady state
Theoretical works building on the New Keynesian paradigm often assume sub-
sidies and taxes to eliminate in the steady state the price distortions that stem
from monopolistic competition in the goods market. By contrast, works on
empirical DSGE models — including the seminal contributions of Christiano
et al. (2005) and Smets and Wouters (2007) — tend to abstract from such
subsidies and taxes. The (in-)eﬃciency of the steady state aﬀects the welfare-
ranking of policies through the proper definition of the output gap.
If price subsidies do not fully oﬀset the distortions in the goods market,
the model in equations (1.18)-(1.22) needs adjustment as shown in Benigno
and Woodford (2005). Denoting the welfare-relevant output gap in the model
with steady state distortions by x˜t, the period loss function satisfies
Lt = (σ




(πp,t − ιpπp,t−1)2 (1.27)
and the structural equations are
(πp,t − ιpπp,t−1) = κp(σL + σC)x˜t + βEt(πp,t+1 − ιpπp,t)
+
σL + σC
σL + σC + (Φ− 1)(1 + σL)u
p
t (1.28)
x˜t = Etx˜t+1 − 1
σC






σL + σC + (Φ− 1)(1 + σL)u
p
t (1.30)
with g˜mu,t = σC [Ety˜t+1 − y˜t]. At first glance, it appears that we have merely
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replaced “x∗t” by “x˜t” and rescaled the impact of the cost push shock. However,
the two definitions of the output gap respond diﬀerently to the cost push
shock. Under the definition x∗t ≡ yˆt − yˆ∗t , the target output level yˆ∗t defined in
equation (1.20) does not respond to the cost push shock; all else equal under
the definition x˜t ≡ yˆt − y˜t, the output gap will respond by less to a cost push
shock since the relevant output level y˜t defined in equation (1.30) does move
in the same direction as actual output. Absent steady state distortions, i.e.,
Φ = 1, the two definitions of the output gap coincide. Furthermore, in response
to technology shock, the optimal monetary policy under commitment from the
timeless perspective entails keeping the output gap closed and inflation at its
steady state level irrespective of the degree of steady state distortions. Using
the language of Blanchard and Gali (2007), the “divine coincide” applies for
technology shocks as in the textbook NKM.
Applying this change in the definition of the relevant output gap to the
three targeting frameworks, the second row of panels in Figure 1.2 plots the
results for the case of a distorted steady state with the sales subsidy set equal
to zero. The relative performance of inflation targeting improves both under
commitment and discretion. In particular, inflation targeting surpasses speed
limit and price level targeting already for a moderate degree of price indexation
around ιp = 0.4. While the behavior of the output gap is sensitive to the
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definition of potential output, in the context of the NKM with a distorted
steady state the IT objective can only be optimal when potential output is
defined as y˜t implying the output gap to be given by x˜t. Without this change
in definition, price level and speed limit targeting can be shown to yield results
superior to those under inflation targeting even for the case of commitment
unless the degree of price indexation is very high.
Habit persistence
Habit persistence leads to inertia in the output gap: A household’s utility
function depends on a quasi-diﬀerence in consumption which in turn implies
a quasi-diﬀerence in the output gap in the social loss function . Assuming
consumption habits to be external as in Smets and Wouters (2007), the linear-














and the structural equations


































)− (yˆ∗t − hyˆ∗t−1)] . The
















The degree of habit persistence is measured by the parameter h ∈ [0, 1). The
model with habit persistence features endogenous persistence since the lagged
value of the output gap enters into the NKPC and the aggregate demand curve
which in turn aﬀects the dynamics of inflation.24
When habits are external, the decisions taken by the household members
are not eﬃcient under flexible prices even if a sales subsidy removes the distor-
tions from monopolistic competition in the goods market. To render the steady
state of the model eﬃcient, we introduce a consumption tax; yet, the dynam-
ics remain ineﬃcient. As a result, technology shocks lead to policy trade-oﬀs.
With the term hβ1−hβg
∗
mu,t entering equation (1.32) through the definition of
the marginal cost term, m̂ct, the central bank is unable to perfectly stabi-
lize inflation and the eﬃcient output gap in response to technology shocks.
As discussed in Leith et al. (2012) and Woodford, ed (2003), consumption
habits have to be specified as internal in order for the “divine coincidence” to
24As shown in Amato and Laubach (2004) allowing for habit persistence in consumption
greatly improves the empirical performance of the NKM. Output and inflation show a higher
degree of intrinsic persistence than in the textbook NKM.
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re-emerge.
The final feature of the model with external consumption habits relevant
to our analysis relates to the presence of the lagged output gap term in the
true social loss function (1.31). Abstracting from price indexation, the so-
cial welfare function resembles the objective describing the speed limit target-









p,t for h suﬃciently close to 1; the optimal
speed limit targeting policy under commitment can therefore almost mimic the
optimal monetary policy under commitment from the timeless perspective.
As shown in the third row of panels in Figure 1.2, speed limit targeting
can outperform inflation targeting under commitment for a moderate degree
of habit persistence (h = 0.7) and low inflation inertia due to little or no price
indexation. Overall, under commitment, the diﬀerences between speed limit
policies and inflation targeting are small for any degree of price indexation.
Price level targeting performs relatively poorly under commitment for a high
degree of price indexation as in the previous two model variations.
When policy is conducted under discretion, inflation targeting never out-
performs the other two targeting frameworks for any degree of inflation index-
ation given the degree of habit persistence. Compared to the textbook NKM
the diﬀerences between frameworks are of much larger magnitude. Although
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the advantage of speed limit and price level targeting over inflation targeting
narrows considerably as ιp approaches one for similar reasons as in the text-
book NKM, inflation targeting cannot get as closely to replicate the optimal
monetary policy under commitment when price indexation is complete as in
the textbook NKM without habit persistence; the isomorphism of inflation
targeting (and ιp = 1) with price level targeting (and ιp = 0) under discretion
no longer applies when consumption habits are present.
The micro-founded model with habit persistence and price indexation closely
resembles the linear model in Walsh (2003). Although Walsh (2003) evaluates
the three targeting frameworks assuming that the preferences of society are
given by π2t +λx
2
t rather than the preferences of the representative household,
the qualitative findings for the model with moderate consumption habits and
price indexation resemble those in Walsh (2003) shown in Appendix A.2.6.25
Under discretion, speed limit and price level targeting strictly outperform infla-
tion targeting for moderate degrees of price indexation; when inflation target-
ing dominates (as under commitment or for a high degree of price indexation
under discretion), speed limit targeting tends to deliver better outcomes than
price level targeting.
25Figure A.3 in Appendix A.2.6 shows the results for the exercise in Walsh (2003) Figure




Sticky nominal wages as in Erceg et al. (2000) are the final feature that we
consider in isolation. The New Keynesian Phillips curve for wages, equation
(1.39), presents the key addition. This equation links wage inflation, πw,t, to
the gap between the marginal rate of substitution (between consumption and















while the structural equations are summarized by
(πp,t − ιpπp,t−1) = κpm̂ct + βEt (πp,t+1 − ιpπp,t) + upt (1.37)
m̂ct = ωˆt − ξˆAt (1.38)
(πw,t − ιwπp,t−1) = κw (m̂rst − ωˆt) + βEt (πw,t+1 − ιwπp,t) + uwt (1.39)
























it − Etπt+1 − g∗mu,t
)
. (1.42)
Wage inflation assumes an important role for optimal monetary policy con-
siderations in the model with sticky nominal wages. Typical calibrations end
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up assigning a relatively high weight to wage inflation stabilization relative to
price inflation in the loss function.
In analogy to the textbook NKM with price indexation, when prices and
wages are rigid, the optimal commitment policy seeks to undo over time most
of the deviations of the price level and the (aggregate) nominal wage from their
respective long-run trend paths induced by shocks. The exception is the case
of full indexation of prices and wages to past inflation for which all deviations
of prices and wages from their long-run trend are permanent. For given degrees
of indexation, the speed with which the policymaker attempts to realign prices
and wages with their respective trends depends on the rigidities of wages. The
more rigid nominal wages are, the slower this speed; price inflation induces
flexibility in real wages while reducing the need for wage inflation and welfare-
costly dispersion in the nominal wages across households. On the flip side, by
being less hawkish on inflation, the output gap turns less volatile.
With these features of the optimal commitment policy in mind, we return
to Figure 1.2. The fourth row of the figure shows that the IT framework out-
performs the other frameworks, when the policymaker can commit. By setting
the weight on the output gap suﬃciently high in the IT objective function, the
optimal IT framework under commitment implements a policy close to the
optimal commitment policy despite the diﬀerences in the objective functions,
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equation (1.7) versus (1.36). Overall, the welfare diﬀerences are small across
targeting frameworks when the central bank implements its objective under
commitment.
When the optimal targeting frameworks are implemented under discre-
tion, the IT framework performs poorly relative to the SLT and the PLT
frameworks. In contrast to the models with flexible wages, raising the degree
of price inflation widens the performance gap between the frameworks. For
given degree of wage inflation indexation, with ιw = 0 in Figure 1.2, a higher
degree in price indexation suggests more persistent deviations of inflation from
target to be optimal. Yet, these persistent deviations ought to be reversed in
the future to a large extent in order to realign prices and wages with their
long-run paths. The optimal IT framework can deliver on the first part, but
fails along the second dimension. The optimal SLT framework and in par-
ticular the optimal PLT framework implement both aspects of the optimal
commitment policy as discussed previously.
Under flexible wages, the optimal commitment policy does not reverse any
deviations of the price level from its long-run trend when prices are fully in-
dexed, leaving an opening to the optimal IT framework to be nearly optimal
under discretion. In the presence of sticky wages, allowing all changes in the
price level to be permanent is optimal only when both prices and wages are
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fully indexed to past inflation. Finally, if we keep the degree of price index-
ation fixed and vary the degree of wage indexation, a higher degree of wage
indexation is associated with a small improvement of the relative performance
under the optimal IT framework. Yet, the performance gap between the op-
timal IT framework and the other two frameworks remains of a similar order
of magnitude.
1.4 Empirical models of the business cycle
Our discussion suggests, that the ordering of the targeting frameworks depends
most importantly on the degree of commitment of the policymaker for future
policy actions. To further support of this conclusion, we move to evaluate the
frameworks in the empirical DSGE model of Smets and Wouters (2007) (SW
model). This model features additional frictions and shocks and highlights
the rich quantitative interaction of the various building blocs: sticky nominal
prices and wages both with partial indexation to past inflation, physical cap-
ital and investment with capital utilization and investment adjustment costs,
habit persistence in consumption, a variable elasticity of substitution between
intermediate goods as in Kimball (1995) (and the same for labour types), a
distorted steady state, and shocks to technology, the risk premium, govern-
ment spending, investment, price and wage markups, and monetary policy.
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Appendix A.3 provides the details on the SW model including the parameter
estimates (posterior mode).
As before, we compare the welfare implications under the optimal IT, SLT
and PLT framework both under commitment and discretion. In addition, we
also report results for the NIT and the NIT-II frameworks described in equa-
tions (1.7)-(1.11) that were included in Walsh (2003). We start our analysis by
fixing the parameters in the SW model at their posterior mode before explor-
ing parameterizations that are drawn from (an approximation to) the posterior
distribution.
The model in A.3 is estimated using U.S. data. To assess robustness of our
results we estimated the SW model using euro area data. Finally, we discuss
the relevance of distinguishing between wage markup shocks and labor supply
shocks, an issue raised by Chari et al. (2009).
1.4.1 Targeting frameworks in the SW model
Figure 1.3 is the counterpart to Figure 1.2 for the SW model. As before, we
vary the degrees of price (and wage) indexation. The posterior mode of the
indexation parameter ιp (and ιw) is represented by the vertical line in each
panel.
The top row of panels in Figure 1.3 shows how the degree of price indexation
impacts the relative ordering of the five targeting regimes in the SW model.
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The results nicely relate to our earlier findings. With consumption habits at
0.71 and sticky nominal wages in the SW model, the SLT framework is a close
second to the IT framework when the policymaker acts under commitment.
With placing too much importance on price stability and disregarding the need
to smooth the evolution of the output gap, the PLT framework comes in third.
The overall magnitude of the welfare diﬀerences is significantly larger in the
SW model reflecting the presence of additional model features and shocks as
we will discuss in the next section. As generally the case, the two remaining
frameworks NIT and NIT-II are strictly outperformed by the SLT and the
PLT framework. Including the change in the nominal income at the expense
of other variables is a bad idea: to avoid too much weight on inflation (NIT)
or on the output gap (NIT-II), the weight on πt + yˆt − yˆt−1 tends to be very
large without leaving room to distinguish between real and nominal changes
in economic activity.
Under discretion, the SLT framework strictly outperforms both the IT and
the PLT framework owing to the relatively strong presence of consumption
habits irrespective of the degree of price indexation: While the optimal com-
mitment policy oﬀsets changes in prices and wages relative to their long run
trends in the SW model over time, it also induces smooth changes in the out-
put gap — a feature of the optimal commitment policy best captured under
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the SLT objective. As in the textbook NKM with sticky wages the lead of
the optimal SLT framework over the IT framework is larger when the degree
of price indexation is higher. The need for substantial inertia in monetary
policy is also reflected in the much better performance of the NIT and NIT-II
frameworks relative to the IT framework under discretion.
Removing the steady state distortions due to monopolistic competition in
the goods and labor market through properly sized subsidies does not alter our
findings although the relative performance of the IT framework improves under
discretion as in the textbook NKM. Varying the degree of wage indexation
away from its posterior mode of ιw = 0.59 while keeping the degree of price
indexation at its posterior mode of ιp = 0.22, reveals that a lower degree
of wage indexation goes along with relatively poorer performance of the IT
framework under discretion. Under commitment, changing the degree of wage
indexation impacts the relative performance of frameworks in a manner similar
to changes in price indexation.
1.4.2 Deconstructing the results
There are many ways of expanding the textbook NKM to the SW model by
introducing one new feature at the time. For the case of discretion, Figure
1.4 plots the CEV values for each framework relative to the IT framework for
varying degrees of price indexation for one such sequence. Starting from the
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textbook NKM using the parameters of the SW model where applicable, we
introduce the following changes as we move from one panel to the next: (1),
an ineﬃcient steady state by removing sales subsidies for intermediate goods;
(2), government spending, physical capital and investment, including capital
utilization and investment adjustment costs; (3), sticky wages (with a wage
subsidy to oﬀset distortions in the labor market and no wage markup shock);
(4), a wage markup shock; (5), remove the wage subsidy; (6), habit persistence;
(7), raise the degree of nominal rigidities measured by the probabilities of not
adjusting price or wages optimally from ξp = 0.65 and ξw = 0.73 to ξp = 0.85
and ξw = 0.88, respectively, in order to match the slopes of the Phillips curves
between a model with and without a variable elasticity of substitution (Kimball
aggregator); (8), a variable elasticity of substitution as in Kimball (1995).
The figure confirms the findings of Section 1.3: Sticky wages and habit per-
sistence alter the magnitude of the welfare diﬀerences between the IT frame-
work and the remaining ones and possibly their ranking. A variable elasticity
of substitution as in Kimball (1995) is the only other feature of quantitative
importance, albeit this is in part due to the implied higher degree of nominal
rigidities as one moves from a model with a constant elasticity of substitution
to a model with a variable elasticity while keeping ξp and ξw.26 We obtain the
26To arrive at this assessment, we compare the last row of panels in each figure. Moving
from the leftmost panel (constant elasticity of substitution and ξp = 0.65 and ξw = 0.73)
54
same conclusions for the case of commitment (not shown).
1.4.3 Robustness to alternative parameterizations
Thus far, we have abstracted from the fact that the estimation in Smets and
Wouters (2007) delivers more than a single parameterization of the SW model.
To explore the sensitivity of our findings to alternative parameter choices we
obtain 30000 draws from the Laplace approximation to the posterior distribu-
tion in Smets and Wouters (2007) and
1. compute the optimal IT, SLT, and PLT framework for each parameter
draw,
2. compare welfare for each parameter draw when the IT, SLT, and PLT
frameworks are parameterized as is optimal (under commitment and
discretion) under the posterior mode.
The NIT and NIT-II framework are excluded from this part of our analysis as
they were always outperformed.
The first experiment confirms that the ordering of targeting frameworks
is robust to other empirically plausible parameterizations of the SW model.
to the rightmost one (variable elasticity of substitution and ξp = 0.65 and ξw = 0.73)
directly, the welfare diﬀerences double in the commitment case and more than triple in the
discretion case. Considering the intermediate step of the middle panel (constant elasticity
of substitution and ξp = 0.85 and ξw = 0.88) reveals that some of the changes could also be
obtained by simply raising the degree of nominal rigidities.
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Figure 1.5 plots the distribution of welfare losses relative to the optimal com-
mitment policy (expressed in CEV in %) for each targeting framework and
draw of parameters. Under commitment, the distribution of welfare losses is
similar across targeting frameworks, although the losses tend to be smaller
under the IT framework. The median loss under the IT framework is -0.0290,
whereas it reaches -0.0540 under the PLT framework and -0.0456 under the
SLT framework. Large losses are rare for all frameworks and for 95% of the
parameter draws the losses are smaller than -0.16 for all three frameworks.
Since Figure 1.5 does not enable a comparison of the frameworks for each
individual draw, we provide additional information in Table 1.1. Panel (a)
reports the frequency with which each of the frameworks performs better than
the remaining two. The optimal IT framework emerges as the winner for 97%
of the parameter draws. However, given the similarity of the distributions of
welfare losses in Figure 1.5 one might suspect that the lead of the IT frame-
work over the PLT and the SLT framework is small. Panel (b) of Table 1.1 is
designed to shed light on this issue: For each draw of parameters we compute
the welfare diﬀerence between a given targeting framework and the best per-
forming framework of the remaining two and report percentiles in increasing
order. Since the IT framework almost always performs best, the diﬀerences
reported in columns 3 and 4 basically coincide with the diﬀerences between
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the PLT and IT framework and between the SLT and the IT framework, re-
spectively. Only for 5% of the parameter draws does the diﬀerence between
the PLT and the IT framework exceed -0.0493; for the SLT framework the
value is -0.0280. For the IT framework, the lead over the next best targeting
framework is smaller than 0.0280 for about 95% of the draws. Comparing the
values at the nth percentile for column 2 (IT) and the (100 − n)th percentile
for column 4 (SLT) reveals that the SLT framework must be the second-best
performing framework most of the time.
Under discretion, the three targeting frameworks look much less alike than
under commitment. The distribution of welfare losses relative to the optimal
commitment policy is noticeably more disperse for the PLT and, in particular,
for the IT framework. By contrast, the distribution under the SLT framework
is more concentrated, an observation leading us to speculate whether SLT
framework under discretion may deliver better welfare outcomes than oper-
ating (1) the SLT framework under commitment, and (2) the IT framework
under commitment. The first claim is true for any parameterization we consid-
ered; the second claim is true for more than 50% of the parameter draws and
in particular it is true when the parameters in the SW model are fixed at their
posterior mode. Both these findings are in line with our discussion in Section
1.3. Table 1.1 Panel (a) further reveals the superiority of the SLT framework
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under discretion as it is found to perform better than the IT and PLT frame-
work for most parameter draws. As shown in Panel (b), the lead of the SLT
framework over the IT framework can be sizeable (column 5). Although the
PLT framework performs consistently better than the IT framework, it rarely
performs best (column 6).
The final row of Figure 1.6 plots the cumulative distributions of the optimal
weights on the activity measure. For each framework, under commitment
the optimal weights tend to be larger and the distribution of weights is more
disperse. For example, the median weight under the SLT framework is λSLP =
11.86 for commitment, but only λSLP = 3.39 for discretion making the central
bank appear more “conservative” under discretion in line with Rogoﬀ (1985)
and Clarida et al. (1999).
The robust performance of the SLT framework across commitment and
discretion not only applies to a wide range of empirically plausible parame-
terizations of the SW model. In our second experiment, it appears that the
performance of the SLT framework is also less sensitive to the exact choice
of the weight on the activity measure: (1) We fix the weight on the activity
measure for each targeting framework at the value found to be optimal (un-
der commitment and discretion respectively) when the parameters in the SW
model are fixed at their posterior mode and compute the welfare losses rela-
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tive to the optimal commitment policy for each of the 30000 parameter draws.
(2) We fix the weight on the activity measure for each targeting framework
at the value found to be optimal under commitment (discretion) when the
parameters in the SW model are fixed at their posterior mode and compute
the welfare losses relative to the optimal commitment policy for each of the
30000 parameter draws, but solve the model under the assumption that the
policymaker acts under discretion (commitment). Subsequently, we refer to
(1) as the “fixed weight” case and to (2) as the “exchanged fixed weight” case.
In the “fixed weight” case, the SLT framework performs best for 16.5%
of the parameter draws under commitment — up from 2.7% in the first ex-
periment — and it maintains its superior performance under discretion by
outperforming the other regimes for 98% of the draws, see Table 1.1. To fur-
ther investigate robustness Figure 1.7 plots the distribution of welfare losses
under the “fixed weight case” relative to the “optimal weight case.” Welfare
losses that are due to not using the optimal weights are small under commit-
ment across regimes, but are often sizeable under discretion for both the PLT
and, in particular, the IT framework.
The “exchanged fixed weight” case, tests the sensitivity of the targeting
framework to both parameter uncertainty and uncertainty about the conduct
of policy. Again, the SLT framework turns out to be remarkably robust. As
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shown in Table 1.1, when policy is conducted under commitment, but uses
the weights found to be optimal under discretion under the posterior mode
parameterization of the SW model, the SLT framework performs best for 99%
of the parameter draws. Under discretion, the SLT framework performs best
for 98% of the draws. Figure 1.8 also plots the distribution of welfare losses
under the “exchanged weight case” relative to the “optimal weight case.” The
sensitivity of the IT framework to “getting the weight right” is evidenced by
large welfare losses which exceed 1% (measured as CEV) for more than 50%
of the parameter draws. Under the SLT framework such large losses are never
observed.
The SLT framework emerges as the most desirable setting in our analysis
of the SW model. Across parameterizations, the optimal SLT framework con-
sistently outperforms the IT and the PLT framework under discretion; under
commitment the SLT framework is a very close second to the IT framework;
the optimal SLT framework implemented under discretion delivers higher so-
cial welfare than the optimal IT under commitment. Finally, the performance
of SLT framework is much less sensitive to the exact parameterization of the
objective function.
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1.4.4 Additional robustness checks
Robustness to alternative data
The model in A.3 is estimated using U.S. data. Figure 1.9 compares the
targeting frameworks when SW model is estimated using data for the euro
area.27
Qualitatively, the results for the euro area are similar to those derived from
U.S. data. From a quantitative perspective, the case for the SLT framework
is even stronger as its lead over the IT framework rises from 0.3% to 0.6% of
steady state consumption under discretion without trailing the IT framework
by too much under commitment.
Shocks to labor supply and wage markups
Chari et al. (2009) point to an identification problem in the SW model that
preference shocks shifting the marginal disutility of labor cannot be easily
distinguished from wage markup shocks. Gal et al. (2011) and Justiniano et
al. (2013) impose assumptions to overcome this identification problem.28 In
27 Smets and Wouters (2005) estimate a DSGE model for the euro area, but the details
of the model diﬀer from those in A.3. To maintain comparability of results, we opted to
estimate A.3 using data for the euro area. Following Smets and Wouters (2005), all data
series are taken from the Area Wide Model database (see Fagan et al. (2005)). Consumption,
investment, GDP, hours and wage are expressed in 100 times the log. Inflation is the first
diﬀerence of the log GDP deflator. The interest rate is the short-term interest as shown in
AWM database. As stated in Smets and Wouters (2005), total employment data is used as
hours worked due to the absence of hours worked data for the euro area.
28Gal et al. (2011) obtain identification by embeding a theory of unemployment and
including data on unemployment in the estimation. Justiniano et al. (2013) do not exploit
the connection between unemployment and wage markups and assume instead a particular
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both papers, the importance role of wage markup shocks is reduced, but wage
markup shocks continue to play an important role in Gal et al. (2011). Given
the diﬀerent welfare implications of the ineﬃcient wage markup shocks —
creating a monetary policy trade oﬀ— and the eﬃcient labor supply shocks the
relative importance of these two shocks may influence the ranking of targeting
rules.
Figure 1.10 provides a preliminary understanding of the importance of the
issues raised in Chari et al. (2009) for the ranking of targeting frameworks. We
compute the welfare diﬀerences between targeting frameworks by changing the
relative importance of wage markup and labor supply shocks. Following Gal
et al. (2011) and Justiniano et al. (2013), we model the labor supply shock as
a shock to the marginal disutility of labor. The labor supply shock is specified
to match the unconditional variance of the wage markup shock and to induce
responses of magnitudes similar to those induced by the wage markup shock.
The weight on the labor supply shock (between 0 and 1) governs the relative
importance of the two shocks.
Both for the commitment and the discretion case, the ranking of targeting
frameworks is independent of the relative importance of wage markup and
labor supply shocks with the exception of the NIT and the NIT-II framework
stochastic structure for the latter (white noise).
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for the case of discretion and high importance of the labor supply shock.
However, as the importance of the ineﬃcient wage markup shock is reduced
the welfare diﬀerences between targeting frameworks shrink by construction.
Monetary policy can mostly oﬀset the welfare consequences of the labor supply
shock; when wage markup shocks are absent from the model, price markup
shocks are the only remaining source of ineﬃcient fluctuations.
As long as one believes for wage markup shocks to play some role in driv-
ing business cycle fluctuation as in Gal et al. (2011), the SLT framework un-
der discretion strongly outperforms the other frameworks under discretion (as
well as the IT framework under commitment). But even for the assessment
in Justiniano et al. (2013), which assigns little importance to wage markup
shocks, the SLT framework performs well. Absent certainty about the true
data-generating process, adopting the SLT framework may turn out to be a
dominant strategy.
1.5 Conclusion
The debate on targeting frameworks has almost exclusively focused on the
diﬀerences between inflation and price level targeting. In models that follow
the New Keynesian (NK) paradigm, the optimal policy under commitment
from the timeless perspective recommends to undo earlier changes of price
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and wage inflation from their long-run targets over time to realign prices and
wages with their long-run trends. Given this insight, price level targeting
appears to be a natural contender to inflation targeting when policymakers
act under discretion.
However, we argue that speed limit targeting is a superior alternative to
both the inflation targeting and the price level targeting framework. The ob-
jective function underlying the SLT frameworks with its long-run commitment
to stable inflation and its short-run focus on inflation and smooth changes in
the output gap leads consistently to better outcomes than the other frame-
works when policymakers act under discretion. When policymakers act under
commitment, the diﬀerences between the three targeting frameworks are neg-
ligible. We show the relative superiority of the SLT framework in a sequence
of simple NK models that allow for inflation indexation, habit persistence,
and sticky wages and in the model of Smets and Wouters (2007) for a range
of parameterizations drawn from the posterior distribution of estimated SW
model.
Table 1.1: Policy Performance under Parameter Uncertainty
a: Frequency of being the best framework “optimal weights case”
IT PLT SLP
Commitment 0.9723 0.0004 0.0273
Discretion 0.0000 0.0167 0.9833
b: Frequency of being the best framework “fixed weights case”
IT PLT SLP
Commitment 0.8281 0.0073 0.1646
Discretion 0.0000 0.0168 0.9832
c: Frequency of being the best framework “exchanged weights case”
IT PLT SLP
Commitment 0.0036 0.0056 0.9908
Discretion 0.0000 0.0162 0.9838
d: Percentiles of CEV diﬀerences
Commitment Discretion
Quantile IT PLT SLP IT PLT SLP
5% 0.0022 -0.0493 -0.0280 -0.7717 -0.2169 0.0114
10% 0.0055 -0.0413 -0.0244 -0.6086 -0.1621 0.0193
15% 0.0081 -0.0368 -0.0222 -0.5291 -0.1350 0.0258
20% 0.0098 -0.0338 -0.0207 -0.4772 -0.1172 0.0310
25% 0.0110 -0.0316 -0.0194 -0.4349 -0.1035 0.0362
30% 0.0119 -0.0297 -0.0184 -0.4013 -0.0927 0.0409
35% 0.0128 -0.0280 -0.0174 -0.3728 -0.0837 0.0458
40% 0.0135 -0.0264 -0.0166 -0.3475 -0.0757 0.0510
45% 0.0142 -0.0250 -0.0158 -0.3253 -0.0685 0.0565
50% 0.0150 -0.0237 -0.0150 -0.3053 -0.0624 0.0624
55% 0.0158 -0.0226 -0.0143 -0.2856 -0.0565 0.0685
60% 0.0165 -0.0213 -0.0136 -0.2674 -0.0510 0.0757
65% 0.0174 -0.0202 -0.0128 -0.2483 -0.0458 0.0837
70% 0.0183 -0.0191 -0.0120 -0.2294 -0.0409 0.0927
75% 0.0193 -0.0178 -0.0110 -0.2105 -0.0362 0.1035
80% 0.0206 -0.0165 -0.0099 -0.1910 -0.0310 0.1172
85% 0.0222 -0.0149 -0.0082 -0.1675 -0.0258 0.1350
90% 0.0243 -0.0130 -0.0056 -0.1388 -0.0193 0.1621
95% 0.0279 -0.0094 -0.0023 -0.0970 -0.0114 0.2169
Note: Table (1.1) show the results for welfare loss under both commitment and discretion
for IT PLT SLP by allowing for parameter uncertainty. Panel (a) displays the frequency
for each regime being the best. for instance, frequency of IT under commitment being
the best is defines as
N(IT−best))
N
, where N(IT−best) refers to number of draws where
CEV−IT−commitment > max(CEV−PLT−commitment, CEV−SLP−commitment). N
indicates total number of draws. Panel (b) further present the quantile for the
CEV diﬀerence to see how superior or inferior one regime can be. For instance,
to see the performance of IT relative to PLT and SLP under commitment, col-
umn 2 of panel (b) presents the quantile for the variable (CEV−IT−commitment −
max(CEV−PLT−commitment, CEV−SLP−commitment)). same logic applies to other
part of the table.
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Figure 1.1: Targeting frameworks in the textbook New Keynesian Model
weight on output gap x
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Note: Performance of targeting frameworks in the textbook New Keynesian Model under
commitment and discretion. The figure plots the welfare loss against the optimal policy
under commitment form a timeless perspective for each targeting framework under diﬀerent
values for λx. The only source of fluctuations is an ARMA(1,1) cost push shock and welfare
is measured in terms of consumption equivalence variation. The weight λx for which the
welfare loss is minimised is indicated by“∗” under PLT, “◦” under SLP, and “⋄” under IT.
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Figure 1.2: Welfare evaluation of targeting frameworks in extensions of the
textbook NKM
price indexation p


































































































Note: Welfare evaluation of PLT and SLP against IT in the baseline NKM with varying
degree of price indexation ιp under commitment and discretion. The only source of fluctu-
ations is an ARMA(1,1) cost push shock and welfare is measured in terms of consumption
equivalence variation. The top row depicts the results in the textbook NKM with an eﬃ-
cient steady state and price indexation. Each of the following rows diﬀers from the textbook
NKM by a single feature: distorted steady state (second row), external habits (third row),
and sticky wages (last row).
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Figure 1.3: Welfare evaluation of targeting frameworks in the model of Smets
and Wouters (2007)
price indexation p







































0 SW-model/Efficient Steady State
price indexation p













40 SW-model/Efficient Steady State
wage indexation w
























SW posterior mode: p = 0.22
SW posterior mode: p = 0.22
SW posterior mode: p = 0.22
SW posterior mode: p = 0.22
SW posterior mode: w = 0.59
SW posterior mode: w = 0.59
Note: Welfare evaluation of PLT, SLP, NIT, and NIT-II against IT in the SW model under
commitment and discretion. Parameters estimated in Smets and Wouters (2007) are set
at the mode of the posterior distribution. Welfare is measured in terms of consumption
equivalence variation. In the first two rows of panels the degree of price indexation is
varied. The second row deviates from Smets and Wouters (2007) by correcting steady state
ineﬃciencies through taxes and subsidies. The third row considers variations in the degree
of wage indexation. The degree of indexation at the posterior mode in SW is indicated
where ιp = 0.22 for prices and ιw = 0.59 for wages, respectively.
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Figure 1.4: Understanding the welfare rankings in the SW model under dis-
cretion: introducing frictions sequentially
price index p
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60 Kimball (Full SW)
Note: Welfare evaluation of PLT, SLP, NIT, and NIT-II against IT in the SW model under
discretion. From top left to bottom right the textbook NKM with an eﬃcient steady state is
augmented step-by-step to the SW model. The sequencing is as follows. Goods subsidies are
removed to render the steady state ineﬃcient, capital and government spending are added
in top right panel. In the second row, sticky wages with a wage subsidy are introduced, a
wage markup shock is added, and finally, the wage subsidy is removed. In the final row,
external habits are modelled, the nominal rigidities are increased to obtain the same slopes
in the price and wage inflation New Keynesian Phillips as in Smets and Wouters (2007). By
introducing the Kimball1995 aggregator in the bottom right panel, the model SW model is
obtained.
69
Figure 1.5: Welfare evaluation of targeting frameworks in SW2007 model under
Parameter Uncertainty: optimal CEV
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Note: The figure displays how optimal CEV for each targeting regime response to param-
eter uncertainty. Upper panel plots the simulated density function (PDF) of IT under
commitment and discretion; Middle panel plots the simulated density function (PDF) of
PLT under commitment and discretion; Lower panel plots the simulated density function
(PDF) of SLP under commitment and discretion. x-axis indicates the optimized CEV,
which is a negative number. y-axis captures density (PDF). The uncertainty parameters
explored here are 36 parameters that had been initially estimated in SW model, includ-
ing both shocks process and structure parameters. Based on Laplace approximation, those
parameters can be simulated from multi-normal distribution with mean at SW posterior
mode and variance-covariance being SW inverse hessian matrix, which have been proved to
be valid approximation to the underlying posterior distribution as long as the simulation is
suﬃcient rich. For each regime, it has roughly more than 18000 eﬀective draws. To facil-
itate comparison, we highlight 5% ,50% (median), and 95% levels with dash vertical line.
Solid vertical line refers to the optimized CEV at SW posterior mode. By simulating from
multi-normal distribution, the median of optimized CEV almost mimic those evaluated at
posterior mode as shown in figure.
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Figure 1.6: Welfare evaluation of targeting frameworks under parameter un-
certainty: optimal targeting weight
optimized weight
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Note: The figure plots the distribution of the optimized weight λx for three targeting regimes
(IT, PLT, and SLP) under commitment and discretion when the parameters in the SW
model are drawn from the Laplace approximation to the posterior distribution in Smets and
Wouters (2007). We simulate 30000 draws. The top row shows the results under commit-
ment, the middle one under discretion. The bottom row of panels depicts the cumulative
distribution function under discretion and commitment for each framework in a single panel.
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Figure 1.7: Welfare evaluation of targeting frameworks in SW2007 model under
Parameter Uncertainty: fixing optimized weight
CEV difference









































Note: Figure (1.7) displays the welfare evaluation of targeting frameworks under parameter
uncertainty, by fixing targeting weights at optimized level with parameterization at posterior
mode. The performance is assessed by looking at the diﬀerence between welfare loss if
reoptimize for every model parameterization with welfare loss if not reoptimize but fix
targeting weight at optimal level obtain with model parameters being at posterior mode.
Upper panel plots the simulated cumulative distribution function (CDF) of IT PLT SLP
under commitment; bottom panel plots the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of IT
PLT SLP under commitment.
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Figure 1.8: Welfare evaluation of targeting frameworks in SW2007 under Pa-
rameter Uncertainty: exchange discretion and commitment
CEV difference









































Note: Figure (1.8) displays the welfare evaluation of targeting frameworks under parameter
uncertainty, by fixing targeting weights at optimized level with parameterization at posterior
mode and exchange the weight for commitment and discretion. The performance is assessed
by looking at the diﬀerence between welfare loss if reoptimize for every model parameteriza-
tion with welfare loss if not reoptimize but fix targeting weight and exchange discretion for
commitment and commitment for discretion, at optimal level obtain with model parameters
being at posterior mode. Upper panel plots the simulated cumulative distribution function
(CDF) of IT PLT SLP under commitment; bottom panel plots the cumulative distribution
function (CDF) of IT PLT SLP under commitment.
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Figure 1.9: Welfare evaluation of targeting frameworks under estimation with
Euro area data
price index p


























































posterior mode: w=0.374 posterior mode: w=0.374
posterior mode: p=0.128
Note: Welfare evaluation of PLT, SLP, NIT, and NIT-II against IT in the SW model
estimated with euro area data (1976Q4 to 2008Q3) under commitment and discretion. In
the first row of panels the degree of price indexation is varied. The second row considers
variations in the degree of wage indexation. The degree of indexation at the posterior mode
in SW is indicated where ιp = 0.128 for prices and ιw = 0.374 for wages, respectively.
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Figure 1.10: Welfare evaluation of targeting framework: labor supply shock
weight on labor supply shock
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SW/AR labor supply shock
Note: Figure (1.10) displays welfare evaluation of targeting frameworks by considering labor
supply shock in addition to wage markup shock. The relative importance of labor supply
shock and wage markup shock is controlled by weight parameter as indicated in x-axis,
where 0 refers to only wage markup shock and 1 corresponds to only labor supply shock.
Welfare losses for PLT, SLP, NIT, and NIT-II are expressed as the absolute deviation from
IT, as shown in y-axis. Upper panel shows the case under ARMA(1,1) wage markup shock
and ARMA(1,1) labor supply shock. Lower panel shows the case under ARMA(1,1) wage






Macroeconomic models intended to capture the cyclical properties of employ-
ment and wages often feature either nominal wage rigidities or search and
matching frictions in the labor market. We study optimal monetary policy
when policymakers view both approaches as providing a reasonable fit to the
data.
The empirical New Keynesian (NK) literature has largely relied on the idea
of nominal wage rigidities to construct models with labor market dynamics
that are in line with stylized facts of the business cycle while setting the
individual labor supply elasticity at realistic values. Fine illustrations of this
approach are Smets and Wouters (2007) and Christiano et al. (2005). Models
with search and matching frictions in the labor market as in Diamond (1982),
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Mortensen (1982), and Pissarides (1985), by contrast, assume nominal wages
to be flexible. A worker’s (real) wage is not determined in an anonymous
market, but it is the result of a bargaining game between a worker and a firm.
Although common in macroeconomics, search and matching frictions are rarely
embedded in monetary models of the business cycle. Notable exceptions are
Krause and Lubik (2007) and Ravenna and Walsh (2008).1
In recent work, Christiano et al. (2013) find that a NK model with search
and matching frictions fits the macro data just as well as a NK model with
sticky nominal wages when monetary policy follows an estimated interest rate
rule.2 We consider this finding to be potentially troubling news as the two mod-
els have conflicting normative implications for monetary policy. It is known
that the optimal monetary policy places high weight on stabilizing wage in-
flation at the expense of price inflation when nominal wages are sticky, but
it places high weight on price inflation when nominal wages are flexible and
search and matching frictions prevail in the labor market.3 This tension sets
1Gertler et al. (2008), and Gertler and Trigari (2009) merge the two strands of literature
by replacing the assumption of period-by-period wage bargaining in favour of staggered
multi-period wage contracts.
2This interpretation of the findings in Christiano et al. (2013) is not necessarily shared by
the authors of that study. They stress in the abstract that under on their adopted statistical
decision criterion “Our model outperforms a variant of the standard New Keynesian Calvo
sticky wage model.” Yet, in a probabilistic sense, the evidence presented by the authors
would not lead one to believe that one of the models is correct with certainty.
3For optimal monetary policy analysis in a model with sticky nominal wages similar to
ours see Erceg et al. (2000); for the case of search and matching frictions Ravenna and
Walsh (2011) is the closest reference.
the stage for our study of robust monetary policy with multiple reference mod-
els. We show that unless the NK model with sticky wages can be ruled out with
near certainty, monetary policy should be less concerned with price inflation
and instead stabilize the relevant wage dynamics.
Our version of the NK model with search and matching frictions in the
labor market builds on Faia (2009) and Ravenna and Walsh (2011). As in
their work, wholesale firms post vacancies and workers search for jobs. When
a firm and a worker are matched, they Nash bargain over the terms of em-
ployment and production of wholesale output occurs. Retail firms diﬀerentiate
wholesale output and set prices for varieties using staggered contracts as in
Calvo (1983). However, similar to Sveen and Weinke (2009), we assume that
the labor supply of an employed worker is elastic and individual hours worked
are determined during the bargaining process along with the real wage. The
reasons for this departure are twofold. First, this assumption facilitates com-
parability with standard sticky wage models which feature an elastic labor
supply at the individual level; for certain parameter choices the two models
nest each other. Second, our approach models explicitly the opportunity costs
of employment, a key element in improving the model’s fit of the empirical
patterns of unemployment and vacancies.4 Our NK model with sticky nom-
4Shimer (2005) argues that search and matching models cannot generate labor market
movements that are in line with the empirical evidence for plausible parameter choices.
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inal wages builds on Erceg et al. (2000) with minor modifications. Labor is
diﬀerentiated and households set wages for each labor variety in a staggered
fashion. Sticky prices are modelled as in the search and matching model.
To ensure that the two models generate dynamics in line with selected em-
pirical evidence, we employ an impulse response function matching estimator.
In particular, we estimate the coeﬃcients of the interest rate rule adopted by
the monetary policymaker. For each model we compute the optimal mone-
tary policy under commitment from the timeless perspective in response to
technology and price markup shocks — a task not undertaken in Christiano
et al. (2013).5 Following the vast literature on optimal monetary policy, the
policymaker’s preferences coincide with those of the representative household
in the model. In the model with search and matching frictions price inflation is
kept under tight control while nominal wages display large movements under
the optimal policy.6 Although the search and matching process is not eﬃcient
in our setting, monetary policy cannot correct the underlying distortions in
Numerous authors have tackled this criticism: Hall (2005) and Shimer (2005) propose real
wage rigidities; Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) argue in favor of high opportunity costs of
employment; Hall and Milgrom (2008) suggest departures from Nash bargaining over wages.
Yashiv (2007) provides a comprehensive summary of the debate and a broader assessment
of the search and matching framework. Our approach keys oﬀ the ideas in Hagedorn and
Manovskii (2008), but we model the opportunity costs of employment explicitly and allow
for variation over the business cycle.
5See Woodford (1999) for a discussion of “optimality from the timeless perspective.”
6Apparently, the labor market variables behave rather diﬀerently under the estimated
interest rate rule than socially desirable. This contrast is not restricted to real and nominal
wages, but includes unemployment and vacancy postings.
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the labor market. Thus, the optimal monetary policy focuses on addressing
the dynamic distortions associated with sticky prices in the product market.
Low inflation reduces the diﬀerences in relative prices across varieties and the
associated ineﬃcient shifts in relative demand. The degree of inflation sta-
bilization is only constrained by the possible trade-oﬀ between inflation and
resource utilization (as measured by output gaps). By contrast, in the NK
model with sticky nominal wages, the optimal policy needs to strike a bal-
ance between price and wage inflation. Similar to the product market, wage
inflation distorts relative real wages and labor demand in the labor market;
price inflation supports the adjustment of real wages under staggered nominal
wages. The near complete stabilization of wages reflects the high welfare costs
associated with even minor relative wage diﬀerences in empirical sticky wage
models.
We then investigate how each model economy would fare if it is exposed
to the optimal policy associated with the other model. To conduct this exper-
iment, we employ the concept of optimal targeting rules discussed in depth in
Giannoni and Woodford (2016). The optimal targeting rule specifies the vari-
ables — including the relative importance and the dynamic structure of each
variable — in a single target criterion that seeks to implement the optimal
monetary policy. In other words, the optimal targeting rule is a commitment
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to a certain relationship between the model variables. If the optimal targeting
rule for the NK model with sticky nominal wages is implemented in the model
with search and matching frictions, monetary policy restricts wage inflation
drastically at the expense of more volatile price inflation; the dynamics of
all endogenous variables in the search and matching model are far from the
dynamics under the optimal policy. Similar results obtain when the optimal
targeting rule of the search and matching model is imposed in the sticky wage
model: price inflation in the sticky wage model becomes more stable than
under the optimal policy and wage inflation features much larger movements
than optimal.
Apparently, a targeting rule that is optimal in one model can be far from
being optimal in the other model as indicated by welfare losses that are or-
ders of magnitudes larger than the welfare costs of business cycles in Lucas
(2003). The lack of robustness of the optimal targeting rules is not necessarily
symmetric though. The optimal targeting rule derived form the search and
matching model induces welfare losses in the sticky wage model that are ten
times larger than in the opposite case. A policymaker who knows with ab-
solute certainty which of the two models constitutes the true data-generating
process would never choose the optimal targeting rule derived from the wrong
model.
81
However, a policymaker may not have a unique approximating model in
mind. In fact, our empirical approach is constructed in a way that does not
allow to resolve model uncertainty via standard model selection exercises prior
to the evaluation of monetary policy, but model uncertainty is a component of
that evaluation along the lines argued in Brock et al. (2007). We analyze mon-
etary policy when the policymaker acknowledges multiple models and pursues
either a Bayesian or a minmax strategy to assess the optimality of a policy.
In this part of the analysis, we restrict attention to simple interest rate rules
to keep the policymaker’s problem of finding the optimal parameterization of
the rule manageable.7
Under a Bayesian strategy, the policymaker searches for an instrument
rule that minimizes the expected loss for a given probability distribution over
the relevant reference models. In some sense, the policymaker’s model is a
weighted average across the reference models. Unless the policymaker is very
certain about the search and matching model being the correct data-generating
process, the optimal interest rate rule resembles the optimal targeting rule de-
rived in the sticky nominal wage model. In other words, the optimal targeting
rule derived from the search and matching model is not robust to the (small)
possibility that the sticky wages model is the true data-generating process.
7The simple interest rate rules are flexible enough to mimic closely the optimal targeting
rules absent model uncertainty in both models.
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This lack of robustness is more pronounced if price markup shocks play a
more prominent role in the two models. At the same time, the consequences
of implementing policies that stabilize wage inflation in the search and match-
ing model are benign.
When the policymaker adopts a minmax strategy, the optimal interest rate
rule minimizes the maximum expected loss. This approach does not require the
policymaker to assign specific probability weights to the models; for a model
to be included in the list of reference models it suﬃces that the policymaker
assigns non-zero probability to it being the true data-generating process. The
optimal interest rate rule in this case mimics the optimal targeting rule derived
in the sticky wage model.
With regard to methodology, our paper is closest to Levin and Williams
(2003) and Levin et al. (2003) which study robust monetary policy with com-
peting reference models. Brock et al. (2007) outline basic principles for in-
corporating model uncertainty into policy evaluation exercises. Other related
papers include Cogley and Sargent (2005) and Svensson and Williams (2005),
but we abstract from the learning dynamics featured in this set of contribu-
tions. In sync with our conclusions, these works reveal the general principle
that policymakers concerned with avoiding worst case scenarios may generally
shy away from tailoring their policies towards a model with recommendations
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that are not robust to model misspecification and uncertainty even if the model
is very likely.8
Our analysis diﬀers from all these contributions along important dimen-
sions. First, we restrict attention to microfounded models and exclude macro-
econometric models from the set of reference models. Thus, we can derive an
objective function of the policymaker that is consistent with the underlying
reference models and reflects the policymaker’s probability distribution over
the models. The aforementioned contributions assume that the policymaker’s
preferences are independent of the models under consideration. Second, we
parameterize the models to fit the same empirical evidence under empirical
interest rate rules before deriving the optimal monetary policy. In Cogley
and Sargent (2005) and Svensson and Williams (2005), model parameters are
estimated conditional on the policymaker setting policy to maximize a given
quadratic objective; no two models fit the data equally well over a given histor-
ical episode and the ranking of the quality of fit switches between episodes. In
Levin and Williams (2003) and Levin et al. (2003) the models are not parame-
terized using the same empirical evidence. Third, labor market aspects are at
8Research on model uncertainty and policy evaluation has taken several directions. One
direction is to assume a given baseline model and consider all models within a given distance
as in Hansen and Sargent, eds (2007), Tetlow and von zur Muehlen (2001), and Giannoni
(2002). The second approach, taken in this paper, does not require that the models are
close to each other. In addition to the papers mentioned in the main text see also Taylor
and Wieland (2012) for an illustration of this approach. In addition to model uncertainty,
data uncertainty and parameter uncertainty are other areas of concern for policymakers.
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the core of our analysis and we stress the importance of smoothing wage dy-
namics at the expense of price inflation as a general principle of robust optimal
monetary policy. These considerations are ruled out in the earlier contribu-
tions by the choice of models. Sensitivity analysis suggests that our results
survive if the policymaker’s preferences resemble those of earlier studies and
are common across models as long as the policymaker has suﬃcient dislike for
price inflation.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the
NK model with search and matching fictions and the NK model with nominal
sticky wages. Section 3 discusses the details of our empirical strategy to pa-
rameterize the two models. Section 4 derives optimal targeting rules for each
model and assess robustness across models. Optimal instrument rules under
model uncertainty when policymakers follow Bayesian and minmax strategies
are discussed in Section 5. Concluding remarks are oﬀered in Section 6.
2.2 Two competing models of the labor mar-
ket
The two reference models that the policymaker considers in our framework of
optimal monetary policy under model uncertainty build on the New Keynesian
(NK) model with sticky nominal prices; the models diﬀer with regard to the
details of the labor market. The first model features search and matching
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frictions in the labor market as in Diamond (1982), Mortensen (1982), and
Pissarides (1985). Each Worker negotiates the terms of employment with
the matched firm. While the real wage may adjust slowly to shocks, the
nominal wage is fully flexible. By contrast, the second model introduces sticky
nominal wages along the same lines as sticky nominal prices as in Erceg et al.
(2000). Unlike NK models with Walrasian labor markets, the two models we
employ in the analysis are shown to fit well the impulse responses of labor
market variables derived from structural vector auto-regressions (SVAR) for
reasonable parameter choices. We provide brief model descriptions in the main
text and refer to Appendix B.1 for details.
2.2.1 NKM with search and matching frictions
Households are modelled as in Andolfatto (1996) and Merz (1995). At any
point in time nt agents of the household are employed (w) and 1 − nt agents
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E0 is the expectations operator conditional on all the information available
up to period 0. β is the time discount factor. Consumption is denoted by cit,
and hours worked by hit, where i = {w, u}. The real wage is given by wt and
unemployment benefits (generated through home production) are measured by
bu as in Ravenna and Walsh (2011).9 Bond holdings Bt, taxes and transfers
Tt, and profits Prt are measured in nominal terms and are converted into real
units through division by the price level Pt. Rt is the nominal interest rate
on bonds. We denote by λt the Lagrange multiplier attached to the budget
constraint when solving the household’s problem.
To allow for as many similarities between the search and matching model
and the sticky wage model as possible, individual preferences over consumption












with φu0 = 0, i.e., unemployed agents do not experience disutility from search-
ing for employment.
The labor market features search and matching frictions. Firms post va-
cancies vt and ut measures the share of agents searching for jobs. New matches
9We choose to model unemployment benefits through home production as this setup
in principle allows for positive unemployment benefits and eﬃciency of matching as in
Hosios (1990). While unimportant for this paper, this modelling choice plays a role in our
companion paper Bodenstein and Zhao (2016).
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leading employment nt to evolve according to
nt = (1− ρ)nt−1 +mt (2.5)
where ρ is the exogenous rate at which existing matches break up. The number
of job seakers in period t follows
ut = 1− nt−1 + ρnt−1 = 1− (1− ρ)nt−1. (2.6)
Wholesale firms employ labor as the only factor to produce the wholesale
good ywt that is sold at the competitive market price P
w
t . To hire workers,
wholesale firms have to first post a vacancy at the cost κv.10 These firms max-
















s.t. nt = (1− ρ)nt−1 + qtvt
ywt = atntht (2.7)




10We abstract from fixed costs of starting the negotiation process suggested in Pissarides
(2009) as our empirical procedure ruled out such costs.
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Total factor productivity at follows a standard AR(1) process
log (at) = ρa log (at) + ε
a
t (2.8)
with normally distributed innovations εat ∼ N (0,σ2a).
When an agent and a firm are matched, they engage in Nash bargaining
over wages and hours worked. We assume Nash bargaining. The solution to






where ξ stands for the bargaining power of the agent. The marginal value
of employment to the firm Jt is given by the period profit of the additional
worker, i.e., the excess of the marginal product over the real wage payment,








ht + (1− ρ)Etβλt+1
λt
Jt+1. (2.10)













and consists of the increase in household income
Wt
Pt
ht − bu by having an
additional household member employed over the monetary equivalent to com-






well as the continuation value if the match survives into the next period.
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Retail prices experience nominal rigidities. Retail firms produce diﬀerenti-
ated goods using wholesale goods as the sole input. The optimization problem







s.t. Yt(i) = y
w
t (i). (2.12)





Retailer i adjusts its price Pt(i) each period with the fixed probability 1 − ξp.
For firms that do not re-optimize their price in a given period, prices will be
updated as a weighted average of Πt =
Pt
Pt−1 , the nominal price inflation in the














































where τ¯ p is a subsidy to the firm to oﬀset distortions in the steady state due
to monopolistic competition. We introduce a markup shock directly into the
first order condition of the retailer. In choosing its price, the firm takes into
account the demand curve for its diﬀerentiated good. This demand curve is
derived from the problem of the producers of the final composite consumption
good.









that is sold under perfect competition. The term λ
p
λp−1 refers to the elasticity
of substitution between the retail varieties.
2.2.2 NKM with sticky nominal wages
The model with sticky nominal wages diﬀers from the search and matching
model with regard to the labor market details. In this model, all household
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members are employed and nominal wages are set in staggered contracts follow-
ing Calvo (1983). Each household j chooses consumption and asset holdings













subject to the budget constraint
Ptct(j) + Bt+1(j) = (1 + τ¯
w)Wt(j)ht(j) + Rt−1Bt(j) + Prt(j) + Tt(j).
(2.18)
Labor bundlers package diﬀerentiated labor services supplied by each indi-
vidual into an aggregate labor service oﬀered at the aggregate nominal wage









where the term λ
w
λw−1 measures the elasticity of substitution between diﬀeren-








Each household j supplies diﬀerentiated labor services ht(j) to the labor
bundlers. The imperfect substitutability of diﬀerentiated labor services gives
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each individual household some market power. The household can readjust its
wage with probability 1−ξw in each period. If the household cannot reoptimize
its wages, wages will increase by a weighted average of past inflation and the























s.t. Pt+sct+s +Bt+s+1 =

















Where τ¯w is the subsidy to households who supply diﬀerentiated labor va-
rieties. If τ¯w = λw − 1, labor supply distortions arising from monopolistic
competition are eliminated.
Wholesale firms purchase aggregate labor services ht from the labor bundler.
Retail firms purchase the wholesale good, diﬀerentiate it, and set prices us-




We briefly turn to the log-linear approximation of the two models around their
respective steady states. We restrict attention to our baseline specifications
that abstract from price and wages indexation (ιp = ιω = 0) and consumption
habits (h = 0) and we display the core equations only. The details for the
search and matching model are provided in Appendix B.2; for the sticky wage
model, we refer the reader to Erceg et al. (2000).
Our derivations of the linear search and matching model resemble those
in Ravenna and Walsh (2011) with two important exceptions: (i) the steady
state is ineﬃcient as we do not impose the conditions stated in Hosios (1990),
(ii) the individual labor supply is elastic. Under the first assumption, the
flexible price economy is not eﬃcient. This feature of our model complicates
finding the second order approximation to the preferences of the representative
household which will be used in Section 2.4 to describe the preferences of the
policymaker. The second assumption is of direct consequence for the linear
presentation of the model’s structural equations.
The linearized search and matching model can be reduced to three equa-
tions (excluding a description of monetary policy) and four endogenous vari-
ables (price inflation πt, output yˆt, employment nˆt, and the nominal interest
rate it all in deviations from the model’s steady state values; “hatted” variables
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are in log-deviations). The exogenous shocks to technology ( aˆt) and markups
















(it − Etπt+1 + (θ1 − φ) (Etnˆt+1 − nˆt) + θ2 (nˆt − nˆt−1))
(2.24)














(it − Etπt+1) (2.25)
Equations (2.23) and (2.24) are the NK Phillips curve and the aggregate de-
mand relationship in the model with search and matching frictions, respec-
tively. We have opted against expressing the model in terms of output gaps;
for our analysis in Section 2.4 it is more appropriate to write the model in terms
of output. In contrast to standard NK models without search and matching
frictions in the labor market, the level of employment nˆt enters the equations.
The third equation, which can be traced back to the Nash bargaining over
real wages, summarizes the labor market dynamics by relating the evolution
of employment to the other variables in the model.
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This model reduces to the standard NK model if each household member
is employed at every point in time which, among other assumptions, requires
that vacancy posting costs are set to zero. Absent posting costs, κc assumes
the value of 0, ϖyss = 1, and nˆt = 0 for all t. Equation (2.25) is dropped
due to the lack of wage bargaining. Alternatively, the model in Ravenna and
Walsh (2011) with inelastic individual labor supply emerges in the limit as
φ approaches infinity implying limφ→∞ θ1 = φ and limφ→∞ γ2 = φ. Equa-
tion (2.25) converges to nˆt = yˆt − aˆt which simply describes the production
technology when hours worked are fixed. Using this result, equations (2.23)
and (2.24) can be written in terms of inflation, the nominal interest rate, and
employment.11 Notice, that the search and matching model with fixed hours
worked does not nest the standard NK model.
The sticky nominal wage model features NK Phillips curves for prices and
wages.
πt = βEtπt+1 + κ




w (σ + φ)
(




− κw (wˆt − aˆt)(2.27)
yˆt = Etyˆt+1 − 1
σ
(it − Etπt+1) (2.28)
wˆt = wˆt−1 + πwt − πt (2.29)
11Strictly speaking, Ravenna and Walsh (2011) substitute out employment in terms of
the number of job seeking workers, where the latter is proportional to the (negative) value
of employment in the linearized model.
96
Equation (2.29) describes the evolution of the real wage. If wages are fully
flexible, the model reduces to the standard NK model since equation (2.27)
reduces to wˆt − aˆt = yˆt − 1+φσ+φ aˆt and equation (2.26) can be written in its
standard formulation.
Absent price indexation, inflation is a forward-looking phenomenon in both
models and can be expressed as the discounted present value of real marginal
costs, see equations (2.26) and (2.23). Although real wages are not the ex-
clusive determinant of real marginal costs, the real wage dynamics shape the
dynamics of real marginal costs importantly in both models. Thus, the dy-
namics of price inflation depend on the adjustment process for real wages and
in turn on the impact that price inflation has on the adjustment of real wages.
Monetary policy does influence the interplay between these variables.
2.3 Empirical Strategy
At the core of our analysis lies the idea, that the policymaker can formulate
multiple models that provide a good approximation to the true data-generating
process given the empirical evidence against which the models are assessed.
The large variety of business cycle models found in the academic literature
(that all try to explain similar aspects of the data) and the diverse set of
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models used within central banks in practice lend support to this view.12
To arrive at a setting in which the policymaker considers multiple models
for the purpose of policymaking, we parameterize the two models discussed in
the previous section to match the same empirical evidence. Given the number
of free parameters in most theoretical models, it is basically impossible to
reduce the set of candidate models to a single one and obtain model certainty.
This section discusses the criteria by which we judge the empirical performance
of the sticky wage model and the search and matching model.
Our approach resembles Levine et al. (2012) in the sense that we estimate
our models using the same data before exploring the optimal monetary policy
for each model. Levine et al. estimate variants of the same model — the
models diﬀer with regard to parameter restrictions — using the full information
Bayesian approach. By contrast, we use an impulse response function matching
approach. This approach diﬀers substantially from Svensson and Williams
(2005) and Cogley and Sargent (2005). These authors estimate models under
the assumption that monetary policy is set optimally given the preferences
assigned to the policymaker. The central bank re-assesses over time which of
12For example, staﬀ at the Federal Reserve derives policy recommendations for
the Federal Open Market Committee from a variety of models. See the Mon-
etary Policy Strategies section of the August 2010 Tealbook B, available under
https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/FOMC20100810tealbookb20100805.pdf.
In addition, several regional Reserve Banks maintain their own (publicly available DSGE)
models reflecting a multitude of views about the functioning of the economy.
98
the multiple models provides the best description of the economy and chooses
monetary policy accordingly. At no point in time, do any two models imply
very similar economic outcomes contrary to our setup. The models in these
papers are not designed to explain the same empirical evidence.
2.3.1 Estimation strategy
We estimate selected parameters of the two models using impulse response
function matching introduced by Rotemberg and Woodford (1997). The em-
pirical impulse responses against which we assess the performance of the two
theoretical models are taken from Christiano et al. (2013). These authors es-
timate structural vector autoregressive (SVAR) models and identify shocks to
monetary policy, as well as neutral and investment-specific technology shocks.
For each model, we divide the parameters into two groups: calibrated and
estimated parameters. The values assigned to the first group of parameters
are taken from the literature. The parameters in the second group shape the
dynamics of the model importantly; with clear evidence hard to come by for
these parameters, we allow the data to determine their values.
In this part of our analysis, monetary policy is assumed to follow a simple
rule for the nominal interest rate as commonly found in the literature and in
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central bank analysis. In detail, we assume
it = ρRit−1 + ρππt + ρxxt (2.30)
where πt refers to price inflation in deviation from its long-run target value,
and it denotes the short term nominal interest rate in deviation from steady
state. The output gap is xt. The coeﬃcients ρR and ρπ govern the degree of
interest rate smoothing and the reaction of the nominal interest rate to current
price inflation, respectively. In what follows, we abstract from the output gap
by setting ρx = 0. When we included the output gap in the estimation, our
results hardly changed.
For each model, conditional on the calibrated parameters θc, we search
over the remaining parameters — collected in the vector θ — to minimize the
distance between the impulse response functions generated from the model,
denoted by G(θ, θc)model, and the empirical impulse response functions from
the SVAR in Christiano et al. (2013), denoted by G:
θˆ = argminθ
(
G−G(θ, θc)model)′ Ω−1 (G−G(θ, θc)model) . (2.31)
The diagonal weighting matrix Ω is obtained from the empirical variance-
covariance matrix of the empirical impulse response functions Ψ by setting
all oﬀ-diagonal elements in Ψ to zero. The estimate θˆ minimizes the objec-
tive function in (2.31). By construction, this methodology ensures that the
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dynamics of each model trace the dynamics in the selected empirical evidence.
Before reporting the results of the estimation, we review the values assigned
to some key parameters collected in θc. The parameter values are recorded
in Table 2.1. To the extent appropriate, we assign identical values to the
parameters that are common across the models. In particular, we set the
labor supply elasticity equal to 1/2, implying a choice of φ = 2, in line with
the results reported by Smets and Wouters (2007). We discuss the importance
of this choice for the dynamics in the search and matching model separately
below. Hours worked are assumed to be 1/3 in the steady state. The parameter
ξp which governs the degree of nominal price rigidities is fixed at 0 .75. The
markup for prices is set at 20 percent in the steady state implying λp equal to
0.2.
In the sticky wage model, two more parameters need to be specified: the
parameter governing the stickiness of nominal wages ξw and the steady state
wage markup λw. As in Christiano et al. (2013), we set ξw = ξp, implying
that wage and price contracts are updated on average once a year. The steady
state wage markup is also set at 20 percent.
Parameters specific to the model with search and matching frictions are
chosen as follows. The break up probability of a match with ρ = 0.1 implies
a quarterly separation rate of 10 percent which is in line with the estimate in
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Shimer (2005) of 3.4 percent per month. The parameter ζ in the matching
function is set at 0.54, just in the range of plausible values between 0.5 and
0.7 reported in Pissarides and Petrongolo (2001). We target a vacancy filling
rate in the steady state qss of 0.7 following Ramey et al. (2000), and Ravenna
and Walsh (2012). The unemployment rate in the steady state is set at 0.055,
the average US unemployment rate over the period from 1951Q1 to 2008Q4
reported by Christiano et al. (2013). We assume that the costs associated
with posting and filling vacancies are proportional to the number of posted
vacancies. Relative to output these costs amount to ηs, which is fixed at
100 ∗ ηs = 0.66.
We estimate the remaining parameters for each model by matching the
model impulse responses to a neutral technology shock to the corresponding
SVAR estimates in Christiano et al. (2013). We include the first 15 periods
after the shock. While we fix the persistence of the technology shock at ρa =
0.9999, we estimate the standard deviation of the shock σa. Furthermore, for
each model we estimate the coeﬃcients in the interest rate rule, ρR and ρπ, the
degree of (internal) consumption habits h, and the degree of price indexation
ιp. In the search and matching model, we also estimate the replacement ratio
ru. Finally, we estimate two versions of the sticky wage model; in the first one
we abstract from wages indexation, i.e., ιω is fixed at 0, and in the second one
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we estimate the degree of wage indexation. For the sticky wage model, the
estimation includes the impulse response functions for output, inflation, the
short-term interest rate as measured by the federal funds rate, hours worked,
real wages, and consumption. In the case of the search and matching model,
we also include the responses of the unemployment rate, vacancies, and the
job finding rate.
Table 2.2 summarizes the estimates. Figure 2.1 shows the resulting im-
pulse responses for the two models absent wage indexation in the sticky wage
model and Figure 2.2 plots the responses when the degree of wage estima-
tion is estimated. In both figures, the theoretical models match the empirical
responses well; with the exception of hours worked, the model responses lie
within the confidence bands of the empirical responses and the responses are
reasonably close to the SVAR point estimates and to each other. The sticky
wage model with indexation, estimated at ιω = 1, provides a better fit to the
data than the model without wage indexation according to the value of our
criterion function, see bottom of Table 2.2. Most of the diﬀerence in fit stems
from the model’s implications for hours worked. However, some authors have
expressed skepticism regarding the presence of wage indexation in the data,
see Levine et al. (2012) and Christiano et al. (2013).
The estimates for the coeﬃcients in the policy rule, the variance of the tech-
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nology shock, price indexation, and consumption habits are almost identical
across models. The estimated policy rule features a high degree of interest rate
smoothing and the implied long-run response of the interest rate to inflation
is just strong enough to satisfy the Taylor principle, e.g., for the search and
matching model this value is 1.0003 = (1 − 0.8555)/0.14445. The estimated
simple interest rate rules are close to identical across models. For all model
specifications, price indexation is estimated to be zero. Overall, our estimates
resemble those in Christiano et al. (2013) despite the greater simplicity of our
models — Christiano et al. include investment, capacity utilization, and the
relative price of investment in the set of impulse responses and they require
their models to also match the empirical responses to monetary policy and
investment-specific technology shocks. Two important diﬀerence emerge, how-
ever. First, our models do not rely on internal consumption habits to match
the empirical responses (h = 0), whereas Christiano et al. estimate h to lie
between 0.7 and 0.8. This result in Christiano et al. appears to stem from
their inclusion of the monetary policy shock in the estimation. Their (recur-
sively identified) monetary policy shock induces a pronounced hump-shaped
response in consumption, a feature that the consumption response does not
show for the neutral or for the investment-specific shock. Habit persistence is
key to match the consumption response to the monetary policy shock. When
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we fix h at a strictly positive value and estimate the model again, the remain-
ing parameters reported in Table 2.2 change slightly while the overall fit of
the impulse responses remains of similar quality. Unless noted otherwise, we
abstract from consumption habits from there on. Second, we estimate the
replacement ratio ru at 0.5345, which is well below the implausibly high esti-
mate in Christiano et al. (2013) for the search and matching model with Nash
bargaining. We elaborate on the role of the replacement ratio next.
2.3.2 The elasticity of labor market tightness with re-
spect to shocks
The responses of unemployment and vacancies are important dimensions to
judge the empirical performance of the search and matching model. The un-
employment rate (and thus the number of job seakers ut) drops significantly
after rising initially and vacancies vt increase strongly over the medium term.
Both in the data and the model the directions and the magnitudes of these re-
sponses imply a strong response of labor market tightness (the ratio of unfilled
vacancies to job seekers).
As shown in Appendix B.2.1, labor market tightness θˆt (expressed in log de-
viation from steady state) is approximately proportional to (the log-deviations
from steady state of) the marginal product of labor, hours worked, and real
105
marginal costs in our model:
















Υ = ζ +
(1− ρ)βξqssθss (1− ζ)
[1− (1− ρ)β (1− ξqssθss)] . (2.33)
Υ lies in the interval [ζ, 1], where ζ is often set around 0.5 (in our case 0.54).
Abstracting from the disutility of working for employed workers (i.e., set-
ting φ at an infinitely large number), Shimer (2005) argues that standard
search and matching models cannot produce the strong response of labor mar-
ket tightness relative to the movements in the marginal product of labor com-
pared to the empirical evidence under plausible parameter choices, in particu-
lar for the replacement ratio ru. According to Shimer, a strongly pro-cyclical
real wage dampens the responses of vacancies and unemployment resulting in
a much muted response of labor market tightness vis-a-vis the data.13
Although Hall (2005), Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008), Hall and Milgrom
(2008), Pissarides (2009), and Christiano et al. (2013) among others oﬀer
13For our parameterization, the steady state values of the marginal product of labor mplss
and marginal costs mcss are 1, and hours worked hss are 1/3, implying hssmplssmcss = 1/3.
With the term (1 − (1− ρ)β) κvqss assuming the value 0.0024, the elasticity of labor market
tightness can be raised to its value in the data by choosing ru suﬃciently close to 1. In a
setting similar to ours, Christiano et al. (2013) estimate ru to be 0.88.
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approaches to resolve this issue, there is no paper that studies the optimal
monetary policy for a NK model with search and matching frictions with em-
pirically plausible labor market responses. Our framework avoids the criticism
in Shimer (2005) by modeling the disutility from working explicitly. With a
labor supply elasticity of 0.5, i.e., φ = 2, the required value for ru in order to
match the empirical evidence on unemployment, vacancies, and labor market
tightness drops from almost 1 to near 0.5.14
2.3.3 Additional shocks
In addition to technology shocks, our model features markup shocks. Unfor-
tunately, we are not aware of a broadly accepted scheme to identify markup
shocks using SVAR analysis. Without resorting to full information estimation
of the two models as in Smets and Wouters (2007), we proceed by assuming
that each economy is subject to purely transitory markup shocks. The stan-
dard deviation of the markup shock is set at 0.0135 in the sticky wage model.
The standard deviation of the markup shock in the search and matching model
of 0.0104 minimizes the distance between the impulse responses for the markup
shocks in the two models given the remaining parameters in Tables 2.1 and
2.2. The smaller value of the standard deviation in the search and matching
14Hall and Milgrom (2008) suggest replacing the assumption of Nash bargaining by an
alternating oﬀer bargaining game. As shown in Bodenstein et al. (2016), this alternative
approach has similar empirical implications as ours.
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model reflects the stronger impact of an equal-sized markup shock on output
and inflation in the search and matching model compared to the sticky wage
model.
2.4 Optimal policy and robustness
In matching our two models to the empirical evidence, we assumed that mon-
etary policy follows a simple interest rate rule similar to Taylor (1993) and
estimated the coeﬃcients of the rule. While these estimated rules provide
a good fit to actual monetary policy, they do not necessarily implement the
optimal monetary policy.
Although the search and matching model and the sticky wage model imply
similar responses to shocks, in particular for price and wage inflation, under the
estimated rules we show that this is no longer the case when monetary policy
is set optimally in the two models. Furthermore, implementing the policy that
is optimal in the search and matching model in the sticky wage model leads
to responses that are far from optimal under sticky nominal wages. The same
issue arises if the roles are reversed. We show this lack of robustness of the
optimal policy with the help of optimal targeting rules. In the following, when
referring to the sticky wage model we abstract from wage indexation unless
stated otherwise.
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2.4.1 Optimal policy and optimal targeting rule
Svensson and Woodford (2004), Giannoni and Woodford (2003), Giannoni and
Woodford (2016) advocate for the use of optimal targeting rules to characterize
the optimal monetary policy. The optimal targeting rule specifies the variables
— including the relative importance and the dynamic structure of each variable
— in a single target criterion that seeks to implement the optimal monetary
policy.
Optimal targeting rules can be computed for any preferences assigned to
the policymaker. However, we adopt the approach in Woodford, ed (2003) to
have the preferences of the policymaker coincide with those of the represen-
tative agent in the model. Therefore, obtainaing optimal targeting rules in
our settings requires to: (1) derive the objective function of the policymaker
as a purely quadratic approximation to the preferences of the representative
household;15 (2) obtain the first order conditions associated with the policy-
maker’s problem of optimizing the (quadratic) objective function subject to
the (linear) equations that describe the behavior of the private sector using
the Lagrangian approach; (3) combine the first order conditions to obtain a
single equation without Lagrange multipliers; this targeting rule describes the
15We follow Woodford (1999) and Benigno and Woodford (2012) in adopting the concept
of “optimality from the timeless perspective” — a necessary assumption to obtain the correct
linear quadratic approximation to our (nonlinear) model.
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relationship between the endogenous and exogenous variables under the opti-
mal policy. Importantly, the evolution of the economy that is consistent with
the targeting rule is unique.
The optimal targeting rule implements the optimal monetary policy in
the model from which it is derived, in contrast to simple instrument rules
with optimally chosen coeﬃcients. However, similar to instrument rules, the
optimal targeting rule is expressed in terms of economically relevant model
variables only; instrument rules prescribe how to adjust the policy instrument
(such as the short term interest rate) in response to variables such as inflation,
output, etc., and targeting rules describe how to adjust a target variable (for
example, price inflation) to output, wage inflation and other variables. Finally,
the evolution of the optimal target criterion does not depend on the policy
instrument of the central bank itself. Optimal targeting rules are therefore
ideally suited to investigate the robustness of the optimal policy of one model
in a diﬀerent model.
The optimal targeting rule for the NK model with sticky wages is eas-
ily obtained from the linear quadratic approximation of the original model.
Employing results from Woodford, ed (2003) for the policymaker’s objective
function and the linear approximation of the model’s structural equations, the
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s.t. equations (2.26) to (2.29)
and suitably specified pre-commitments for period 0. 16
Absent consumption habits, price and wage indexation, the loss function con-

















Giannoni and Woodford (2003) show that the first order conditions associated































We continue to express the rule in terms of output and the underlying shocks
instead of the output gap (xt = yˆt − 1+φσ+φ aˆt). See Appendix B.4 for details
of the derivation. Absent sticky wages, the rule in equation (2.36) suggests
lowering the target value for inflation in the current period below its long
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run target when the growth rate of the output gap is positive as during the
recovery from a shock that caused a negative output gap (χ1 > 0, χ6 > 0,
all other coeﬃcients are zero in this case). If wages are sticky and growth in
the output gap is positive, wage inflation below its steady state value, ceteris
paribus, calls for bringing inflation closer to its long-run target value than
under flexible wages as χ3 > 0.
Thus far, derivations of the optimal targeting rules in models with search
and matching frictions are absent from the literature. Blanchard and Gal´ı
(2010), Thomas (2008), and Ravenna andWalsh (2011) derive purely quadratic
objectives for the policymaker from household preferences under the assump-
tion that the search and matching process does not induce ineﬃciencies as
in Hosios (1990). None of these papers derives the implied optimal target-
ing rule. Furthermore, if the Hosios condition is not imposed, even the first
step of obtaining an explicit second order approximation to the preferences of
the representative household that serves as the policymaker’s model-consistent
objective is missing in the literature.
To derive a purely quadratic objective for the policymaker in the presence
of a distorted steady state, we employ the numerical approach described in
Bodenstein et al. (2014) which is consistent with the theoretical results in
Benigno and Woodford (2012). Appendix B.3 shows that the policymaker’s
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(period) loss function consistent with a second order approximation to the
preferences of the representative household can be written as
Ls&mt = Pπ,ππ2t + Py,yyˆ2t + Pn,nnˆ2t + Pn−,n−nˆ2t−1 + Py,nnˆtyˆt + Py,n− yˆtnˆt−1
+Pn,n−nˆtnˆt−1 + Pn,anˆtaˆt + Pn,pnˆtθˆp,t + Py,ayˆtaˆt + Py,pyˆtθˆp,t.
(2.37)
This formulation of the loss function is already simplified to include those vari-
ables only that enter the linear model in equations (2.23)-(2.25). We cannot
obtain closed form expressions for the composite coeﬃcients in (2.37), but our
approach provides numerical values based on the underlying deep parameters







s.t. equations (2.23) to (2.25)
and suitably specified pre-commitments for period 0.
Rearranging the first order conditions associated with the optimization
problem in (2.38) delivers the optimal targeting rule in the search and matching
model
ϖ1nˆt +ϖ2nˆt−1 +ϖ3nˆt+1 +ϖ4yˆt +ϖ5yˆt+1 +ϖ6aˆt +ϖ7θˆp,t









t = 0 (2.39)
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where we define
πt = Pˆt − Pˆt−1 (2.40)
yˆWAt = βδyˆ
WA
t−1 + yˆt (2.41)
nˆWAt = βδnˆ
WA
t−1 + nˆt (2.42)
PˆWAt = βδPˆ
WA
t−1 + Pˆt. (2.43)
aˆWAt = βδaˆ
WA
t−1 + aˆt (2.44)
θˆWAp,t = βδθˆ
WA
p,t−1 + θˆp,t (2.45)
In the steady state, the price level grows with the steady state inflation rate.
The term Pˆt denotes deviations of the price level from this growth path. Com-
pared to the sticky wage model, the targeting rule in the search and matching
model involves weighted infinite-moving averages of output, employment, the
price level, and the shocks. The presence of the markup shock θˆp,t in the tar-
geting rule is solely due to our decision not to impose the eﬃciency condition
by Hosios (1990).17 For the parameters in Table 2.1 and 2.2, the weights ϖj
with j = 1, ..., 15 are such that the optimal targeting rule from the standard
NK model (without search and matching frictions) is a close approximation
to the rule in equation (2.39) as discussed in more details in the companion
paper Bodenstein and Zhao (2016).
17In the sticky wage model the markup shock does not enter equation (2.36) since the
steady state is assumed to be eﬃcient; otherwise the markup shock would appear in the
targeting rule as well. See also Benigno and Woodford (2005).
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2.4.2 Robustness of optimal targeting rules
The optimal targeting rules in equations (2.36) and (2.39) are stated in terms
of variables that are common across models. We can therefore compute the
responses of prices and quantities in the sticky wage model under the rule
in equation (2.39) and in the search and matching model under the rule in
equation (2.36). We start by comparing the impulse responses in the search
and matching model under the two rules. Figure 2.3 depicts the case of the
technology shock aˆt, and Figure 2.4 shows the case of the price markup shock
θˆp,t.
Under the technology shock, the optimal monetary policy as implemented
by the targeting rule (2.39) calls for almost full stabilization of price inflation.
No meaningful trade-oﬀs arise as the welfare relevant gaps move in the same
direction: the technology shock exerts downward pressure to prices, and up-
ward pressure on output and employment with the expansions being held back
by sticky nominal prices. An interest rate cut reduces the downward pressure
on prices and speeds up the expansion in output and employment. As a result,
the real variables follow closely their paths in a real economy without sticky
prices. These findings are reminiscent of the standard NK model with flexible
wages in which the optimal monetary policy fully stabilizes inflation and closes
the output gap.
115
Notably, the labor market adjusts almost instantaneously to the shock in
sharp contrast to the empirical responses in Figure 2.1. Under the optimal
policy the real wage adjusts swiftly facilitated by a pronounced spurt in wage
inflation. The movements in wages reflect the persistent jump in the marginal
value of employment to the firm that gives rise to the front-loaded response in
vacancies and the fall in unemployment.
In contrast to equation (2.39), the rule given in equation (2.36) places
greater emphasis on stabilizing wage inflation and less emphasis on price infla-
tion. With monetary policy holding nominal wages basically constant, but the
persistent rise in technology pressuring real wages to rise, price inflation must
fall below its target value to facilitate at least gradual adjustment in the real
wage. As firms and households cannot reap all the benefits of higher technol-
ogy and higher real wages immediately, vacancy postings, employment, and
unemployment display inertia relative to the optimal responses. Adjustment
in output and consumption is consequently delayed, as well.
In the case of the markup shock, similar diﬀerences emerge between the
two policy rules in the search and matching model. With the exception of price
inflation, all other variables react more strongly to the shock under the optimal
policy, equation (2.39). As the markup shock induces a trade-oﬀ between
variables, price inflation is not fully stabilized under the optimal policy to
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temper the fluctuations in the other variables. Again, when the targeting rule
derived from the sticky wage model is imposed instead, i.e., the rule in equation
(2.36), wage inflation is almost fully stabilized at the expense of higher price
inflation. The responses of all other variables are greatly muted compared to
the optimal policy case.
The lack of robustness of the targeting rules across models also applies
to the model with sticky wages. Figures 2.5 and 2.6 plot the responses in
the sticky wages model to technology and markup shocks, respectively, for
the two targeting rules. The optimal policy under sticky nominal wages, im-
plemented through equation (2.36), stabilizes wage inflation in response to
both shocks. This policy avoids welfare-costly wage dispersion, whereas price
inflation induces movements in the real wage that in turn facilitate the ad-
justment process for all other variables under the optimal policy. By overly
stabilizing price inflation, the targeting rule derived in the search and match-
ing model (2.39) allows more wage inflation than is optimal and in turn causes
hours worked, output, and consumption, in particular, to exceed the optimal
responses noticeably.
To sum up, the targeting rule (2.39), which is optimal in the search and
matching model, favours stabilizing prices over stabilizing wages irrespective of
the model in which the rule is implemented. The targeting rule (2.36), which
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is optimal in the sticky wage model, favours stabilizing wages over stabilizing
prices irrespective of the model under consideration. Exchanging targeting
rules between the models induces welfare losses that are orders of magnitudes
larger than the welfare costs of business cycles in Lucas (2003). For the sticky
wage model the welfare loss (measured in CEV) is considerably higher than
for the search and matching model (1.3033 versus 0.1133) reflecting the high
welfare costs associated with even minor relative wage diﬀerences in the sticky
wage model.
2.4.3 Sensitivity
The lack of robustness of the optimal targeting rules may depend on our
modelling choices. We investigate two avenues to explore the sensitivity of this
result: (i) wage indexation in the sticky wage model, and (ii) the preferences
assigned to the policymaker.
The estimation results in Table 2.2 suggest that the empirical fit of the
sticky wage model improves if we allow for indexation of wages to past inflation.
With full wage indexation, the focus of optimal monetary policy in the sticky
wage model shifts from smoothing wage inflation to smoothing the diﬀerence
between wage inflation and lagged price inflation, i.e., πwt − πt−1. This change
in focus of the optimal policy is also reflected in the optimal targeting rule
derived for the sticky wage model with ιω = 1.
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Figure 2.8 plots selected impulse responses to a markup shock when the
sticky wage model features full wage indexation and we repeat the previous
exercise of comparing the outcomes in the search and matching model and
the sticky wage model (now with ιω = 1) under the optimal targeting rules
derived in the two models, respectively. Under full wage indexation, the opti-
mal monetary policy in the sticky wage model refrains from stabilizing wage
inflation; to reduce welfare-costly dispersion in the nominal wage, the central
bank smooths the term πwt −πt−1. Under the markup shock, the decline in the
real wage is still engineered by raising inflation in the impact period. Yet, the
rise in price inflation this period pushes up nominal wages in the subsequent
period through indexation which in turn oﬀsets most of the decline in the real
wage. To compensate for this eﬀect, price inflation rises by more in the im-
pact period under the optimal policy in the model with indexation than absent
indexation. Turning to the optimal targeting rule derived in the search and
matching model, this rule with its focus on reducing price inflation induces
even bigger welfare losses (measured as CEV) in the sticky wage model with
full indexation than in the model without indexation (now 1 .9728 instead of
1.3033), confirming the lack of robustness of the optimal targeting rules.
For the search and matching model, wage indexation in the sticky wage
model only impacts the responses under the optimal targeting rule from the
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sticky wage model relative to the previous discussion; the diﬀerences between
the two targeting rules are mostly quantitative in nature. Given the modified
focus of the new targeting rule from the sticky wage model, wage inflation
is not stabilized as forcefully as in Figure 2.4. Yet, since nominal wages in
period t move to oﬀset past inflation, the downward adjustment in the real
wage demands even larger movements in inflation than under the no-indexation
targeting rule. Thus, the overall welfare loss in the search and matching model
(measured as CEV) rises (now 0.1680 instead of 0.1133 for ιω = 0).
Our two models diﬀer with regard to the details of the labor market and,
as a result of our choice to assign to the policymaker the preferences of the
representative household, the models also diﬀer with regard to the objective
function assigned to the central bank. To glean a better understanding of the
role of these diﬀerences across models, we consider the case that the policy-
maker’s preferences are given by the simple quadratic loss function of the type
Lsqlt = π2t +λxx2t irrespective of the underlying model. This objective function
is commonly used in the literature and policy analysis. Examples are Levin et
al. (2003), Svensson and Williams (2005), and Debortoli et al. (2015). The pa-
rameter λx governs the relative importance of stabilizing price inflation versus
the output gap. We consider two parameterizations of λx: under the first one,
λx = 0.0429, the policymaker places high emphasis on price inflation similar
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to the policymaker with preferences Ls&m; under the second one, λx = 1, the
emphasis on price inflation is low as for a policymaker with preferences Lsw.18
Figure 2.9 shows the impulse responses under the targeting rules derived from
the simple loss functions.
In the search and matching model, the optimal policy consistent with pref-
erences Lsql with λx = 0.0429, resembles the optimal policy derived under
preferences Ls&m — the two top rows of panels in the figure. However, with
the exception of price inflation all variables react by less to the markup shock
than in Figure 2.4, indicating that under our parameterization of Lsql the pol-
icymaker prefers price inflation to bear more of the burden of adjustment than
in our original case. When imposing onto the search and matching model
the optimal targeting rule derived in the sticky wage model under preferences
Lsql, the same qualitative diﬀerences emerge as in Figure 2.4 despite the fact
that the policymaker’s preferences are now constant across models. The op-
timal targeting rule is a function of both the policymaker’s preferences and
the underlying economic model. Similarly, in the sticky wage model the gaps
between the impulse responses under the two targeting rules derived for pref-
erences Lsql remain large albeit smaller than in Figure 2.6. Once again, the
18The choice λx = 0.0429 is consistent with the weight on the output gap in the loss
function derived for the standard NK model with flexible wages under the parameters in
Tables 2.1 and 2.2. The alternative specification of λx = 1 is popular in the literature.
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optimal targeting rules are not robust across models.
However, if the policymaker assigns even lower relative importance to price
inflation, the optimal targeting rules are robust. The lower two rows of panels
in Figure 2.9 show the impulse responses for λx = 1. In both the search and
matching model and the sticky wage model, the gaps between the impulse
responses generated by the optimal targeting rules derived for λx = 1 in the
two models are minor. It is important to realise, though, that the robustness
of the optimal targeting rules under λx = 1 only applies from the viewpoint
of the policymaker with preferences Lsql = π2t + x2t . For the representative
households these policies are suboptimal as household preferences continue to
be given by Ls&m and Lsw, respectively. The robustness of optimal targeting
rules is definitively sensitive to the preferences assigned to the policymaker.
As in Levin and Williams (2003) obtaining robustness of optimal targeting
rules across models requires a reduced focus on price stability.
2.5 Robust policy
Our findings pose a policy dilemma: we have two models that by design match
the selected empirical evidence under estimated simple interest rate rules rea-
sonably well, but the two models recommend conflicting policy actions from
the optimal policy perspective. How should a policymaker conduct monetary
122
policy if the policymaker considers both models to be good approximations to
the true data-generating process?
It is straightforward to include more than two reference models into the
framework. One such candidate is the model by Gertler and Trigari (2009)
which merges the ideas of the search and matching framework with those of
nominal rigidities in wage setting.19 We could also include reference models
that have the same form of our two models but diﬀer with respect to the
parameter choices like the sticky wage model with full wage indexation.
2.5.1 Methodology
To analyze optimal monetary policy under model uncertainty with multiple
reference models we follow the approach in Levin and Williams (2003) and
Levin et al. (2003). This approach requires us to specify the objective function
of the policymaker, the economic models to be considered by the policymaker
(including a probability distribution over these models), and a flexible policy
rule to summarize the optimal policy.
19At least for the calibration in Thomas (2008), the optimal policy recommendations
derived from this hybrid framework with regard to inflation stabilization resemble those of
the standard sticky wage model. In the interest of keeping our setup simple we choose not
to include a model of this sort.
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Objective function of the policymaker and models
There are two dimensions to the objective function. First, we need to decide
on the preferences of the policymaker over the outcomes within a given model;
second, we need to formalize the policymaker’s strategy for dealing with model
uncertainty over the two models.
Previous works of model uncertainty tend to separate discussing the poli-
cymaker’s preferences from the underlying model; often these preferences are
assumed to be represented by a simple quadratic loss function that punishes
deviations of inflation and the output gap from their respective long-run tar-
get values and the preferences do not diﬀer across models. We assign model-
consistent preferences to the policymaker. For each model, the preferences of
the policymaker over model outcomes coincide with those of the representative
household in that model. By construction, the policymaker’s preferences diﬀer
across the reference models in our framework. In the following, we denote the
policymaker’s preferences over outcomes in the search and matching model by
the function Ls&m(Θ) and in the sticky wage model by the function Lsw(Θ),
see equations (2.37) and (2.35), respectively.
We consider two strategies to cope with model uncertainty: the Bayesian
and the minmax approach. Under the Bayesian approach, the policymaker’s
objective function weighs the various models according to their assigned prob-
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abilities
LBayesian = ω ∗ Ls&m(Θ) + (1− ω) ∗ Lsw(Θ) (2.46)
where ω is the weight assigned to the search and matching model and 1 − ω
is the weight on the sticky wage model.
The Bayesian strategy can be interpreted literally as the case of a sin-
gle policymaker assigning a probability distribution over the reference models
based on statistical analysis. For example, Levine et al. (2012) translate poste-
rior odds ratios of models estimated with full information Bayesian techniques
into the policymaker’s probability distribution over models. The policymaker
then engages into model averaging. In this sense, the policymaker’s model is a
weighted average across the reference models. An alternative interpretation is
related to decision-making in committees. Each member of the committee se-
lects a single model that reflects her/his views over the economy. The optimal
policy under uncertainty is not optimal from any individual member’s point
of view, but it produces outcomes that might be acceptable to all members.
When the policymaker pursues the minmax strategy, the objective is to
minimize the maximum welfare loss across the search and matching model
and the sticky wage model
Lminmax = max{Ls&m(Θ),Lsw(Θ)} . (2.47)
125
This policymaker is strongly concerned with avoiding the worst case scenario
of setting a policy that could result in large welfare losses under any circum-
stances.
Formulating policy
In computing the optimal monetary policy under model uncertainty we assume
that monetary policy follows a simple instrument rule of the type
it = ρRit−1 + ρππt + ρwππ
w
t + ρxxt. (2.48)
We collect the coeﬃcients of the rule in the vector Θ =
{
ρR, ρπ, ρwπ , ρx
}
.
According to the rule, the nominal interest rate is adjusted in response to
movements in price and wage inflation, as well as the output gap. Furthermore,
the rule allows for interest rate inertia. We search for the (non-negative) values
of the parameters in Θ that minimize the welfare loss of the policymaker under
the given objective.20
We restrict attention to simple rules in this section in order to maintain
transparency. Adapting the ideas in Svensson and Williams (2005), it would
be possible to compute the optimal policy under model uncertainty using the
tools of the optimal control literature. However, characterizing the optimal
20For a given parameterization of the rule, we compute the unconditional welfare loss.
Following Benigno and Woodford (2012) we include a correction term to account for the
fact that the rule may violate the pre-commitment conditions imposed in deriving the loss
functions. Rules that lead to equilibrium indeterminacy are discarded.
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policy in terms of a targeting rule turns diﬃcult under model uncertainty
with multiple reference models; the resulting targeting rule is hard to analyze.
After all, interpreting the targeting rule for the search and matching model in
equation (2.39) is already cumbersome, see Bodenstein and Zhao (2016) for
details. Although optimal targeting rules obtain higher welfare outcomes than
optimal simple rules, simple rules can provide high-quality approximations to
the optimal policy even if the number of variables included in the rule is small.
We confirm that without model uncertainty the simple rule (2.48) can indeed
approximate the optimal policy with high degree of accuracy.
2.5.2 Monetary policy rules under model uncertainty
Table 2.3 reports the optimal simple rules under the benchmark parameter-
ization of the search and matching model and the sticky wage model. For
lack of clear empirical guidance, we consider multiple probability distributions
with ω, the probability that the policymaker assigns to the search and match-
ing model being the true data-generating process, ranging from 0 to 1 for the
Bayesian approach. We refer to the optimal simple rule associated with a
given probability distribution as the “ω-optimal simple rule.” 21 The policy-
21Although the empirical evidence discussed in Section 2.3 can be viewed as favouring
the search and matching model over the sticky wage model if wages are not indexed, the
sticky wage model with full indexation appears to have stronger support in the data than
the search and matching model. Absent formal model comparison — which is complicated
by the fact that estimation of the three models does not employ same data series — and
the predominance of the sticky wage approach in the DSGE models used at central banks,
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maker’s probability distribution over models is irrelevant under the minmax
strategy. The table also reports the welfare implications in both models un-
der each policy rules. Welfare is expressed in terms of the loss functions and
consumption equivalent variations (CEV). Finally, we report the welfare costs
of implementing in the model under consideration the targeting rule that is
optimal in the other model (exchanging optimal targeting rules).
Under the Bayesian strategy, we distinguish three regions for the probabil-
ity ω: low (ω ≤ 0.2), intermediate range (0.3 ≤ ω ≤ 0.8), and high (ω ≥ 0.9).
The optimal simple rule varies distinctly across these regions. In the first
region with little probability weight on the search and matching model, the
nominal interest rate responds primarily to wage inflation in line with the
optimal policy prescriptions of the sticky wage model. In the second region,
the rule responds to wage and price inflation with the coeﬃcients assigned to
the two variables being of similar magnitude. It is only in the third region,
that the optimal rule displays significant interest rate inertia. The coeﬃcient
on wage inflation basically drops to zero whereas the nominal interest rate
responds to price inflation. With the policymaker assigning a high probability
to the search and matching model, the importance of wage inflation stabiliza-
tion fades. Consequently, in the sticky wage model the welfare loss (relative to
exploring a wide range of values for ω seems well-advised.
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the optimal monetary policy in that model) under the ω-optimal simple rule
is larger for higher values of ω and the welfare loss in the search and matching
model is reduced.
While the implications of the policy rules in the first and third region of
the table are easily understood and rationalized simply through the magnitude
of the weight ω, the rules in the intermediate second region are harder to
understand. We thus plot the impulse responses of output, price and wage
inflation in the two models to both the technology and the markup shock for
the optimal simple rules derived under ω = 0, 0.2, 0.3, 0.8, 0.9, 1 in Figure 2.7.
In the sticky wage model, the ω-optimal simple rules with ω < 0.9, induce
impulse responses (bottom two rows of panels) that are reasonably close to
those under ω = 0 (the optimal simple rule if the policymaker is certain about
the sticky wage model being the true data-generating process). For the search
and matching model, ω-optimal simple rules with ω < 0.9 induce responses
that diﬀer noticeably from those under ω = 1 (the optimal simple rule if the
policymaker is certain about the search and matching model being the true
data-generating process).
This conclusion is supported by two more pieces of evidence. First, the
welfare losses in Table 2.3 induced by the ω-optimal simple rule change no-
ticeably as ω increases from 0.8 to 0.9. The CEV value for the sticky wage
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model goes from negligible to 0.2. While the welfare losses in the search and
matching model are generally small, the CEV value is practically zero under
the ω-optimal simple rule for ω = 0.9. Second, we compute the Euclidean dis-
tances between the impulse response functions. If the optimal simple rules are
examined in the search and matching model, we compute the Euclidean dis-
tance between the impulse responses under each ω-optimal simple rule and the
ω-optimal simple rule with ω = 1. The Euclidean distances in the sticky wage
model are computed relative to the impulse responses under the ω-optimal
rule for ω = 0. Again, unless the probability weight assigned to the search
and matching model is 0.9 or above, the ω-optimal simple rule bears close re-
semblance with the optimal targeting rule derived in the sticky nominal wage
model. Policies that are (close to) optimal in the search and matching model
absent model uncertainty are not robust to the (small) possibility that the
sticky wages model is the true data-generating process.
The reason to the apparent bias of the optimal policy under model uncer-
tainty towards the sticky wage model lies in the high welfare costs associated
with even minor relative wage diﬀerences in the sticky wage model. The desire
to avoid bad economic outcomes caused by bad monetary policy is even more
explicit when the policymaker adopts a minmax strategy. In this case, the
optimal simple rule coincides with the ω-optimal simple rule for ω = 0, which
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in turn mimics the optimal targeting rule derived in the sticky wage model. 22
2.5.3 Sensitivity of results
Functional form of the policy rule
In principle, the policy rule in equation (2.48) allows the policymaker to re-
spond to the lagged value of the nominal interest rate, price and wage inflation,
and the output gap. However, each variable is assigned the value of zero for
some ω; the patterns of zeroes define the three distinct regions of the ω-optimal
simple rules in Table 2.3 for the Bayesian approach. To assess the sensitivity of
our findings to the functional form of the policy rule, Table 2.4 reports optimal
simple rules that, in comparison to (2.48), are restricted not to respond to ei-
ther the lagged interest rate, the output gap, price inflation, or wage inflation,
respectively.23
Absent interest rate smoothing (Case I in Table 2.4), the optimal simple
rule changes only for ω ≥ 0.9 compared to Table 2.3. The response coeﬃcient
for price inflation becomes very large to compensate for the lack of interest
rate smoothing in the rule, but overall welfare and welfare in the search and
22The ω-optimal simple rule with ω = 0 is very close to but not identical to the optimal
targeting rule derived in the sticky wage model, as the functional form of the policy rule in
equation (2.48) is not quite flexible enough.
23This analysis also sheds light on the optimality of the computed rules. The presence
of three distinct parameter regions under the Bayesian approach suggests the existence of
multiple local optima. In computing restricted optimal simple rules we retrieve additional
confirmation regarding the ω-optimal simple rules reported in Table 2.4 are indeed globally
optimal.
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matching model deteriorate nevertheless. In its eager to fight price inflation,
the rule for ω = 1 and ρR = 0 is particularly unattractive, as it induces welfare
losses in the sticky wage model that by far exceed the corresponding loss in
Table 2.4.
Eliminating the output gap from the list of response variables (Case II)
aﬀects the computations of the optimal simple rules only for ω ≤ 0.2. These
restricted rules respond to wage inflation by more than in Table 2.3 — the
optimizer reaches the upper bound of 100 — where the ω-optimal simple rule
responded importantly to the output gap for ω ≤ 0.2. The overall welfare loss
is higher mostly because the restricted rules perform worse in the sticky wage
model.
More dramatic changes in the optimal simple rules appear if the rules are
restricted not to respond to price inflation or wage inflation (Case III). Setting
ρπ = 0 leads to higher response coeﬃcients for wage inflation (and the output
gap or interest rate smoothing depending on the value of ω). The deterioration
in overall welfare is borne by the search and matching model; welfare in the
sticky wage model improves for most values of ω and never declines.
Finally, when eliminating the policymaker’s ability to respond to wage
inflation directly, welfare losses increase in both the sticky wage and the search
and matching model for most values of ω (Case IV). The form of the simple
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rule in this final case coincide with the specification adopted in our estimation.
Even more so, under ω = 0.8 and ω = 0.9, the restricted optimal simple rules
feature parameter values that are practically the same as the values retrieved
in our estimation: the interest rate smoothing coeﬃcient lies around 0 .8 and
the coeﬃcient assigned to price inflation lies just above 1. If we interpret the
estimated simple rules obtained in Section 2.3 (which basically coincide for the
two models) as arising from optimal policy considerations under uncertainty
— where the policymaker intentionally excludes a direct response to wage
inflation — U.S. policymakers can be viewed as assigning a probability to the
search and matching model being the true data-generating process between
0.6 and 0.8.
Shock persistence and consumption habits
Thus far, we have assumed that the markup shock is transitory and that
households do not experience habit persistence in consumption. As our es-
timation strategy is silent on the parameterization of the markup shock, we
also explore the possibility of a mildly persistent markup shock (ρu = 0.2).
Also, the impulse response function matching in Section 2.3 finds no support
for consumption habits in contrast to Christiano et al. (2013). In part, this
result emerges as we exclude monetary policy shocks from the empirical anal-
ysis. In the SVAR monetary policy shocks induce a pronounced hump-shaped
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response of consumption and output. One way to capture this feature is to in-
troduce habit persistence in consumption. We investigate the impact of habit
persistence in consumption (h = 0.6) for our results in a second alternative.
Table 2.6 summarizes the results for the case of mildly persistent markup
shocks. Overall, the results are similar to those in Table 2.3, if not stronger.
Under the Bayesian strategy, the ω-optimal simple rule is biased towards im-
proving the outcomes in the sticky wage model: the welfare loss (measured in
CEV) in the sticky wage model is smaller than in the search and matching
model as long as ω ≤ 0.8 and negligible for ω ≤ 0.4 (compared to ω ≤ 0.2 in
Table 2.3). The minmax strategy continues to pick the ω-optimal simple rule
for ω = 0. Our results also withstand the introduction of habit persistence
as shown in Table 2.7. Yet, in the presence of this real rigidity the bias of
the optimal policy under model uncertainty towards the sticky wage model is
slightly less pronounced.
2.6 Conclusion
In this paper, we contrast the optimal monetary policy recommendations in
two models that the policymaker views as good approximations of the true
data-generating process. The models diﬀer with regard to the details of the
labor market. The first model follows the search and matching literature in
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assuming that workers have to search for jobs and firms post vacancies. For
a worker to become employed and for the production of goods to occur, the
worker has to be matched with a firm. The two parties then negotiate over
the real wage which, as a result, may experience substantial inertia. In the
second model, nominal wages are rigid as the result of staggered (nominal)
wage contracts. We apply impulse response function matching to estimate key
parameters of the models.
While the two models produce very similar impulse responses for common
variables under the estimated policy rules, the responses diﬀer importantly
when monetary policy is chosen optimally. Under sticky wages without in-
dexation, the optimal policy induces little variation in nominal wages; the
dynamics of the real wage are determined by the adjustment in prices.24 In
the search and matching model, it is optimal to stabilize prices and to allow
for substantial real wage adjustment brought about by changes in nominal
wages. We fill a gap in the literature by deriving the optimal targeting rule
for a search and matching model — a single target criterion that seeks to im-
plement the optimal monetary policy. We investigate the performance of each
economy under the optimal targeting rule derived in the other model. In par-
ticular, the optimal targeting rule derived for the search and matching model
24When wages are fully indexed, the optimal policy smoothes the diﬀerence between wage
and past price inflation.
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is not robust, in the sense that it induces large welfare losses in the sticky wage
model. While the optimal targeting rule derived for the sticky wage model also
alters the dynamics in the search and matching model relative to the optimal
monetary policy in that model, the welfare consequences are less dramatic.
Given the models’ sensitivity to the optimal targeting rules, we compute
optimal simple (interest rate) rules when the policymaker considers both the
sticky wage and the search and matching model to be good candidates for the
true data-generating process. Applying Bayesian and minmax strategies to
obtain optimal simple rules, we find that unless the policymaker places high
probability weight on the search and matching model the optimal simple rule
is biased towards stabilizing wage inflation, a feature of the optimal monetary
policy in the sticky wage model.
Our framework abstracts from the possibility of learning dynamics as in
Svensson and Williams (2005) or Cogley and Sargent (2005). These authors
stress how agents adjust their probability distribution over the set of reference
models based on observed economic outcomes. In our setup, the implications
of learning for policy may be subdued as long as the both models are considered
to be suﬃciently likely. We plan to explore this issue in future work.
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Table 2.1: Calibrated Parameters
Description Parameter Search and Matching Sticky Wage
discount factor β 0.99 0.99
exogenous seperation rate ρ 0.1 -
matching function share of unemployment ζ 0.54 -
steady state inflation rate π¯ 1 1
Calvo price stickiness ξp 0.75 0.75
steady state price markup λp 1.2 1.2
Calvo wage stickiness ξw - 0.75
steady state wage markup λw - 1.2
invers consumption elasticity σ 1 1
inverse labor supply elasticity φ 2 2
hiring flow cost / output 100 ∗ ηs 0.66 -
steady state unemployment rate u˜ss 0.055 -
steady state vacancy filling rate qss 0.7 -
steady state working hour hss 1/3 1/3
Shock Process
technology shock: AR ρa 0.9999 0.9999
markup shock: AR ρu 0 0
markup shock: Std σu 0.0104 0.0135
Implied Deep Parameter Value
hiring fixed cost κ¯ 0 -
hiring flow cost κv 0.0154 -
unemployment benefit bu 0.1769 -
worker’s share of surplus ξ 0.7438 -
matching eﬃciency χ 0.6625 -
scaling of working hour disutility φ0 27.8940 27
Note: Table 2.1 summarizes the parameters and calibration targets for the NK model with
search and matching frictions and the NK model with sticky wages.
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Table 2.2: Estimated Parameters
Description Estimated Parameter Search Sticky Wage Sticky Wage with Indexation
interest rate smoothing ρR 0.8555 0.8379 0.8895
[0.0294] [0.0450] [0.0260]
weights on inflation ρπ 0.1445 0.1622 0.1105
[1.5e-05] [3.12e-05] [2.4e-05]
std technology shock σz 0.0031 0.0033 [0.0031]
[0.0002] [ 0.0002] [0.0002]
habit persistence h 0 0 0
[0.5148] [0.4394] [0.7734]
replacement ratio rb 0.5345 - -
[0.0185] - -
price indexation ιp 0 0 0
[0.3123] [0.3204] [0.2714]
wage indexation ιw - - 1
- - [0.1656]
Minimum Distance Estimator
Description Search Sticky Wage Sticky Wage with Indexation
criterion value (9 variables) 124.8128 - -
criterion value (6 variables) 99.6490 136.0783 77.2143
Note: The top panel of Table 2.2 summarizes the estimated parameters for the NK model
with search and matching frictions and the NK model with and without wage indexation.
The parameters are estimated using impulse response function matching under neutral tech-
nology shocks. The empirical impulse responses against which the performance of the the-
oretical models is assessed are taken from the SVAR estimation in Christiano et al. (2013).
The numbers in the square bracket are the standard deviations of the estimates. The lower
panel provides the value of the criterion function (2.31) at the minimum.
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Table 2.3: Optimal Simple Rules: transitory markup shock ρu = 0 and no
habit h = 0
Approach Prior
Optimal Simple Rule Welfare Loss
ρR ρπ ρwπ ρx Objective Ls&m(Θ∗) CEV s&m(Θ∗) Lsw(Θ∗) CEV sw(Θ∗)
Bayesian
(0, 1) 0 0 66.6844 2.3852 3.1047 2.1568 0.1094 3.1047 0.0010
(0.1, 0.9) 0 0 61.5860 2.0019 3.0099 2.1566 0.1092 3.1048 0.0010
(0.2, 0.8) 0 0 56.4038 1.6763 2.9151 2.1565 0.1091 3.1048 0.0011
(0.3, 0.7) 0 0.6240 0.5226 0 2.8139 2.1028 0.0554 3.1186 0.0149
(0.4, 0.6) 0 0.6368 0.5160 0 2.7123 2.1025 0.0551 3.1188 0.0151
(0.5, 0.5) 0 0.6558 0.5131 0 2.6106 2.1022 0.0548 3.1190 0.0153
(0.6, 0.4) 0 0.7005 0.5158 0 2.5088 2.1014 0.0540 3.1199 0.0162
(0.7, 0.3) 0 0.8135 0.5231 0 2.4067 2.0994 0.0520 3.1240 0.0202
(0.8, 0.2) 0 1.1725 0.5245 0 2.3031 2.0920 0.0446 3.1475 0.0438
(0.9, 0.1) 0.8177 0.8860 0 0 2.1870 2.0623 0.0149 3.3098 0.2061
(1, 0) 0.9366 2.1197 0 0 2.0477 2.0477 0.0003 4.0851 0.9814
Minimax 0 0 66.6844 2.3852 3.1047 2.1568 0.1094 3.1047 0.0010
Exchanging OTR 2.1607 0.1133 4.4070 1.3033
Note: Table 2.3 documents the optimal simple rules when policymakers have two reference
models, the NK model with search and matching frictions and the NK model with sticky
wages when ρu = 0 and h = 0. For the Bayesian approach, the prior (ω, 1− ω) means
that probability ω is attached to the search and matching model and probability (1 −
ω) is attached to the sticky wage model being the true data-generating process. For the
Bayesian and the minmax approach, objective functions are LBayesian = ω ∗ Ls&m(Θ∗) +
(1− ω) ∗ Lsw(Θ∗) and Lminmax = max{Ls&m(Θ∗),Lsw(Θ∗)} respectively. Ls&m(Θ∗) and
CEV s&m(Θ∗) denote the welfare loss and the consumption equivalent variation for the
search and matching model under each optimal simple rule. Similarly, do Lsw(Θ∗) and
CEV sw(Θ∗) for the sticky wage model. Exchanging OTR refers to exchanging the optimal
targeting rules between the two models.
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Table 2.4: Restricted Optimal Simple Rules: ρu = 0 and h = 0
Bayesian Approach Prior
Restricted Optimal Rule Welfare Loss
ρR ρπ ρwπ ρx ω ∗ Ls&m(Θ∗) + (1− ω) ∗ Lsw(Θ∗) Ls&m(Θ∗) Lsw(Θ∗)
Case I:
(0, 1) 0 0 66.6844 2.3852 3.1047 2.1567 3.1047
No interest rate smoothing
(0.1, 0.9) 0 0 61.5860 2.0019 3.0099 2.1566 3.1048
(0.2, 0.8) 0 0 56.4038 1.6763 2.9151 2.1565 3.1048
(0.3, 0.7) 0 0.6240 0.5226 0 2.8139 2.1028 3.1186
(0.4, 0.6) 0 0.6368 0.5160 0 2.7123 2.1025 3.1188
(0.5, 0.5) 0 0.6558 0.5131 0 2.6106 2.1022 3.1190
(0.6, 0.4) 0 0.7005 0.5158 0 2.5088 2.1014 3.1199
(0.7, 0.3) 0 0.8135 0.5231 0 2.4067 2.0994 3.1240
(0.8, 0.2) 0 1.1725 0.5245 0 2.3031 2.0920 3.1475
(0.9, 0.1) 0 2.2488 0.4734 0 2.1922 2.0730 3.2651
(1, 0) 0 51.5995 5.2078 0.5170 2.0485 2.0485 20.0584
Case II:
(0, 1) 0 0 100 0 3.1059 2.1556 3.1059
No output gap
(0.1, 0.9) 0 0 100 0 3.0108 2.1556 3.1059
(0.2, 0.8) 0 0 100 0 2.9158 2.1556 3.1059
(0.3, 0.7) 0 0.6240 0.5226 0 2.8139 2.1028 3.1186
(0.4, 0.6) 0 0.6368 0.5160 0 2.7123 2.1025 3.1188
(0.5, 0.5) 0 0.6558 0.5131 0 2.6106 2.1022 3.1190
(0.6, 0.4) 0 0.7005 0.5158 0 2.5088 2.1014 3.1200
(0.7, 0.3) 0 0.8135 0.5231 0 2.4067 2.0993 3.1242
(0.8, 0.2) 0 1.1725 0.5245 0 2.3031 2.0920 3.1475
(0.9, 0.1) 0.8177 0.8860 0 0 2.1870 2.0623 3.3098
(1, 0) 0.9366 2.1197 0 0 2.0477 2.0477 4.0851
Case III:
(0, 1) 0 0 66.6844 2.3852 3.1047 2.1567 3.1047
No price inflation
(0.1, 0.9) 0 0 61.5860 2.0019 3.0099 2.1566 3.1048
(0.2, 0.8) 0 0 56.4038 1.6763 2.9151 2.1565 3.1048
(0.3, 0.7) 0 0 93.0510 2.1243 2.8203 2.1563 3.1048
(0.4, 0.6) 0 0 93.5958 2.3938 2.7254 2.1564 3.1048
(0.5, 0.5) 0.5709 0 5.0689 0.2221 2.6309 2.1554 3.1063
(0.6, 0.4) 0.3093 0 20.0193 0.4160 2.5357 2.1559 3.1055
(0.7, 0.3) 0.4090 0 20.0150 0.2744 2.4407 2.1556 3.1060
(0.8, 0.2) 0.5257 0 20.0071 0.1165 2.3457 2.1554 3.1067
(0.9, 0.1) 0.6127 0 19.9914 0 2.2505 2.1553 3.1075
(1, 0) 0.9269 0 19.3246 0 2.1552 2.1552 3.1076
Case IV:
(0, 1) 0 1.0001 0 11.2269 3.1107 2.2809 3.1107
No wage inflation
(0.1, 0.9) 0.0473 0.9528 0 2.3993 3.0267 2.2599 3.1119
(0.2, 0.8) 0.9900 0.0113 0 0.0011 2.9370 2.1308 3.1386
(0.3, 0.7) 0.9900 0.0112 0 7.5300e04 2.8357 2.1232 3.1410
(0.4, 0.6) 0.9900 0.0111 0 5.1800e04 2.7335 2.1178 3.1439
(0.5, 0.5) 0.9142 0.1019 0 5.5770e04 2.6296 2.1052 3.1539
(0.6, 0.4) 0.9079 0.1171 0 0 2.5243 2.1024 3.1572
(0.7, 0.3) 0.8947 0.2260 0 0 2.4176 2.0912 3.1790
(0.8, 0.2) 0.8669 0.4487 0 0 2.3061 2.0769 3.2226
(0.9, 0.1) 0.8177 0.8861 0 0 2.1870 2.0623 3.3099
(1, 0) 0.9367 2.1182 0 0 2.0477 2.0477 4.0846
Note: Table 2.4 reports the optimal simple rules under the Bayesian approach similar to
Table 2.3 when restricting the rule not to respond to one of the variables in (2.48) at the
time.
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Table 2.5: Euclidean Distance of IRFs under robust Taylor rules
Search Model Stickywage Model
Technology Shock Price Markup Shock Technology Shock Price Markup Shock
Reference Prior (1,0) (1,0) (0,1) (0,1)
Prior (0,1) 0.0042 0.0522 0 0
Prior (0.1,0.9) 0.0042 0.0522 0.0000 0.0001
Prior (0.2,0.8) 0.0042 0.0522 0.0001 0.0003
Prior (0.3,0.7) 0.0033 0.0407 0.0003 0.0077
Prior (0.4,0.6) 0.0032 0.0405 0.0003 0.0077
Prior (0.5,0.5) 0.0032 0.0402 0.0004 0.0078
Prior (0.6,0.4) 0.0031 0.0397 0.0006 0.0080
Prior (0.7,0.3) 0.0030 0.0386 0.0011 0.0086
Prior (0.8,0.2) 0.0027 0.0347 0.0024 0.0116
Prior (0.9,0.1) 0.0001 0.0191 0.0098 0.0245
Prior (1,0) 0 0 0.0157 0.0659
Note: Table 2.5 documents the Euclidean distance between the impulse response functions
(IRFs) for price inflation, wage inflation, and output under the ω-optimal simple rule for
both models. Reference prior (1,0) means that the IRFs of the search and matching model
are taken as reference to compute the Euclidean distance, whereas reference prior (0,1)
means that IRFs of sticky wage model are taken as reference.
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Table 2.6: Optimal Simple Rules: persistent markup shock ρu = 0.2 and no
habit h = 0
Approach Prior
Optimal Simple Rule Welfare Loss
ρR ρπ ρwπ ρx Objective Ls&m(Θ∗) CEV s&m(Θ∗) Lsw(Θ∗) CEV sw(Θ∗)
Bayesian
(0, 1) 0 0 66.6812 1.6100 3.2524 2.2305 0.1520 3.2524 0.0014
(0.1, 0.9) 0 0 62.1310 1.3100 3.1501 2.2302 0.1518 3.2524 0.0014
(0.2, 0.8) 0 0 57.0042 1.0663 3.0479 2.2300 0.1516 3.2524 0.0015
(0.3, 0.7) 0 0 51.9820 0.8663 2.9457 2.2299 0.1514 3.2524 0.0015
(0.4, 0.6) 0 0 47.4445 0.6725 2.8434 2.2297 0.1513 3.2525 0.0016
(0.5, 0.5) 0 0.6436 0.5084 0 2.7087 2.1448 0.0663 3.2726 0.0217
(0.6, 0.4) 0 0.6743 0.5110 0 2.5958 2.1441 0.0656 3.2735 0.0226
(0.7, 0.3) 0 0.7419 0.5165 0 2.4827 2.1424 0.0639 3.2768 0.0259
(0.8, 0.2) 0 0.9590 0.5250 0 2.3683 2.1361 0.0576 3.2973 0.0463
(0.9, 0.1) 0.8744 0.5682 0 0 2.2419 2.0993 0.0208 3.5253 0.2744
(1, 0) 0.9789 1.4644 0 0 2.0785 2.0785 0.0000 4.7228 1.4719
Minimax 0 0 66.6812 1.6100 3.2524 2.2305 0.1520 3.2524 0.0014
Exchanging OTR 2.2372 0.1588 5.5388 2.2879
Note: Table 2.6 reports the optimal simple rules under the Bayesian and minmax approach
similar to Table 2.3 when the two models feature persistent markup shocks ρu = 0.2 and no
habit persistence h = 0.
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Table 2.7: Optimal Simple Rules: transitory markup shock ρu = 0 and habit
h = 0.6
Approach Prior
Optimal Simple Rule Welfare Loss
ρR ρπ ρwπ ρx Objective Ls&m(Θ∗) CEV s&m(Θ∗) Lsw(Θ∗) CEV sw(Θ∗)
Bayesian
(0, 1) 0 0 68.1424 1.4345 3.1519 2.1796 0.1347 3.1519 0.0007
(0.1, 0.9) 0 0.6175 1.3949 0 3.0546 2.1689 0.1240 3.1530 0.0018
(0.2, 0.8) 0 0.6561 1.3497 0 2.9561 2.1678 0.1229 3.1532 0.0020
(0.3, 0.7) 0 0.7064 1.3276 0 2.8575 2.1664 0.1215 3.1537 0.0025
(0.4, 0.6) 0 0.7754 1.3139 0 2.7586 2.1646 0.1197 3.1547 0.0035
(0.5, 0.5) 0 0.8786 1.3099 0 2.6594 2.1621 0.1172 3.1568 0.0056
(0.6, 0.4) 0.9882 1.4557 0 0.2369 2.5576 2.1205 0.0756 3.2132 0.0620
(0.7, 0.3) 0.9198 2.4368 0 0.3228 2.4461 2.1042 0.0593 3.2438 0.0926
(0.8, 0.2) 0.8178 4.0965 0 0.4114 2.3289 2.0867 0.0418 3.2976 0.1464
(0.9, 0.1) 0.6763 6.9621 0 0.4346 2.2020 2.0677 0.0228 3.4110 0.2598
(1, 0) 0 41.4453 1.6503 0 2.0465 2.0465 0.0016 5.0518 1.9006
Minimax 0 0 68.1424 1.4345 3.1519 2.1796 0.1347 3.1519 0.0007
Note: Table 2.7 reports the optimal simple rules under the Bayesian and minmax approach
similar to Table 2.3 when the two models feature transitory markup shocks ρu = 0 and
habit persistence h = 0.6.
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Figure 2.1: Impulse response function matching under neutral technology
shock
Note: Figure 2.1 depicts the impulse responses to a neutral technology shock in the search
and matching model (blue) and the sticky wage model (red). The solid black lines show the
point estimates of the empirical impulse responses along with the 90% confidence interval,
the grey shaded area. Inflation rates and the federal fund rate are annualized.
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Figure 2.2: Impulse response function matching under neutral technology
shock with wage indexation in the sticky wage model
Note: Figure 2.2 depicts the impulse responses to a neutral technology shock in the search
and matching model (blue) and the sticky wage model (red). The solid black lines show the
point estimates of the empirical impulse responses along with the 90% confidence interval,
the grey shaded area. Inflation rates and the federal fund rate are annualized.
145
Figure 2.3: Targeting rules in the search and matching model: neutral tech-
nology shock
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Note: Figure 2.3 plots the impulse responses in the search and matching model to a neu-
tral technology shock when policy follows the optimal targeting rule from the search and
matching model (purple) and the sticky wage model (yellow).
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Figure 2.4: Targeting rules in the search and matching model: price markup
shock
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Note: Figure 2.4 plots the impulse responses in the search and matching model to a price
markup shock when policy follows the optimal targeting rule from the search and matching
model (purple) and the sticky wage model (yellow).
147
Figure 2.5: Targeting rules in the sticky wage model: neutral technology shock
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Note: Figure 2.5 plots the impulse responses in the sticky wage model to a neutral technology
shock when policy follows the optimal targeting rule from the sticky wage model (blue) and
the search and matching model (yellow).
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Figure 2.6: Targeting rules in the sticky wage model: price markup shock
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Note: Figure 2.6 plots the impulse responses in the sticky wage model to a price markup
shock when policy follows the optimal targeting rule from the sticky wage model (blue) and
the search and matching model (yellow).
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Figure 2.7: Impulse responses under optimal simple rules




































































































Note: Figure 2.7 compares the performance of the search and matching and the sticky wage
model under ω-optimal simple rules (0, 1), (0.2, 0.8), (0.3, 0.7), (0.8, 0.2), (0.9, 0.1), and (1, 0)
for the neutral technology shock and the price markup shock.
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Figure 2.8: Targeting rules with wage indexation in the sticky wage model:
price markup shock































































Note: Figure 2.8 compares the performance of optimal targeting rules for both the search
and matching model and the sticky wage model in response to a price markup shock when
the sticky wage model features wage indexation.
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Figure 2.9: Targeting rules with simple loss function: price markup shock





































































































for both the search and matching model and the sticky wage model
in response to a price markup shock. In the upper six panels, it is λx = λ∗ = 0.0429; in the
lower six panels it is λx = 1.
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Chapter 3
Optimal Monetary Policy with
Labor Market Frictions
3.1 Introduction
Recent study by Christiano et al. (2013) shows that incorporating search and
matching frictions into conventional DSGE model can better fit empirical ev-
idence under an estimated Taylor rule, in particular regarding labor market
variables. In terms of the normative perspectives, although optimal monetary
policy in conventional NKM has been widely explored started from Rotemberg
and Woodford (1997) and Woodford (2001) for NKM with walrasian labor
market and continued by Erceg et al. (2000) with staggered nominal wages,
etc., there are only few studies on optimal monetary policy in NK models
with labor market frictions formed as search and matching frictions. Excep-
tions are Blanchard and Gal´ı (2010), Thomas (2008), and Ravenna and Walsh
(2011) and those authors examine optimal monetary policy with labor market
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frictions by imposing Hosios (1990) condition to ensure non-distorted steady
state. Going beyond the existing literature we examine optimal monetary pol-
icy in NK model with labor market frictions and assume that the steady state
of the model may be ineﬃcient, an assumption that opens up new conceptual
and mathematical challenges.
When Hosios condition is respected, the dynamics of labor market variables
are eﬃcient even in the presence of search and matching frictions in the labor
market as in Diamond (1982), Mortensen (1982), and Pissarides (1985). Thus,
the optimal policy implication is similar to the case as in standard NK models
where price inflation is kept under control and sticky price economy reverts
to the eﬃcient level. From technical perspectives, if Hosios (1990) condition
holds in labor markets, model steady state will be eﬃcient. Accordingly, in
LQ framework, the first order approximation to the model structure equations
is suﬃcient to derive the correct quadratic loss function even in the presence of
labor market frictions, enabling us to investigate optimal monetary policy; for
instance, Blanchard and Gal´ı (2010), Thomas (2008), and Ravenna and Walsh
(2011). However, if Hosios condition is violated, both model steady state and
model dynamics are distorted. The distortions pose additional challenges to
obtain correct LQ systems associated with the original nonlinear system and
thus to analyze the optimal monetary policy, as the second order approxi-
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mation to the model structure equations is necessary to arrive at the correct
quadratic loss function.1. In this paper, even in the presence of ineﬃcient labor
market frictions, we manage to characterize the optimal policy using a purely
quadratic approximation to the utility function of the representative agent
and further derive the optimal targeting rule following the ideas discussed in
Giannoni and Woodford (2016)2 3.
We first document the general approach to obtaining correct loss functions
for NK models with search and matching frictions. The procedures of the
approach can be summarized as: (1), Deriving nonlinear equilibrium condi-
tions for original search and matching model. (2), Simplifying the nonlin-
ear equation system obtained in step (1) such that it only involves variables
that show up in the log-linearized model, together with sticky price variables
{Up, V p, p˜optt ,Ωy}. (3), Applying the numerical approach to retrieve welfare
matrices based on the simplified equation system. (4), Writing out the loss
function by plugging in retrieved welfare matrices. (5), Using the log-linearized
structure equations to eliminate sticky price variables {Up, V p, p˜optt ,Ωy} in the
loss function. (6), Obtaining the correct quadratic loss function, even though
1This is true even in standard NKM with distorted steady state, see Benigno and Wood-
ford (2004), Benigno and Woodford (2005), and Benigno and Woodford (2012).
2Optimal targeting rules are able to implement optimal monetary policy by only involv-
ing model endogenous and exogenous variables; instrument rules are not optimal though
specifying how the instrument reacts to model variables.
3Although Faia (2009) studies optimal monetary policy with labor market frictions where
Hosios (1990) condition is violated, she abstracts from the issue of optimal targeting rules.
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we can only know numerically the value of the associated coeﬃcients which
depend on model structure parameters.
We then log-linearize the structure equations for NK models with search
and matching frictions. According to price inflation NKPC, similar to standard
NKM, the inflation dynamic in search and matching models is determined by
current and future real marginal cost which is proportional to the ratio of real
wage to marginal product of labor. However, real wage in search and matching
models is determined through a bargaining process rather than simply equal to
marginal rate of substitution between leisure and consumption. Thus, labor
market variables start to aﬀect inflation dynamics directly through NKPC.
Further, real interest rate aﬀects inflation dynamics through price inflation
NKPC directly. This channel, which is absent in standard NKM, is named as
”cost-channel” in Ravenna and Walsh (2008) and Ravenna and Walsh (2011).
In contrast to standard NKM, IS equation in search and matching models
features not only forward looking behavior but also backward looking behavior
even with standard household preferences that exhibit no habit persistence,
see also Ravenna and Walsh (2011). When intensive labor supply presents,
the aggregate demand IS relationship is comprise of both Euler equation and
the equation capturing the relationship between employment and output.
After having both the correct quadratic loss function and the linear struc-
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ture equations, optimal targeting rules can be obtained after eliminating all
the lagrange multipliers in the FOCs of the LQ system. To obtain optimal
targeting rules in our settings requires to: (1) derive the objective function
of the policymaker as a purely quadratic approximation to the preferences of
the representative household; (2) obtain the first order conditions associated
with the policymakers problem of optimizing the (quadratic) objective func-
tion subject to the (linear) equations that describe the behavior of the private
sector; (3) combine the first order conditions to obtain a single equation with-
out Lagrange multipliers; this targeting rule describes the relationship between
the endogenous and exogenous variables under the optimal policy.
Further, we compare optimal targeting rules obtained under various labor
market specifications and contrast with the optimal targeting rule in stan-
dard NKM. When Hosios condition holds and intensive labor supply is absent,
similar to the model studied in Ravenna and Walsh (2011), the optimal tar-
geting rule now highly depends on the dynamics of labor market variables.
The optimal targeting rule requires price inflation to react to labor market
variables, including contemporary employment, lagged employment, and for-
ward employment, contemporary output level, forward output level, forward
price inflation, and lagged price level. When Hosios condition is violated and
intensive labor supply is absent, price markup shocks start to enter the op-
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timal targeting rule, as opposed to the case where Hosios condition holds in
the presence of search and matching frictions. Deviating from Hosios condition
distorts both model steady state and model flexible economy. Not surprisingly,
price markup shocks will have to be eﬀective in the optimal targeting rule for
search and matching model when Hosios condition is violated. When Hosios
condition is violated and intensive labor supply exists, the optimal targeting
rule further involves the historical averages of output, employment, technology
shock, price markup shock, and price level. Surprisingly, the optimal target-
ing rule in NKM with search and matching frictions when Hosios condition is
respected and intensive labor supply exists does not depend on labor market
variables at all. The contemporary employment, lead and lag of employment,
and the historical average of employment all disappear. The price markup
shocks do not aﬀect the optimal targeting rule because of Hosios condition.
The optimal targeting rule in this case is much close to the optimal targeting
rule in standard NKM.
To further have a better understanding of the features of optimal target-
ing rules, we then explore how targeting rules and loss functions taken from
models with diﬀerent labor market specifications perform in the full model. It
has been found that the targeting rule obtained from NKM with search and
matching frictions when intensive labor supply is absent and Hosios condition
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is respected is superior to the loss function obtained under the same frame-
work. At the same time, the targeting rule obtained from the textbook NKM
outperforms the loss function obtained from the textbook NKM as well. Thus,
targeting rules are more robust across models than loss functions. Surprisingly,
the targeting rule taken from the textbook NK model closely resembles the
original Ramsey plan.
Section 2 derives optimal targeting criteria for NKM with search and
matching frictions when intensive labor supply is either absent or present.
Section 3 further displays the implications of optimal targeting rules. We
conclude at section 4.
3.2 Optimal targeting criteria
In principle, the time invariant optimal targeting rules should be able to fully
replicate the optimal monetary policy from timeless perspective. Since optimal
targeting rules can be summarized as additional equations that describe the
relationship of model structure variables (not include lagranger multipliers),
optimal monetary policy can be implemented without a complete description
of the state of the world that in general involves more fine-grained information.
Optimal targeting rules that consist of only model endogenous and exoge-
nous variables are delivered after eliminating all the lagrange multipliers from
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FOC of the LQ problem, following the approach suggested by Giannoni and
Woodford (2003) and Giannoni and Woodford (2016). Nevertheless, it is im-
possible to know what optimal targeting rules should look like if lacking of
knowledge on the correct quadratic loss function for NKM with search and
matching frictions, in particular when Hosios condition in the labor market is
violated, resulting in distorted steady state. If Hosios (1990) condition holds,
model steady state will be eﬃcient. Therefore, the first order approximation
to model structure equations is suﬃcient to derive the correct quadratic loss
function even in the presence of labor market frictions; for instance, Blanchard
and Gal´ı (2010), Thomas (2008), and Ravenna and Walsh (2011). However, if
Hosios condition is violated as in our case, both model steady state and model
dynamics are distorted. Moreover, the distortions due to deviation from Hosios
condition are distinct with steady state distortions that arise from intermediate
firms’ monopolistic competition power but more close to distortions that result
from external habit in standard NKM. Hence, the second order approximation
to model structure equations is necessary to arrive at the correct quadratic
loss function. Accordingly, we use an numerical approach to obtain the cor-
rect loss function for NKM with ineﬃcient labor market frictions, although the
coeﬃcients associated with each term in the loss function can only be known
numerically. After having the correct LQ problem, the optimal targeting rule
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for search and matching model can then be derived correspondingly.
Next, we first summarize the general procedures to obtain quadratic loss
functions for NKM with search and matching frictions. After having correct
quadratic welfare criteria, we then derive the optimal targeting rule in the LQ
framework for each model accordingly. Finally, we contrast optimal target-
ing rules for five economies, including standard NKM, NKM with search and
matching frictions when Hosios condition holds and intensive labor supply is
absent, NKM with search and matching frictions when Hosios condition does
not hold and intensive labor supply is absent, NKM with search and matching
frictions when Hosios condition holds and intensive labor supply presents, and
NKM with search and matching frictions when Hosios condition is violated
and intensive labor supply presents, to see the role of search and matching
frictions, Hosios condition, and intensive labor supply in determining optimal
targeting rules.
3.2.1 Quadratic welfare criteria
Following a large body of the literature, we opt for the optimal monetary
policy under commitment from a timeless perspective as the reference point
to evaluate the performance of diﬀerent policies. Optimality from a timeless
perspective assumes that the policymaker can “pre-commit” and converts the
problem into a recursive structure as shown in detail in Benigno and Woodford
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(2012). As shown in Bodenstein et al. (2014), the first-order approximation to
the system of first order conditions associated with original nonlinear model















EtC(L)xˆt+1 +D(L)ζt = 0
C(L)xˆt0 = dt0
ζt = Γζt−1 +Υξt (3.1)
where xˆt0 measures the (log-) deviation of variable “x” from its value as-
sumed in deterministic steady state. The matrices (A(L), B(L)) capture the
second-order approximation of the welfare function, where “L” denotes the
lag-operator. The matrices C(L) and D(L) capture the linear approximation
of the constraints. The linear constraints C(L)xˆt0 = dt0 implement the time-
less perspective through the appropriate choice of dt0 . The model description
is completed by the evolution of the exogenous variables, the last equation in
(3.1). The innovations ξt follow iid standard normal distributions. The details
of the matrices are provided in Bodenstein et al. (2014).
All welfare relevant matrices in the above LQ problem can be retrieved
by using our numeric approach4. After plugging in values of retrieved welfare
4Notice that the welfare matrices must be retrieved from the simplified model equation
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matrices A(L) and B(L) into the quadratic objective function of LQ problem
(3.1) and taking account of all the zero elements in retrieved welfare matrices
A(L) and B(L), the approximation to the preferences of the representative
household for search and matching model with both extensive and intensive












































+b8,3yˆtnˆt−1 + c3,1nˆtaˆt + c3,2nˆtθˆp,t + c8,1yˆtaˆt
+c8,2yˆtθˆp,t (3.2)
Where yˆt is output, πˆt refers to price inflation, and nˆt stands for employ-





are variables associated with recursive equations in nonlinear sticky price equa-
tions. aˆt is technology shock and θˆp,t is price markup shock. ai,j = A0(i, j),
bi,j = A1(i, j), and ci,j = B1(i, j) for corresponding index (i, j).
Besides terms that agree with standard NKM, labor market variables start
to aﬀect the loss function. The lagged employment becomes a new state vari-
able in search and matching models. Hence, the lagged employment should
enter the second order approximation to agents’ utility function. If intensive
system.
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labor supply was absent, employment would be substituted out completely
by output under linear production technology. Yet, the relationship between
output and employment becomes much more complicated when intensive and
extensive labor supply coexist. Thus, contemporary employment needs to
show up as well in the loss function.
Similarly, the approximation to the preferences of the representative house-













































+b8,3yˆtnˆt−1 + b3,8nˆtyˆt−1 + b8,8yˆtyˆt−1 + c3,1nˆtaˆt
+c3,2nˆtθˆp,t + c8,1yˆtaˆt + c8,2yˆtθˆp,t + c11,1nˆt−1aˆt
+c11,2nˆt−1θˆt + d3,1nˆtaˆt−1 + d3,2nˆtθˆp,t−1 + d8,1yˆtaˆt−1
+d8,2yˆtθˆp,t−1 (3.3)
where ai,j = A0(i, j), bi,j = A1(i, j), ci,j = B1(i, j), and di,j = B2(i, j) for the
corresponding location (i, j).
Using a first order approximation, the nonlinear equations associated with
Calvo sticky price can be summarized into price inflation NKPC. Therefore,
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sticky price variables { ˆ˜poptt , Uˆpt , Vˆ pt } will only show up in the nonlinear equation
system but not in the log-linearized equation system. To make the loss function
work properly in corresponding to linearized structure equations, the sticky
price variables have to be substituted out.
Log-linearizing the evolution equation for optimized price delivers:
ˆ˜poptt =
ξp
1− ξp πˆt (3.4)
Equation (3.4) can be used to replace optimized price ˆ˜poptt with price inflation
πˆt in the loss function.













Ωˆpt = 0 ∀ t (3.6)
Equation (3.6) implies that price dispersions have no impact on welfare losses
in terms of the first order approximation. Consequently, we can simply ignore
the terms that involve price dispersion (for any period) in the loss function.





























































































t ; The third
identity is true as a6,7 +
1
2
a7,7 = 0; Plugging in equation (3.4) gives us the
fourth identity; The fifth identity holds as a2,6 + a2,7 + a6,7
ξp
1− ξp = 0.
We convert the approximation to household’s preference, L˜IntensiveLt , into
a loss function by defining LIntensiveLt = −L˜IntensiveLt
LIntensiveLt = Pπ,ππˆ2t + Py,yyˆ2t + Pn,nnˆ2t + Pn−,n−nˆ2t−1 + Py,nnˆtyˆt
+Py,n− yˆtnˆt−1 + Pn,n−nˆtnˆt−1 + Pn,anˆtaˆt + Pn,pnˆtθˆp,t
+Py,ayˆtaˆt + Py,pyˆtθˆp,t (3.8)


















a3,3, Pn−,n− = −12a11,11, Py,n = −
1
2
a3,8, Py,n− = − (a8,11 + b8,3), Pn,n− =
− (a3,11 + b3,3), Pn,a = −c3,1, Pn,p = −c3,2, Py,a = −c8,1, Py,p = −c8,2.
Similarly, we convert the approximation to household’s preference, L˜NointensiveLt ,
into a loss function by defining LNointensiveLt = −L˜NointensiveLt 5:
LNointensiveLt = Pπ,ππˆ2t + Py,yyˆ2t + Pn,nnˆ2t + Pn−,n−nˆ2t−1 + Py,nnˆtyˆt
+Py,n− yˆtnˆt−1 + Pn,n−nˆtnˆt−1 + Pn,y−nˆtyˆt−1 + Py,y− yˆtyˆt−1
+Pn,anˆtaˆt + Pn,pnˆtθˆp,t + Py,ayˆtaˆt + Py,pyˆtθˆp,t
+Pn−,anˆt−1aˆt + Pn−,pnˆt−1θˆp,t + Pn,a−nˆtat−1
+Pn,p−nˆtθp,t−1 + Py,a− yˆtat−1 + Py,p− yˆtθp,t−1 (3.9)

















a3,3, Pn−,n− = −12a11,11, Py,n = −
1
2
a3,8, Py,n− = − (a8,11 + b8,3), Pn,n− =
− (a3,11 + b3,3), Pn,a = −c3,1, Pn,p = −c3,2, Py,a = −c8,1, Py,p = −c8,2, Pn,y− =
−b3,8, Py,y− = −b8,8, Pn−,a = −c11,1, Pn−,p = −c11,2, Pn,a− = −d3,1, Pn,p− =
−d3,2, Py,a− = −d8,1, Py,p− = −d8,2.
To sum up, the procedures for deriving the correct loss functions for search
and matching models are as follows:
5Ravenna and Walsh (2011) express the loss function for search and matching model
with only extensive labor supply as a weighted average of price inflation and unemployment
gap (lead, lag, and contemporary). In their case, the flexible economy is eﬃcient as Hosios
condition is met. Hence, the flexible economy unemployment can be taken as the reference
to define unemployment gap. Apparently, our loss function is equivalent to theirs, provided
Hosios condition is respected. Once Hosios condition is violated, specifying proper definition
of gaps for search and matching model is out of our scope. We leave it for future study.
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1. deriving nonlinear equilibrium conditions for original search and match-
ing model.
2. simplifying the nonlinear equation system obtained in the first step such
that it only involves variables that show up in the log-linearized model,
together with sticky price variables {Up, V p, p˜optt ,Ωy}.
3. applying the numerical approach to retrieve welfare matrices based on
the simplified equation system.
4. writing out the loss function by plugging in retrieved welfare matrices.
5. using the log-linearized structure equations to eliminate sticky price vari-
ables {Up, V p, p˜optt ,Ωy} in the loss function.
6. obtaining the correct quadratic loss function, even though we can only
know numerically the value of the associated coeﬃcients which depend
on model structure parameters.
3.2.2 Loglinearized structure equations
In appendix, we show that the log-linearized model structure equations of
NKM with search and matching frictions in the presence of both intensive and
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extensive labor supply can be written as:
πˆt = βEtπˆt+1 + κpMˆCt + θˆp,t (3.10)
MˆCt = ø1yˆt − (1 + φ) aˆt − (θ1nˆt + θ2nˆt−1) (3.11)











γ1Etnˆt+1 + γ2nˆt + γ3nˆt−1






MˆCt represents intermediate firms’ real marginal cost. iˆt refers to short term
nominal interest rate. The expressions of all relevant coeﬃcients can be found
in appendix C.1.
After substituting the log-linearized real wage bargaining equation (3.13)
into the marginal cost equation (3.11), we would have a price inflation NKPC
that is analogous to the one in Ravenna and Walsh (2008) and Ravenna and
Walsh (2011)6.




























6NKPC in Ravenna and Walsh (2008) and Ravenna and Walsh (2011) is derived in the
model with only extensive labor supply and with Hosios condtion being met.
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Similar to standard NKM, the inflation dynamic in search and matching mod-
els is determined by current and future real marginal cost. Calvo price stick-
iness paramter ξp governs the elasticity of inflation on real marginal cost.
NKPC is flatter with higher ξp, as intermediate firms become more sluggish to
adjust price if price stickiness is higher. As in standard NKM, real marginal
cost is proportional to the ratio of real wage to marginal product of labor.
However, as opposed to standard NKM, real wage in search and matching
models is determined through a bargaining process rather than simply equal
to marginal rate of substitution between leisure and consumption.
As opposed to standard NKM, labor market variables start to aﬀect infla-
tion dynamics directly through NKPC. (According to the log-linearized rela-
tionship between labor market tightness and employment, θˆt = ν1nˆt−ν1ν2nˆt−1,
a rise of lagged employment decreases labor market tightness. From the log-
linearize relationship between labor market tightness and vacancy filling rate,
qˆt = −ζθˆt, the fall of labor market tightness reduces vacancy filling rate.) A
rise in lagged employment decreases labor market tightness, raises vacancy
filling rate and brings down the cost of filling a job for wholesale firms, re-
ducing the ratio of wholesale prices to retail prices and thus real marginal




γ3 − θ2 < 0, indicating the negative elasticity of inflation on
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lagged employment. By the same token, a rise of contemporary employment
will lead to a increase in inflation as the elasticity of inflation on contemporary
employment is positive, i.e.
ø1
1 + ø1
γ2−θ1 > 0. A rise of contemporary employ-
ment increases labor market tightness, reduces vacancy filling rate and drives
up the cost of filling a job for wholesale firms, raising the ratio of wholesale
prices to retail prices and thus real marginal cost of retail firms. As a result,
inflation goes up. By contrast, a rise of future employment reduces inflation
according to the fact that
ø1
1 + ø1
γ1 < 0. The expectation of greater future
employment leads to higher expectation of future labor market tightness and
lower expectation on future vacancy filling rate, raising the expected cost of
filling a job in the future. This increases the value of existing matches as fu-
ture job posting cost can be saved if the existing match survives to following
periods. Hence, the greater the expected future cost of filling a vacancy, the
less the cost incurred by wholesale firms associated with current labor match.
The fall in wholesale firms’ cost reduces the ratio of wholesale prices to retail
prices, and thus decreases real marginal cost of retail firms. Accordingly, price
inflation drops. Finally, higher real interest rate reduces the present value of
saved future vacancy posting cost. Wholesale firms need to incur more cost
for current labor match, leading to greater ratio of wholesale prices to retail
prices and thus greater real marginal cost of retail firms. Therefore, price in-
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flation will have to go up. This channel, which is absent in standard NKM,
is named as ”cost-channel” in Ravenna and Walsh (2008) and Ravenna and
Walsh (2011). In the presence of cost channel, optimal monetary policy faces
the tradeoﬀ between price inflation stabilization and output gap stabilization
even in response to technology shock, see Ravenna and Walsh (2006).
Regarding IS relationship, if intensive labor supply is removed from our
model, the elasticity of working hour supply should be zero, i.e. φ = ∞, and
the relationship between yˆt and nˆt can be simplified as yˆt = aˆt + nˆt instead of
the complicated formula given by equation (3.13). Moreover, we are able to
show that aggregate demand equation (3.12) can be written as:









+γdn (ρa − 1) aˆt (3.15)
As stressed in Ravenna and Walsh (2011), in contrast to standard NKM, IS
equation in search and matching models features not only forward looking
behavior but also backward looking behavior even with standard household
preferences that exhibit no habit persistence. Lagged employment nˆt−1, the
new state variable, determines the number of people who are looking for jobs
as well as the dynamics of employment and thus output in the current period.
Hence, lagged employment shows up in IS equation as the backward looking
component.
172
The basic insights of equation (3.15) can be carried over into the case
with both intensive and extensive labor supply. But now, the relationship
between yˆt and nˆt is given by equation (3.13). In addition to extensive labor
supply, production also depends on intensive labor supply whose behavior is
aﬀected by the state variable nˆt−1. Hence, equation (3.12) and equation (3.13)
jointly determine IS relationship when search and matching models involve
both intensive and extensive labor supply.
When we eliminate equation (3.13), i.e., treating employment as fixed with
nˆt = 0 and set κc = 0 and ϖyss = 1, the standard NKM reemerges.
3.2.3 Optimal targeting rule
After having the correct quadratic loss function and linear structure equations,
we are able to derive the optimal targeting rule of search and matching mod-
els analytically following the approach suggested by Giannoni and Woodford
(2016). Evidently, the optimal targeting rule should be able to fully implement
optimal monetary policy from timeless perspective.
The correct LQ system for search and matching model with both intensive
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s.t. πt = βEtπt+1 + κp (ø1yˆt − (1 + φ) aˆt − (θ1nˆt + θ2nˆt−1)) + θˆp,t
yˆt = Etyˆt+1 − 1
ø1 − φ (it − Etπt+1)
− 1





γ1Etnˆt+1 + γ2nˆt + γ3nˆt−1
+(1 + φ) aˆt + ϑ
κEt (it − πt+1)
]
(3.16)
Where the problem is to maximize the quadratic objective function, which
is the second order approximation to agents’ utility function, subject to lin-
ear structure equations, including aggregate demand equation, price inflation
NKPC, as well as the evolution of employment. Eliminating all the lagranger
multipliers in the FOC of the LQ problem delivers the optimal targeting rule.
We show in appendix C.1 that the optimal targeting rule for search and
matching model with both intensive and extensive labor supply is given by:
ϖ1nˆt +ϖ2nˆt−1 +ϖ3Etnˆt+1 +ϖ4yˆt +ϖ5Etyˆt+1 +ϖ6aˆt









t = 0 (3.17)
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Where we define
πˆt = Pˆt − Pˆt−1 (3.18)
yˆWAt = βδyˆ
WA
t−1 + yˆt (3.19)
nˆWAt = βδnˆ
WA
t−1 + nˆt (3.20)
aˆWAt = βδaˆ
WA
t−1 + aˆt (3.21)
θˆWAp,t = βδθˆ
WA
p,t−1 + θˆp.t (3.22)
PˆWAt = βδPˆ
WA
t−1 + Pˆt (3.23)
yˆt is output level. πˆt also refers to price inflation. nˆt stands for employment.







p,t , and Pˆ
WA
t are the historical averages of output, employ-
ment, technology shock, price markup shock, and price level respectively. The
expressions of the coeﬃcients, ϖ1 to ϖ15 and βδ can be found in appendix ??.
For search and matching model with both intensive and extensive labor
supply, since the historical weighted average of output yWAt , employment n
WA
t ,
technology shock aWAt , cost push shock θ
WA
t , and price level P
WA
t−1 can be writ-
ten recursively into AR(1) form, the optimal targeting rule is able to be de-
scribed as second order linear rational expectation diﬀerence equations. Con-
sequently, all the model equilibrium equations can be combined into a linear
rational expectation system. The optimal targeting rule is given by equation
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(3.17) with additional variables being defined by equation (3.18)-(3.23). As
can be seen, labor market variables start to enter the optimal targeting rule.
The optimal targeting rule includes lead and lag of employment, contempo-
rary employment. Since output gap in search and matching model when Hosios
condition is violated has not been properly defined, shock processes, both tech-
nology shock and price markup shock, show up in the optimal targeting rule
directly. Moreover, the optimal targeting rule involves the historical averages
of output, employment, technology shock, price markup shock, and price level.
The correct LQ system for search and matching model with only extensive







s.t. πˆt = βEtπˆt+1 + κp
(



















[θ1 (Etnˆt+1 − nˆt) + θ2 (nˆt − nˆt−1)]
yˆt = aˆt + nˆt
In appendix C.2.3, using the same approach, we derive the optimal targeting

























13 Pˆt−1 = 0 (3.24)
Where we define
πˆt = Pˆt − Pˆt−1 (3.25)
For search and matching model with only extensive labor supply, the optimal
targeting rule is given by equation (3.24). As opposed to the case with inten-
sive labor supply supply, all the variables that represent the historical averages
disappear. Similar to the case with both intensive and extensive labor sup-
ply, the optimal targeting rule depends on labor market variables, including
lead and lag of employment, contemporary employment. At the same time,
shock processes, both technology shock and price markup shock, present in
the optimal targeting rule directly.
There are common features for optimal targeting rules across these two
models: (a), Optimal targeting rules specify a relationship of model endoge-
nous and exogenous variables without referring to the complete description of
the state of the world. (b), As pointed out in Giannoni and Woodford (2016),
optimal targeting rules involve only targeting variables and are independent of
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the choice of policy instrument. It can be seen that short term nominal interest
rate it is absent in optimal targeting rules for both models. (c), It is easy to
verify that optimal targeting rules for both models are determinate, meaning
the optimal targeting rules together with model structure equations yield a
unique saddle-path stable equilibrium. (d), Analogous to optimal monetary
policy from timeless perspective, some initial conditions are needed to ensure
the time invariance of optimal targeting criterion. Evidently, time invariant
optimal targeting rules should be able to fully replicate optimal monetary
policy from timeless perspective.
3.3 The implication of optimal targeting rules
In previous section, we have already derived the formulas of optimal targeting
rules in NKM with search and matching frictions. In this section, we com-
pare the explicit expressions of optimal targeting rules for NKM with search
and matching frictions under various specifications, in particular regarding
Hosios condition and intensive labor supply. Further, we study how misuses
of targeting rules and loss functions distort model dynamics
3.3.1 Optimal targeting rule comparison
It is known that model-consistent loss functions highly depend on the struc-
tures of micro-founded models. Accordingly, the model-consistent optimal
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targeting rules which are derived from correct quadratic loss functions will
have to diﬀer under diﬀerent model specifications and model structures.
To have a better understanding of optimal targeting rules in search and
matching models and to recognize the role of Hosios condition and intensive la-
bor supply in determining optimal targeting rules, we compare optimal target-
ing rules in NKM with search and matching frictions: when Hosios condition
holds and intensive labor supply is absent; when Hosios condition is violated
and intensive labor supply is absent; when Hosios condition is respected and
intensive labor supply exists; when Hosios condition is violated and intensive
labor supply exists. Applying the approach described in previous section, we
are able to obtain optimal targeting rules for NKM with search and match-
ing frictions irrespective of the status of Hosios condition and the presence
of intensive labor supply, although the coeﬃcients in optimal targeting rules
can only be known numerically. In addition, we contrast with the optimal
targeting rule in standard NKM as well. Table (3.2) reports the results of the
comparison for optimal targeting rules under various model specifications.




πˆt + (xˆt − xˆt−1) = 0. If written in terms of output level, the
optimal targeting rule becomes
1 + θp
θp
πˆt+(yˆt − yˆt−1)− 1 + σL
σC + σL
(aˆt − aˆt−1) =
0. Thus, the optimal targeting rule in standard NKM specifies a relationship
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on how price inflation reacts to the change of output level and the change of
technology shocks. It is worth of noting that price markup shocks do not show
up in the optimal targeting rule, as both model steady state and model flexible
economy are eﬃcient in standard NKM, see Woodford, ed (2003). This result
survives even in the presence of search and matching frictions as will be seen
later.
For NKM with search and matching frictions when Hosios condition holds
and intensive labor supply is absent, similar to the model studied in Ravenna
and Walsh (2011), the optimal targeting rule now highly depends on the dy-
namics of labor market variables. As can be seen from column 3 in Table (3.2),
contemporary employment, lead and lag of employment all show up with siz-
able magnitude. The optimal targeting rule requires price inflation to react
to labor market variables, including contemporary employment, lead and lag
of employment, as well as contemporary output, lead of output, lead of price
inflation, and lag of price level. Since Hosios condition leads to eﬃcient steady
state and eﬃcient flexible price economy in NKM with search and matching
frictions, similar to in standard NKM, the optimal targeting rule does not de-
pend on price markup shock. At the same time, the historical average terms
are absent due to the absence of intensive labor supply.
For NKM with search and matching frictions when Hosios condition is
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violated and intensive labor supply is absent, price markup shocks start to
enter the optimal targeting rule, as opposed to the case where Hosios condi-
tion holds in the presence of search and matching frictions. In standard NKM,
if the steady state is distorted arising from price markup charged by monop-
olistic competition firms, the correct quadratic loss function will depend on
price markup shocks. Consequently, price markup shocks enter the optimal
targeting rule in standard NKM. In search and matching model, the distor-
tions due to deviation from Hosios condition are close to distortions that result
from external habit in standard NKM, distorting both model steady state and
model flexible economy. Not surprisingly, price markup shocks will have to
be eﬀective in the optimal targeting rule for search and matching model when
Hosios condition is violated.
For NKM with search and matching frictions when Hosios condition is
violated and intensive labor supply exists, the optimal targeting rule further
involves the historical averages of output, employment, technology shock, price
markup shock, and price level. Notice that the impact of labor market vari-
ables on the optimal targeting rule is rather small according to the magnitude
of their coeﬃcients.
Surprisingly, the optimal targeting rule in NKM with search and matching
frictions when Hosios condition is respected and intensive labor supply exists
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does not depend on labor market variables at all. The contemporary employ-
ment, lead and lag of employment, and the historical average of employment
all disappear. Price markup shocks do not aﬀect the optimal targeting rule be-
cause of Hosios condition. The optimal targeting rule in this case is much close
to the optimal targeting rule in standard NKM. Although the model features
search and matching frictions in addition to price stickiness as in standard
NKM, the movements in the labor market are in eﬀect eﬃcient so long as
Hosios condition is met.
3.3.2 Wrong loss functions and wrong targeting rules
Given the fact that optimal targeting rules tend to diﬀer under diﬀerent model
structures, how significant are those diﬀerences, especially in terms of the eﬀect
on model dynamics and the welfare implications. To further visualize the
diﬀerences of optimal targeting rules, we implement targeting rules and loss
functions taken from models with diﬀerent specifications into the full model,
NKM with search and matching frictions when intensive labor supply exists
and Hosios condition is violated. More specifically, we conduct the following
experiments:
1. applying the optimal targeting rule obtained from NKM with search
and matching frictions when intensive labor supply is absent and Hosios
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condition is respected (model in Ravenna and Walsh (2011)), into the
full model,
2. applying the loss function obtained from NKM with search and matching
frictions when intensive labor supply is absent and Hosios condition is
respected (model in Ravenna and Walsh (2011)), into the full model.
3. applying the targeting rule obtained from standard NKM (simple Wood-
ford model) into the full model.
4. applying the loss function obtained from standard NKM (simple Wood-
ford model) into the full model.
Table (3.3) reports the results of welfare losses and CEV under each exper-
iment. According to the quantitative analysis, both wrong targeting rule and
wrong loss function induce small welfare losses. It can be seen from Table (3.3)
that wrong loss function is inferior to wrong targeting rule. CEV under wrong
loss function is -0.0223, which is almost two times bigger than -0.0127, CEV
under wrong target rule. More apparently, simple loss function is remarkably
inferior to simple targeting rule. CEV under simple loss function is -0.0227,
which is more than 16 times greater than -0.0014, CEV under simple target
rule. Thus, it seems targeting rules are more robust across models than loss
functions. Surprisingly, the targeting rule taken from simple Woodford model
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performs the best, even better than the optimal targeting rule taken from
Walsh model. The loss function taken from simple Woodford model performs
the worst, even worse than the loss function taken from Walsh model. Shock
processes (technology shock and price markup shock) play a significant role in
determining welfare losses for those policies. Technology shocks are eﬃcient
and create only little policy tradeoﬀs, whereas price markup shocks are inef-
ficient and generate significant policy tradeoﬀs. Thus, price markup shocks
dominate technology shocks in determining the results of welfare losses.
Figure (3.1) compares the IRFs of welfare relevant variables, including price
inflation, wage inflation, and output, in the full model under various policy
regimes after technology shock. In response to positive technology shock,
output expands, price inflation goes down, and wage inflation increases. Under
wrong targeting rule and wrong loss function, output expands by more, price
inflation starts to raise, and wage inflation increase by more. The performance
under wrong loss function deviates less from Ramsey plan relative to wrong
targeting rule. Under simple loss function and simple targeting rule, however,
output expands by less, price inflation goes down by more, and wage inflation
increase by less. The performance under simple loss function is more close to
Ramsey plan relative to simple targeting rule.
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Yet, it is price markup shock rather than technology shock that determines
the results of welfare implication under various policy regimes. Figure (3.2)
compares the IRFs of welfare relevant variables, including price inflation, wage
inflation, and output, in the full model under various policy regimes in face of
price markup shock. In response to positive price markup shock, output con-
tracts, price inflation goes up, and wage inflation falls. Under wrong targeting
rule and wrong loss function, output drops by more, price inflation raises by
less, and wage inflation falls by more, compared to Ramsey policy. The per-
formance under wrong targeting rule deviates less from Ramsey plan relative
to wrong loss function. Under simple targeting rule and simple loss function,
output drops by less, price inflation goes up by more, and wage inflation falls
by less. The dynamics under simple targeting rule and Ramsey plan closely
resemble each other. This is consistent with the results in Table (3.3) that tar-
geting rules are more robust across models than loss function and the targeting
rule taken from simple Woodford model performs the best.
3.4 Consclusion
We explore optimal monetary policy in new Keynesian model with search and
matching friction. Go beyond the existing literature, we allow for ineﬃcient
steady state. We manage to derive the correct LQ system as well as the
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optimal targeting rule even in the presence of ineﬃcient search and matching
frictions. It has been found that labor market variables aﬀect optimal targeting
rules dramatically. Moreover, optimal targeting rules seems to be more robust
across models than loss functions.
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Table 3.1: Parameterization of NKM with Search and Matching frictions
Description Parameter ht, No Hosios ht, Hosios No ht, No Hosios No ht, Hosios
Discount factor β 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99
Exogenous seperation rate ρ 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Matching function share of unemployment ζ 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.54
Steady state inflation rate π¯ 1 1 1 1
Calvo price stickiness ξp 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75
Steady state price markup λp 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2
Inverse consumption elasticity σ 1 1 1 1
Inverse labor supply elasticity φ 2 2 - -
Hiring fixed cost / output 100 ∗ ηh 0 0 0 0
Hiring flow cost / output 100 ∗ ηs 0.66 0.66 0.66 0.66
Replacement ratio ru 0.5345 0.9475 0.5345 0.9475
Steady state unemployment rate u˜ss 0.055 0.055 0.055 0.055
Steady state vacancy filling rate qss 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7
Steady state working hour hss 1/3 1/3 - -
Shock Process
Technology shock: AR ρa 0.9999 0.9999 0.9999 0.9999
Technology shock: Std σa 0.0031 0.0031 0.0031 0.0031
Cost push shock: AR ρu 0 0 0 0
Cost push shock: Std σu 0.0104 0.0104 0.0104 0.0104
Implied Deep Parameter Value
Hiring fixed cost κ¯ 0 0 0 0
Hiring flow cost κv 0.0154 0.0154 0.0462 0.0462
Unemployment benefit bu 0.1769 0.2025 0.5307 0.9407
Worker’s share of surplus ξ 0.7438 0.54 0.9124 0.54
Matching eﬃciency χ 0.6625 0.6625 0.6625 0.6625
Scaling of working hour disutility φ0 27.8940 27.7729 - -
Note: Table (3.1) shows the calibration of NKM with search and matching frictions. The
third column ”ht, No Hosios” refers to the parameterization of NKM with search and match-
ing frictions when Hosios condition is violated and intensive labor supply exists; The fourth
column ”ht, Hosios” represents the parameterization of NKM with search and matching fric-
tions when Hosios condition is respected and intensive labor supply exists; The fifth column
”No ht, No Hosios” indicates to the parameterization of NKM with search and matching fric-
tions when Hosios condition is violated and intensive labor supply does not exist; The sixth
column ”No ht, Hosios” specifies the parameterization of NKM with search and matching
frictions when Hosios condition is met and intensive labor supply exists. The upper panel
involves all the calibrated parameters. The middle panel documents the parameterizations
of the shock processes in all models. The standard deviation of technology shock is esti-
mated to match model IRFs with empirical IRFs under neutral technology shock, while the
standard deviation of cost push shock is to ensure the initial response of price inflation is
one percent. The bottom panel presents the values of the remaining deep parameters, which
can be derived from the steady state relationship.
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Table 3.2: Comparison for coeﬃcients of optimal targeting rules
Targeting variables Standard NKM
NKM with search and matching frictions
Hosios, no ht no Hosios, no ht Hosios, ht no Hosios, ht
nˆt 0 0.2473 0.2068 0 -0.0092
nˆt−1 0 -0.0712 0.0160 0 0.0007
nˆt+1 0 -0.0806 0.0141 0 0.0150
yˆt 0.1667 -0.0101 0.0073 0.1718 0.1934
yˆt−1 -0.1667 0 0.0011 0 0
yˆt+1 0 0.0101 0.0029 -0.0052 -0.0244
at -0.1667 -0.1261 -0.0388 -0.1741 -0.1840
θp,t 0 0 0.1937 0 0.0859
πt 1 1 1 1 1
πt+1 0 -0.4228 -0.5147 -0.0309 -0.1498
Pˆt−1 0 0.5729 1.1115 1 1
yˆWAt 0 0 0 -0.1537 -0.1124
nˆWAt 0 0 0 0 -0.0005
aWAt 0 0 0 0.1551 0.1123
θWAp,t 0 0 0 0 -0.0461
PˆWAt 0 0 0 -0.9221 -0.6683
at−1 0.1667 0 -0.0011 0 0
θp,t−1 0 0 0.0132 0 0
Note: Table (3.2) compares coeﬃcients of optimal targeting rules for five economies: stan-
dard NKM, NKM with search and matching frictions when Hosios condition holds and no
intensive labor supply, NKM with search and matching frictions when Hosios condition
does not hold and no intensive labor supply, NKM with search and matching frictions when
Hosios condition holds and intensive labor supply exists, and NKM with search and match-
ing frictions when Hosios condition does no hold and intensive labor supply exists. The
coeﬃcient associated with price inflation πt has been normalized to unit.
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Table 3.3: Welfare losses and CEV under diﬀerent policy regimes
Policy Welfare loss CEV
Ramsey -2.0474 0
Wrong targeting rule -2.0601 -0.0127
Wrong loss function -2.0697 -0.0223
Simple targeting rule -2.0488 -0.0014
Simple loss function -2.0701 -0.0227
Note: Table (3.3) compares welfare losses under original Ramsey plan, wrong targeting
rule (the targeting rule taken from Walsh model where intensive labor supply is absent
and Hosios condition holds), wrong loss function (the loss function taken from Walsh model
where intensive labor supply is absent and Hosios condition holds), simple targeting rule (the
targeting rule taken from simple Woodford model), simple loss function (the loss function
taken from simple Woodford model.) when search and matching model features intensive
labor supply and Hosios condition is violated. Notice that both targeting rule and loss
function obtained from simple Woodford model are expressed in terms of output level rather
than output gap. Welfare losses are the retrieved welfare values instead of CEV. CEV
measures the percentage of steady state consumption that consumers should give up to
compensate welfare losses.
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Note: Figure (3.1) compares the IRFs of our full model under original Ramsey plan, wrong
targeting rule (the targeting rule taken from Walsh model where intensive labor supply is
absent and Hosios condition holds), wrong loss function (the loss function taken from Walsh
model where intensive labor supply is absent and Hosios condition holds), simple targeting
rule (the targeting rule taken from simple Woodford model), simple loss function (the loss
function taken from simple Woodford model.) in response to persistent technology shock.
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Note: Figure (3.2) compares the IRFs of our full model under original Ramsey plan, wrong
targeting rule (the targeting rule taken from Walsh model where intensive labor supply is
absent and Hosios condition holds), wrong loss function (the loss function taken from Walsh
model where intensive labor supply is absent and Hosios condition holds), simple targeting
rule (the targeting rule taken from simple Woodford model), simple loss function (the loss
function taken from simple Woodford model.) in response to transitory price markup shock.
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Appendices for Chapter One
A.1 Details on methodology
A.1.1 Mapping first order conditions and LQ problem








Etg(xt−1, xt, xt+1, ζt) = 0
g(xt0−2, xt0−1, xt0 , ζt0−1) = g¯t0







U(xt−1, xt, ζt) + β−1ϕ′t−1g(xt−2, xt−1, xt, ζt−1)
]
−β−1ϕt0−1 g¯t0 . (A.1)
Under the assumptions of full commitment and optimality from a timeless
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perspective, the equilibrium process {xt,ϕt}∞t=t0 satisfies
DxU(xt−1, xt, ζt) + βEtDx−U(xt, xt+1, ζt+1)
+βEt
{
ϕ′t+1Dx−g(xt, xt+1, xt+2, ζt+1)
}
+Et {ϕ′tDxg(xt−1, xt, xt+1, ζt)}
+β−1ϕ′t−1Dx+g(xt−2, xt−1, xt, ζt−1) = 0 (A.2)
and the structural equations
Etg(xt−1, xt, xt+1, ζt) = 0 (A.3)
at each date t ≥ t0. The notation Dx denotes the vector of partial derivatives
of any functions with respect to the elements of xt; likewise do Dx− and Dx+
for derivatives with respect to xt−1 and xt+1, respectively.
Taking a first order approximation of the equations in (A.2) around the












































′ϕˆt+1 +Dxg¯′ϕˆt + β−1Dx+ g¯′ϕˆt−1 = 0. (A.4)
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The notationD2xx− marks the matrix of second derivatives of a function with re-
spect to x and x−. U¯ and g¯ is used as short-hand to indicate that a function (or
its partial derivatives) is evaluated at the steady-state values {x¯, ϕ¯}. “Hatted”
variables refer to the deviation of the original variable from its steady-state























































′ϕˆt+1 +Dxg¯′ϕˆt + β−1Dx+ g¯′ϕˆt−1 = 0 (A.5)















EtC(L)xˆt+1 +D(L)ζt = 0
























x−x− g¯ + β
−1D2x+x+ g¯
]
















C(L) = Dx+ g¯ +Dxg¯L+Dx− g¯L
2
D(L) = Dζ g¯.
Using the above definitions, it is easy to compute the matrices for the LQ
problem from the numerical output produced by the toolbox described in
Bodenstein et al. (2014). Hence, to a first order approximation the output of














outcomes {xt}∞t=t0 obtained from policies that satisfy the initial pre-commitment
constraint C(L)xˆt0 = dt0 . However, if the policies considered do not respect the
initial pre-commitment constraint by construction, the criterion needs to be
augmented to include a penalty in accordance with the violation of the initial
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pre-commitment. As discussed in detail in Benigno and Woodford (2012), the
correct criterion that allows for meaningful welfare comparisons of arbitrary












+ β−1ϕˆ∗′t0−1C(0)xˆt0 . (A.7)
ϕˆ
∗′
t0−1 denotes the values of the Lagrange multipliers associated with the pre-
commitment constraint under the optimal policy from a timeless perspective.
C(0) is the coeﬃcient matrix going along with the forward-looking variables
in the first order approximation of the equations in g. Finally, xˆt0 contains the
values of the endogenous variables at time t0 under the policy that is actually
implemented.
Intuitively, insuring that the optimal policy under timeless perspective is
the best policy among all feasible policies requires a change in preferences.








βt−t0U(xt−1, xt, ζt) + β−1ϕ′t0−1 (g(xt0−2, xt0−1, xt0 , ζt0−1)− g¯t0) . (A.8)
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+β−1ϕ′t0−1 (g(xt0−2, xt0−1, xt0 , ζt0−1)− g¯t0)
s.t.
Etg(xt−1, xt, xt+1, ζt) = 0. (A.9)
Approximating this problem following the same steps as above yields the crite-
rion function in (A.7). By construction, the problem in (A.9) implies the same
first order conditions as the optimization program in (1.4). In finding a second-
order approximation of the augmented utility function one only needs to in-
clude the second-order expansion of the penalty term, which after eliminating
first order terms, is simply given by β−1ϕˆ′t0−1Dx+ g¯
′xˆt0 = β
−1ϕˆ′t0−1C(0)xˆt0 .
A.1.2 Applying the welfare criterion
Throughout this paper, we focus on unconditional welfare measures. Initial
conditions are integrated out with the help of the invariant unconditional dis-
tribution over possible initial conditions — including the pre-commitments.
Consider an arbitrary policy regime, indexed by TF , and suppose that the





If policy is conducted under commitment from a timeless perspective, the
vector zTFt contains the endogenous variables xˆ
TF
t , the exogenous shocks ζt
and ζt−1, and a set of Lagrange multipliers ϕˆTFt . Under discretion, Lagrange
multipliers are not part of the state space and will be omitted from vector
zTFt . To denote the decision rules under the (socially) optimal policy under
commitment from a timeless perspective, we replace TF with a star, “∗”.
The unconditional variance-covariance matrix CovzTF ,zTF satisfies










which can be computed eﬃciently using the doubling algorithm provided by
Anderson et al. (1996). The (first) auto-covariance term is obtained by recog-
nizing that CovzTF ,zTF−1 = P
TFCovzTF ,zTF .
To compute the unconditional welfare implied by the policy TF we simplify
the two terms in equation (A.7) as follows. The first term of the welfare crite-
rion can be written in terms of the unconditional (auto-)covariances between






























where tr(M) denotes the trace of the matrix M .
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Because the second term in (A.7) involves the Lagrange multipliers as-
sociated with the optimal policy under commitment from the timeless per-
spective, evaluation requires knowledge of the variance-covariance matrix of
the endogenous variables in the optimal policy problem under commitment
from the timeless perspective, ϕˆ∗t0−1. As in Benigno and Woodford (2012), the
pre-commitments are drawn from the invariant distribution of the endogenous
variables under the optimal policy.
If the policy TF is conducted under commitment from a timeless perspec-













from the unconditional perspective. The matrix Sx selects the elements in
zt that coincide with those in the vector xˆt. If the policymaker respects the
pre-commitments consistent with the optimal policy under commitment from
a timeless perspective, it must be that C(0)xˆTFt0 = C(0)xˆ
∗
t0 . Thus, the term
(A.13) does not depend on the decision rules of the policy regime under con-
sideration as long as the policymaker respects pre-commitments.
When pre-commitments are not honoured, in particular under full discre-
tion, the second term, does depend on the decision rules of the policy imple-
213














with Sx defined appropriately to select the elements in zt that coincide with
those in the vector xˆt under discretion.
A.1.3 Decision rules under commitment and discretion
For each objective (1.7) - (1.10), we consider the case of the central bank
optimising its assigned objective under full commitment from a timeless per-
spective and the case of optimization under discretion.
Targeting frameworks under commitment
For a given parameterization of a targeting framework, we optimize the objec-
tive under commitment from a timeless perspective. The optimization problem
















t+1 +D(L)ζt = 0
C(L)xˆTFt0 = dt0
ζt = Γζt−1 +Υξt. (A.15)
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The matrix ATF is parameterized to reflect properly the targeting framework
under consideration with TF = {IT, PLT, SP,NIT 1, NUT2}. The entries
into ATF are zero except for the diagonal elements that correspond to the
positions of the targeting variables in the vector xˆt for the targeting regime TF .
Thus, the problem resembles the one of obtaining the optimal monetary policy
with commitment under the timeless perspective in (B.119) with (A(L), B(L))
being replaced by ATF . In assigning a targeting framework of the above type
to the central bank, the interaction between xˆt and its lags, as well as the
exogenous shocks, is cut out.
The first order conditions associated with this linear quadratic program
can be solved using standard algorithms to obtain the decision rules of the
endogenous variables and the Lagrange multipliers as in (A.10). Welfare com-
putations proceed as described in A.1.2. Importantly, as we assume in this
case that the policymaker respects pre-commitments, it is C(0)xˆTFt0 = C(0)xˆ
∗
t0 .
The second term in equation (A.7) can therefore be written purely in terms
of the decisions rules that characterize the optimal policy under commitment
from the timeless perspective as already discussed above.
Targeting frameworks under discretion
To find the (Markov equilibrium) decision rule of a central bank acting under
discretion we follow the methodology suggested in Dennis (2007). Today’s
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central bank is viewed as the Stackelberg leader; households and firms as well
as future future policymakers are the Stackelberg followers. To flesh out all
details of the approach in Dennis (2007) we modify the notation relative to







to be the vector that contains the endogenous variables, xˆTFt , except for the
vector of policy instruments, it = xˆ
TF,i
t . Start by writing the linearized equi-
librium conditions EtC(L)xˆTFt+1 +D(L)ζt = 0 as

















M3 = c(1) (A.21)
M4 = c(0) (A.22)
M5 = D(0)Υ (A.23)
The matrix C\i(1) is derived from C(1) by eliminating from C(1) the column
c(1) which is associated with the policy instrument and similarly for C(0) and
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C(2). We assume c(2) to be a vector of zeros.
Similarly, we write the objective function of the central bank — originally
characterised by ATF — to conform with the inclusion of the exogenous vari-






















KTF = aTF . (A.26)
We proceed under the conjecture that the solution will be of the from
z˜t = H1z˜t−1 +H2ξt (A.27)
it = F1z˜t−1 + F2ξt. (A.28)
Substituting this conjecture into equation (A.17) we obtain
[M0 −M2H1 −M4F1] z˜t =M1z˜t−1 +M3it +M5ξt. (A.29)


















































































































































The matrices S, R and NTF are defined implicitly as
S = W TF + βH ′1SH1 (A.33)
R = F ′1K
TFF1 + βH ′1RH1 (A.34)
NTF = S + βR. (A.35)
S and R are fixed points provided that the spectral radius of H1 is less than
one. In our application KTF = 0 and the second term of the objective function
drops out.
Under discretion, the policymaker optimizes the objective (A.30) subject to
(A.29). Taking first order conditions and applying the method of undetermined
coeﬃcients yields
M¯ ≡ M0 −M2H1 −M4F1 (A.36)
NTF ≡ W TF + βF ′1KTFF1 + βH ′1NTFH1 (A.37)
F1 = −(KTF +M ′3M¯ ′−1NTFM¯−1M3)−1
∗M ′3M¯ ′−1NTF M¯−1M1 (A.38)
F2 = −(KTF +M ′3M¯ ′−1NTFM¯−1M3)−1






Equations (A.27) and (A.28) can be combined to deliver the law of motion
to the full vector zt under discretionary policies as in equation (A.10).
A.1.4 Welfare comparison
CEV measure welfare cost that consumer would pay in terms of variation of
consumption level at steady state, that is the percent of consumption in steady
state that consumer should give up in compensating the welfare loss.





















With external habit, current period consumption variation in steady state
is adopted as the measure of CEV.












∗ C¯ ∗ CEV
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An alternative approach under external habit is to take account of habit
component as well in evaluating CEV, then












∗ C¯ ∗ (1− h)CEV














A.2 Detailed model descriptions
A.2.1 Baseline New Keynesian model
The baseline New Keynesian features two nominal rigidity and one real rigidity.
In this model, domestic intermediate good producers are subject to monopolist
competition and staggered price. At the same time, it allows for price inertia
with respect to the previous period price. One real rigidities is also intro-
duced,which is household consumption habit persistence. The model dynamic
is driven by three structural shocks: two eﬃcient shocks which are technology,
risk premium; one ineﬃcient shocks, which is cost-push shock. The flexible
economy and steady state of this model is eﬃcient due to the existence of gov-
ernment subsidies to remove distortion. As a consequence, monetary policy
is fully attribute to stabilize economic fluctuation around an eﬃcient steady
state.
There are five type of economic agents in each economy: households, inter-
mediate good producer, final good producer, fiscal authority, and monetary
authority. Households supply homogeneous labor force to intermediate good
producer, and choose optimal life-time consumption path. Intermediate firms
produce diﬀerentiated intermediate good under linear production function by
employing labor from household. Then, final good producers combine dif-
ferentiated intermediate good to produce aggregate good used for consump-
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tion. Fiscal authority collects lump sum tax from household and use it for
government spending, government behavior is assumed to be Ricardian. For
simplicity, we assume zero government spending.
Household
At each period t, household j chooses consumption Ct(j), labor supply Nt(j),
bond holding to maximise expected discounted value of lifetime utility with a
separable period preference, taken all the prices, wages and transfers as given.














Et is the expectation operator conditional on all the information available up
at period 0. The variables Ct(j) and Nt(j) stand for household j′ consumption
and labour supply at time t respectively. CAt−1 refers to aggregate consumption
level in the last period, capturing the presence of external habit formation,
which also reflects certain form of consumption persistence, and parameter h
measures the degree of external consumption habits. In addition, parameter
σC is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, σL represents the Fisher
elasticity of labour supply. We assume the existence of complete financial
market to remove the idiosyncratic labor income diﬀerence. Therefore, in
equilibrium every household will have the same consumption behavior Ct(j) =
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Ct.




= WtNt(j) + Profits +Divs+ T1,t (A.43)
Household earns income by supplying homogeneous labor service to the labor
unionWtNt(j), receiving payment from last period bond holding Bt(j), receiv-
ing an aliquot share of profits distributed by monopolistic competition firm
Profits and monopolistic competition union Divs, and government transfer
T1,t.
Intermediate Goods Producer
Intermediate good producer choose labor demand to minimise the cost of pro-
ducing intermediate good variety subject to the linear technology, taking as





s.t. Yt(i) = ξ
A
t Lt(i) (A.44)
Since all intermediate firms have access to identical technology, the input price
W1,t are same for all firms, and there is no capital and labor market friction.
Thereby marginal cost will be equalised across firms. ξAt stands for the total
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factor productivity shock which is assumed to be identical across firms and










εAt is white noise following N(0,σ
2
A).
The prices of intermediate goods Pt(i) are determined by Calvo-style staggered
contracts, see Calvo (1983). Each period, a firm faces a constant probability
1 − ξp to re-optimize its price Pt(i). The probability is independent across
firms and time. For those firms that do not re-optimize their price, prices
will increase at a weighted average of πt the nominal price inflation in the last




































Diﬀerentiated intermediated products are combined to form the composite
good by a continuum of representative bundler in a perfectly competitive en-
225









Where 1+θpθp refers to the elasticity of substitution among intermediate varieties.































where θpt represents time varying markup shock, the elasticity between dif-
ferentiated varieties. The fluctuation of θpt gives rise to the variation of each
diﬀerentiated intermediate firm’s monopoly power, triggering them to charge
corresponding new price. This ineﬃcient markup shock typically can generate
policy trade-oﬀ between stabilize inflation and output gap.θpt is assumed to
follow exogenous stochastic process:










Demand of aggregate output is given:
Yt = Ct (A.53)
Final product will be consumed by household consumption.




Where Ωyt " 1 due to the concavity of CES labor packaging technology. When
price dispersion is absent, Ωyt = 1, there is no production resources wasting,
intermediate good can be transformed into final product perfectly with each
intermediate firm supplying equalised amount of variety. However, as long as
there is some price dispersion, Ωyt > 1, some of intermediate diﬀerentiates tend
to be relatively expensive while others relatively cheap. This leads to over
demand of relatively cheap diﬀerentiated but less demand of comparatively
expensive diﬀerentiates.Intermediate varieties are only be able to transformed
into final product by less than one to one under CES aggregator technology.
A.2.2 Linear-quadratic framework
Although we implement our solution numerically, we also derive the linear-
quadratic framework for the model with external consumption habits and in-
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flation persistence similar to Leith et al. (2012).1 Following the steps outlined
in Woodford, ed (2003) and Gali, ed (2008), the second-order approximation
of the household preferences around the eﬃcient steady state can be shown to












(πt − ιpπt−1)2 . (A.55)
To arrive at this results, we first approximate each of the utility contribu-
tions from consumption and labor in equation (A.42). In the private sector



















2(1− h) (cˆt − hcˆt−1)
2
}
+ t.i.p. +O(2) (A.56)
with Uc =
(





















2(1− h) (cˆt − hcˆt−1)
2
}
+ t.i.p. +O(2). (A.57)
1Leith et al. (2012) abstracts from inflation persistence and focuses on the conceptually
more challenging derivations under various formulations of consumption habits (internal
versus external, deep versus superficial habits).
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+ t.i.p. +O(2) (A.58)
where Un = N¯σ
L
. Applying the following result from Woodford, ed (2003)


































+ t.i.p. +O(2). (A.60)
Before re-combining the expressions for the utility from consumption and
the disutility from labor, we turn to three relationships that allow us to simplify
the approximation. The market clearing condition implies
















βt−t0 (πt − ιpπt−1)2 . (A.62)
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The third relationship is
(1− hβ)UcC¯ = UnN¯ (A.63)
which is derived as follows. The deterministic steady state of the market
economy is not necessarily eﬃcient under external habits as agents do not
internalize the impact of today’s consumption choice on tomorrow’s marginal
utility. To render the steady state eﬃcient, we introduce a tax on consumption,
satisfying 1 + τ¯c =
1
1−hβ . With this tax in place, the first order conditions for









(1− hβ)UcC¯ = UnN¯ . (A.65)
Combing the utility from consumption and the disutility from labor using these
































































δ = (1− h)(1− hβ).
Our baseline model with sticky prices and external consumption habits can be
summarized in linear-quadratic form by the (hybrid) New Keynesian Phillips
curve
(πt − ιpπt−1) = κm̂ct + ut + βEt (πt+1 − ιpπt) (A.67)
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and the aggregate demand curve satisfies
(yˆt − hyˆt−1) = Et (yˆt+1 − hyˆt)− 1− h
σC
(it − Etπt+1) . (A.69)



















(πt − ιpπt−1)2 . (A.71)
To express the model consisting of equations (A.67) to (A.71) in terms of
“gaps,” we adopt the notion of the eﬃcient output gap as in Woodford, ed
(2003). The eﬃcient output gap is computed by defining potential output as
the eﬃcient output level. Although static distortions arising from external
2The literature oﬀers several ways of modelling markup shocks such as variations in
desired markups in the price setting rules of firms, exogenous variations in wage markups,
shocks to the price subsidy paid to producers, or even shocks to the elasticity of substitution
between varieties. The latter approach suﬀers from technical diﬃculties as the original model
cannot be written recursively. To a first order approximation all these models imply the
same dynamics in response to the markup shock. As discussed below, the second-order
approximation of the household preferences, however, is not identical across approaches if
the steady state is ineﬃcient.
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habits are removed in our framework by introducing the consumption tax
1 + τ¯ c, the dynamics remain distorted under external habits. To obtain the
(linear) equilibrium dynamics of the eﬃcient output level the model is solved


















































)− (1 + σL) ξˆAt . (A.72)
In the eﬃcient economy (flexible prices, no markup shocks) real marginal costs


















Equation (A.73) can be used to rewrite the model in terms of the eﬃcient
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Let the eﬃcient output gap be denoted by x∗t = yˆt − yˆ∗t . Equations (A.67) to
(A.71) can be stated as
(πt − ιpπt−1) = κm̂ct + ut + βEt (πt+1 − ιpπt) (A.76)




































)− (yˆ∗t − hyˆ∗t−1)] . (A.79)






















(πt − ιpπt−1)2 . (A.81)
The equilibrium eﬃcient output follows
yˆ∗t = Γyˆ∗ yˆ
∗
t−1 + ΓξˆA ξˆ
A
t (A.82)


























As the term hβ1−hβg
∗
mu,t appears in equation (A.77), the central bank is un-
able to perfectly stabilize inflation and the eﬃcient output gap under external
consumption habits in response to technology shocks. As discussed in Leith et
al. (2012) and Woodford, ed (2003), consumption habits have to be specified
as internal in order for the “divine coincidence” to re-emeerge; compare to
Blanchard and Gali (2007).
A.2.3 Linear quadratic framework with sticky wages
Following the approach in Erceg et al. (2000) many empirical DSGE models
include sticky nominal wages in addition to sticky nominal prices. Here we
adopt the specific implementation of sticky wages taken in Smets and Wouters
(2007) with the one diﬀerence, that we allow for a shock to the disutility from
labour to obtain additional (exogenous) movements in the labour supply.
















The preference shock ξLt aﬀects all households in the same way.
The key diﬀerence between the implementation of sticky nominal wage in
Erceg et al. (2000) and Smets and Wouters (2007) is that in the latter the
marginal rate of substitution between labour and consumption is equalized
across households. As pointed out in Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2006) the two
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variants of implementation are observationally equivalent.
Following the steps outlined in Gali, ed (2008) and Erceg et al. (2000)
we approximate the utility function of the household to the second-order. In
comparison to the previous section, the approximations of the utility from
consumption shown in equation (A.57) and the disutility from labor given
in equation (A.58) remain unchanged with the small qualifier that the latter



































Absent sticky wages aggregate labor supply Nt is related to final output Yt
and the level of technology via a term that measures price dispersion. Under


















where f is the index of a labor union. Similarly, aggregate output and manu-
























Applying results from Woodford, ed (2003) and Gali, ed (2008) regarding the
approximation of Ωyt and Ω
l
t to our model we obtain






varf (wt(f)) . (A.92)

























+ t.i.p. +O(2). (A.93)
Assuming that the steady state is eﬃcient due to appropriately chosen
subsidies, i.e., (1 − hβ)UcC¯ = UnN¯ , the utility function of the representative
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δ = (1− h)(1− hβ).
To obtain the (linear) equilibrium dynamics of the eﬃcient output level in the
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ξˆAt − ξˆLt . (A.97)
Eﬃcient output is therefore a function of lagged eﬃcient output, technology,
and the labour supply shock.
Substituting this last expression back into the welfare function we can
express the approximation in terms of the eﬃcient output gap, price and wage











































+ t.i.p. +O(2). (A.98)
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Applying equation (A.75) once more allows us to define the social loss
function for the model with sticky wages and prices, indexation, labor supply


























(πw,t − ιwπp,t−1)2 (A.100)
x∗t = yˆt − yˆ∗t denotes the eﬃcient output gap. The structural equations of the
model are given by the New Keynesian Phillips curve for prices
(πp,t − ιpπp,t−1) = κpm̂ct + upt + βEt (πp,t+1 − ιpπp,t) (A.101)
with
m̂ct = ωˆt − ξˆAt = ωˆt − ωˆ∗t (A.102)
and the price markup shock upt , the New Keynesian Phillips curve for wages
(πw,t − ιwπp,t−1) = κw (m̂rst − ωˆt) + uwt + βEt (πw,t+1 − ιwπp,t) (A.103)
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with
m̂rst − ωˆt = σLyˆt + σ
C






1− h (yˆt − hyˆt−1)
























and the wage markup shock uwt , the evolution of real wages



















it − Etπt+1 − g∗mu,t
)
. (A.106)








)− (yˆ∗t − hyˆ∗t−1)] . (A.107)
















ξˆAt − ξˆLt (A.108)
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A.2.4 Linear quadratic framework with distorted steady
state
In our discussion of the case of a distorted steady state, we return to the
simple New Keynesian Model with flexible wages and no consumption habits
as in Benigno and Woodford (2005).3 If the subsidies to prices do not fully
oﬀset markups in the product market, the steady state relationship between






as the steady state markup satisfies 1m¯c =
1+θp
1+τ¯p = Φ. In combining the utility
from consumption (A.57) and the disutility from labour (A.60), the linear term
3For the more general case including sticky wages (but no consumption habits), see
Benigno and Woodford (2004).
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− 2 (Φ− 1) yˆt
+
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+ t.i.p. +O(3). (A.111)
Absent distortions, Φ = 1 and the linear term (Φ − 1)yˆt in equation (A.111)
cancels out. With distortions, we employ the second-order approximation
to the nonlinear New Keynesian Phillips curve as in Benigno and Woodford
















































. Following the steps outlined in Benigno and




























where the terms gˆt and hˆt are given by
gˆt =
τ p
1 + τ p
τˆ pt −
(
















(πt − ιpπt−1)2 .


































1 + τ p
1− σC
σC + σL
τˆ pt yˆt + t.i.p. (A.116)
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βt−t0 − 2(σL + σC)



































1+µp (Φ− 1)(1 + σL)

















1+τp (Φ− 1)(1− σC)
σL + σC + (Φ− 1)(1 + σL) τˆ
p
t yˆt + t.i.p. +O(3). (A.117)












L + σC) (yˆt − y˜t)2 + 1 + θ
p
κpθp
(πt − ιpπt−1)2 (A.119)
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σL + σC + (Φ− 1)(1 + σL)
τ p
1 + τ p
τˆ pt .















+ βEt(πt+1 − ιpπt) (A.120)
or written in terms of the welfare relevant output gap yˆt − y˜t
(πt − ιpπt−1)
= κp(σL + σC) (yˆt − y˜t)
+κp
(
1− (Φ− 1)(1 + σ
L)







1− (Φ− 1)(1− σ
C)
σL + σC + (Φ− 1)(1 + σL)
)
τ p
1 + τ p
τˆ pt
+βEt(πt+1 − ιpπt). (A.121)
In contrast to the model with an eﬃcient steady state, the target output level
y˜t responds to the price markup shock µˆ
p
t and the shock to the subsidy τˆ
p
t .
Only when Φ = 1 does the target level remain unchanged after such shocks.
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While under an undistorted steady state the two shocks have the same impact
under the optimal policy, this is no longer true if the steady state is distorted.
This can easily be seen if σC = 1. In this case, the shocks τˆ pt does not impact
the target output level.
Ignoring the movements in the output target level induced by markup/subsidy
shocks when formulating policies leads to ineﬃciencies. Although optimal pol-
icy under commitment from a timeless perspective can be described as an infla-
tion targeting framework, the definition of the output gap is key. If the output
gap measure applied by the policymaker rests on a definition of potential out-




t — as would be the case under the definition applied in
Smets and Wouters (2007) — instead of y˜t the central bank’s response will not
be optimal.
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Figure A.1: IRFs to Transitory Costpush Shock under Discretion for EHL
Model at ιp = 0















































0 4. real wage
Note: Figure (A.1) displays the dynamic of four endogenous variable for three regimes
(IT PLT SLP) in response to transitory cost push shock under discretion, compared with
optimal policy under commitment with timeless perspective, in the baseline EHL model.
The model features sticky wage as the only friction on top of baseline new Keynesian model,
including sticky price, sticky wage and transitory cost push shock, but excluding endogenous
persistence and ineﬃcient steady state by assuming the existence of sales subsidies for both
price markup distortion and wage markup distortion.
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Figure A.2: IRFs to Transitory Costpush Shock under Discretion for EHL
Model at ιp = 1












































Note: Figure (A.2) displays the dynamic of four endogenous variable for three regimes
(IT PLT SLP) in response to transitory cost push shock under discretion, compared with
optimal policy under commitment with timeless perspective, in the baseline EHL model.
The model features sticky wage as the only friction on top of baseline new Keynesian model,
including sticky price, sticky wage and transitory cost push shock, but excluding endogenous
persistence and ineﬃcient steady state by assuming the existence of sales subsidies for both
price markup distortion and wage markup distortion.
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A.2.5 Inertia under price level and speed limit targeting
in the textbook NKM
Price level and speed limit targeting perform strongly under discretion relative
to the optimal monetary policy under commitment from the timeless perspec-
tive as discussed in Walsh (2003) and Vestin (2006). This appendix reproduces
the key steps to show how inertia in the output gap and inflation arises in the
textbook NKM under these two targeting frameworks.
In the following, we assume that the cost push shock is transitory, i.e.,
Et(ut+1) = 0, and we abstract from the zero lower bound on the nominal
interest rate, which allows us to ignore the aggregate demand curve of the
model. Under these assumptions, the optimal monetary policy under com-
mitment from the timeless perspective implies the following dynamics for the











with Υx being the solution to(




Υx − βΥ2x − 1 = 0 (A.122)
that satisfies Υx < 1. The value for Υu is
Υu =
−κ˜p
λ {1 + β (1−Υx)}+ (κ˜p)2
. (A.123)
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λ is the weight on the output gap in the true social loss function when the
weight on inflation is normalized to unity in the textbook NKM without price




To solve for the equilibrium under discretion we conjecture that the value
function of the policymaker is quadratic and depends on the price level of the
previous period under PLT. The value function of the policymaker satisfies







2)+ βV (pt, ut+1) (A.124)
s.t.
(pp,t − pp,t−1) = κ˜px∗t + βEprivatet (pp,t+1 − pp,t) + upt . (A.125)
We conjecture that the value function is quadratic implying the derivative with
respect to pt−1 to be of the from
Vp(pt−1, ut) = a3ut + a4 + a5pt−1 (A.126)
and that in equilibrium the price level evolves according to
pt = Θppt−1 +Θuut. (A.127)
Combining equations (A.125) and (A.127) and imposing expectations to be
rational delivers
x∗t =








with ω = 1 + β (1−Θp).
The Envelop condition associated with the policymaker’s optimization prob-
lem implies








xt + β [a4 + a5pt] = 0. (A.130)
Combining the equations to eliminate xt and applying equation (A.127) deliv-






























(1− ωΘp) . (A.135)
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Thus, we obtain the implicit definition of Θp and Θu
Θp =
λPLTω
(κ˜p)2 + βλPLT (1− ωΘp) + λPLTω2
(A.136)
Θu = Θp. (A.137)
Equipped with the law of motion for prices and the output gap under price
level targeting with discretion, we can show that inflation and the output gap
follow the same path as under the optimal monetary policy with commitment
from the timeless perspective. Note that equation (A.128) can be rewritten as
x∗t =










and therefore pt =
κ˜p
ω− 1Θp











(κ˜p)2 + βλPLT (1− ωΥx) + λPLTω2
(A.140)
with Υx the solution to equation (A.122) and ω = 1+β (1−Υx). Furthermore,
it is Θpω−1κ˜p = Υu given the conditions imposed on Υx.
Speed limit targeting
To solve for the equilibrium under discretion we conjecture that the value
function of the policymaker is quadratic and depends on the output gap of the
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SLT (xt − xt−1)2
)





t πp,t+1 + u
p
t . (A.142)
We conjecture that the value function is quadratic implying the derivative with
respect to xt−1 to be of the from
Vx(xt−1, ut) = a3ut + a4 + a5xt−1 (A.143)
and that in equilibrium inflation evolves according to
πt = Ωπxt−1 + Ωuut. (A.144)
Combining equations (A.142) and (A.144) and imposing expectations to be
rational delivers








1− βΩxxt + ut. (A.146)
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The Envelop condition associated with the policymaker’s optimization prob-
lem implies
Vx(xt−1, ut) = a3ut + a4 + a5xt−1 = −λSLT (xt − xt−1) (A.147)
implying that the coeﬃcients in the value function are given by a3 = −Ωu,
a4 = 0, and a5 = 1 − Ωx. Using this finding and equation (A.146) to obtain





1− βΩxxt + ut
)
+ λSLT (xt − xt−1) + β (1− Ωx)xt
= 0. (A.148)









Ωu = − κ˜
p (1− βΩx)
λSLT (1− βΩx)2 (1 + β (1− Ωx)) + (κ˜p)2
. (A.150)
A.2.6 Model in Walsh (2003)
Walsh (2003) uses the following linear model. Backward-looking behavior in
the hybrid New Keynesian Phillips curve is measured by the parameter φ
πt = (1− φ)βEtπt+1 + φπt−1 + κxt + et (A.151)
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where πt denotes inflation, xt the output gap and et a markup shock. The
aggregate demand curve includes a lagged term of the output gap
xt = θxt−1 + (1− θ)Etxt+1 − σ(Rt − Etπt+1) + µt (A.152)
where Rt is the nominal interest rate. The variable µt summarizes shocks to
the natural rate of interest
µt = ut − [1− (1− θ)γ¯]y¯ + θy¯t−1 (A.153)
where potential output y¯t and the demand shock ut follow AR(1) processes
y¯t = γ¯y¯t−1 + ξt (A.154)
ut = γuut−1 + ηt. (A.155)
Finally, the markup shock is given by
et = γeet−1 + εt. (A.156)
The welfare criterion in Walsh (2003) is not derived from the preferences




The parameterization of the model is summarized in Table A.1.
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Table A.1: Parameter Values for Walsh(2003)
Parameter Description Value
β Discount Factor 0.99
κ Slope of NKPC 0.05
λ Ramsey weight on output 0.25
σ Inverse of Elast Subs 1.5
φ Lagged Inflation in NKPC 0.5
θ Lagged Consumption in AD 0.5
Shock Description Value
σε Auto markup 0.015
γe Std markup 0
σu Auto Demand Shock 0.015
γu Std Demand Shock 0.3
σξ Auto Natual output 0.005
γ¯ Std Natual output 0.97
258
Figure A.3: Welfare evaluation of targeting frameworks in Walsh(2003)
price indexation 





























































Note: Figure (A.3) presents welfare evaluation of four targeting regimes (PLT SLP IT
and NIT-II) in response to the variation of price indexation, under both commitment and
discretion in Walsh (2003). x-aixs indicates price indexation, which ranges from 0 to 1.
Moreover, x-aixs also refers to welfare performance under IT, which has been takes as
reference for the rest regimes. Upper panel expresses welfare losses for PLT SLP and NIT-II
as the percent deviation from IT, whereas in lower panel relative performance is expressed
as the absolute deviation from IT to facilitate our comparison with results obtained in other
cases. It is worth of noting that upper left panel is for welfare evaluation with respect to
price indexation, corresponding to Figure 3 in Walsh (2003).
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A.3 Smets and Wouters (2007)
This section layouts nonlinear version of Smets and Wouters (2007) model.
Many nominal and real frictions are embedded in this empirical micro-founded
model. To be specific, domestic intermediate good producing sector as well as
labor market are subject to monopolist competition and staggered price and
wage setting respectively. In addition, it also allow for price and wage inertia
with respect to the previous period price and wage setting. Several real rigidi-
ties are also featured in the model, including consumption habit persistence,
investment adjustment costs, variable capital utilisation. The model dynamic
is driven by six structural shocks: four eﬃcient shocks which are technology,
risk premium, investment specific technology, government spending; two ineﬃ-
cient shocks which are cost-push shock, wage mark-up shock, foreign cost-push
shock, foreign wage mark-up shock.
The model would have behaved around eﬃcient steady state had govern-
ment managed to remove market distortion introduced by imperfect competi-
tion in product and factor markets by imposing subsidies collected from lump-
sum taxes. Yet, Smets and Wouters (2007) allows for distortionary steady
state, and monetary policy is only attribute to stabilize costly aggregate fluc-
tuations around an ineﬃcient steady state.
Having allowed not re-optimized price updated with both lagged inflation
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and steady state inflation, the model does not necessarily have to be restricted
to the economy with zero long-run inflation rate. even with strictly positive
steady state inflation, money remain neutral in the long run as steady state
value of other variables are not aﬀected by steady state inflation rate.
The economy is consistent with a balanced steady state growth path driven
by deterministic labour-augmenting technological progress. There are four
type of economic agents in each economy: households, firms,fiscal authority,
and monetary authority. Household sector consists of household agent, la-
bor Union, and labor bundler. Labour union diﬀerentiates the homogeneous
labour supplied by household, and then sell to labour bundler who package
diﬀerentiated labor into aggregate labor force. There are two diﬀerent type
of firms: intermediate good producer, final good producer. Intermediate firms
produce diﬀerentiated intermediate good by employing aggregate labor from
labor bundler and renting capital service from household. Final good produc-
ers combine diﬀerentiated intermediate good to produce good used for gov-
ernment spending and capital utilisation cost,consumption and investment.
Fiscal authority collects lump sum tax from household and use it for govern-
ment spending, government behavior is assumed to be Ricardian.
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Household
Household Agent At each period t, household j chooses consumption Ct(j),
labor supply Nt(j), investment It(j), capital stock Kt(j), capital utilization
Zt(j),domestic bond holding to maximise expected discounted value of lifetime
utility with a non separable period preference, taken all the prices, wages and
transfers as given.



















Et is the expectation operator conditional on all the information available
up at period 0. The variables Ct(j) and Nt(j) stand for household j′ con-
sumption and labour supply at time t respectively. CAt−1 refers to aggregate
consumption level in the last period, capturing the presence of external habit
formation, which also reflects certain form of consumption persistence, and
parameter h measures the degree of external consumption habits. In addition,
parameter σC is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, σL represents the
Fisher elasticity of labour supply. Here, period utility function is assumed
to be non separable with utility from aggregate consumption and disutility
form labour supply in order to accommodate with positive labour-augment
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technology progress.
subject to the budget constraint:
PtCt(j) + PtIt(j) +
Bt(j)
ξRt Rt
= W ft Nt(j) + R
k
tKt−1(j)Zt(j)− a(Zt(j))Kt−1(j)Pt +
Profits +Divs+ Tt (A.159)
Household earns income by supplying homogeneous labor service to the la-
bor union W ft Lt(j), which is also perceived as the desired wage when labor
union sets sticky wage in supply diﬀerentiated labor force to labor package,
and collecting rental rate from renting capital stock to the intermediate good
producer RktKt−1(j)Zt(j) in net of capital utilization cost a(Zt(j))Kt−1(j)Pt ,
as well as receiving payment from last period bond holding Bt(j), receiving an
aliquot share of profits distributed by monopolistic competition firm Profits
and monopolistic competition union Divs, and government transfer Tt.
and the capital accumulation equation:
































δ is the depreciation rate. As in Christiano et al. (2005), S(.) represents the
quadratic adjustment cost function, with S(γ) = 0,S′(γ) = 0,S ′′(.) = κ > 0.
It is costly to vary the level of gross investment from the previous period,
therefore the acceleration of capital stock is penalized. ξIt is investment-specific
technology schock. Rk denotes steady state capital rental rate. Zt(j) is the
capital utilization rate, and a(Zt(j)) is the corresponding cost. As in Debortoli
et al. (2015), adjustment function satisfies a(1) = 0,a
′
(1) = Rk, and a
′′
(1) =
Rkz, where z is defined as ψ1−ψ capital utilization rate.
Intermediate Labor Union and Labor Bundler Households supply their
homogeneous labor force to an intermediate labor union. This union diﬀer-
entiates the labour services, and resell them to intermediate labor packers.
The union is monopolistic competitive, and wages charged to the intermediate
packers are set subject to Calvo (1983) contracts. Moreover, labor packers
supply the composite labor force to the intermediate good producers in the
competitive market.







)di = 1 (A.163)
Following Dotsey and King (2005), function G is assumed to be a strictly
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θw refers to the elasticity of substitution among intermediate vari-
eties, ϵw stands for Kimball elasticity. As can be seen, when ϵw = 0, this is
just the standard Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator, it features constant elasticity of
substitution, meaning the change of relative demand is proportional to the
change of relative price. However, if ϵw is instead positive, firms will face a
quasi-kinked demand curve, meaning one percent decrease of relative price
will only increase the relative demand by less than one percent, whereas one
percent rise in its relative price leads to more than one percentage drop in de-
mand. Compare with standard Dixit-Stiglitz, Kimball aggregator introduces
more strategic complementarity in price setting, making monopolistic firms
or unions more sluggish to adjust their pricing setting behavior. Hence, the
underlying economy exhibits more stickiness than under standard CES aggre-











Labor bundlers buy labor Ljt from labor union, and package to get Lt, and
then resell them to intermediate good producers. Labor bundlers maximize
profits in a perfectly competitive environment.













)dj ∗ Lt = Lt (λLt ) (A.167)













1 + θw − θwϵw (A.168)














In the case where ϵw = 0, the demand of labor services and aggregate wage














Labor bundlers buy the labour from the unions who are the intermediate be-
tween the households and the labor bundlers. The unions allocate and diﬀer-
entiate the labour service from the households and have market powers: they
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to the marginal rate of substitution between leisure and consumption and is
equalised across household, reflects the real wage desired by the household.
Labor unions take marginal rate of substitution as the cost of the labour ser-
vices in their negotiation with the labor bundlers. The markup above the
marginal disutility is distributed to the households. However, unions are sub-
ject to nominal rigidities as in Calvo (1983). As in Erceg et al. (2000), a union
can readjust a wage with probability 1− ξw in each period. For those that can
not adjust wages, wages will increase at a weighted average of inflation in the
last period πt and inflation rate along the balance growth path π¯ by taking







For those that can adjust, the problem is to choose a wage W˜t(j) that max-
imises the wage income in all states of nature where union has to maintain





































1−ιwγ))) for s = · · · ,∞
(A.173)
Where θwt denotes wage markup shock, the elasticity between diﬀerentiated
labor. The fluctuation of θwt gives rise to the variation of each diﬀerentiated
labor’s monopoly power, triggering labor union to charge corresponding new
wage markup. This ineﬃcient wage markup shock typically can generate policy
trade-oﬀ between stabilise inflation and output gap.θwt is assumed to follow
exogenous stochastic process:









There are two diﬀerent type of firms: intermediate good producer, final good
producer. By employing aggregate labor from competitive labor bundler and
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renting capital service from competitive household, intermediate firms pro-
duce diﬀerentiated intermediate good and sell them to final good producer.
Final good producer then combine domestic diﬀerentiated intermediate good
to produce good used for government spending and capital utilisation cost,
investment and consumption.
Intermediate Goods Producer Intermediate good producer choose the a
stochastic path for input capital and labor to minimise the cost of producing
intermediate good variety subject to the Cobb-Dougalus technology, taking as
given capital rental rate Rkt and aggregate wage rate Wt. Intermediate firm’s








ωl − γtΦ (A.175)
Where Φ is choosen to make steady state profit being zero. Since all inter-
mediate firms have access to identical technology, the input price Wt Rkt are
same for any firms, and there is no capital and labor market friction. Thereby
marginal cost will be equalized across firms. ξAt stands for the total factor








1− ρA) log(γ) + ρA log (ξAt )+ εAt (A.176)
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εAt is white noise following N(0,σ
2
A). γ refers to steady sate labor-augment
technology progress.
The prices of intermediate goods Pt(i) are determined by Calvo-style stag-
gered contracts, see Calvo (1983). Each period, a firm faces a constant proba-
bility 1−ξp to re-optimize its price Pt(i). The probability is independent across
firms, time, and countries. For those firms that do not re-optimize their price,
prices will increase at a weighted average of πt the nominal price inflation in









































Final Good Producer Diﬀerentiated intermediated products are combined
to form the composite good by a continuum of representative bundler in a



































θp refers to the elasticity of substitution among intermediate varieties,
ϵp stands for Kimball elasticity. Similar to the case of labor aggregator. If ϵp =
0, then Kimball aggregator for final good production technology degenerates























di ∗ Yt = Yt (λYt ) (A.182)















































where θpt represents time varying markup shock, the elasticity between dif-
ferentiated varieties. The fluctuation of θpt gives rise to the variation of each
diﬀerentiated intermediate firm’s monopoly power, triggering them to charge
corresponding new price. This ineﬃcient markup shock typically can generate
policy trade-oﬀ between stabilize inflation and output gap.θpt is assumed to
follow exogenous stochastic process:









Fiscal and Monetary Policy
Government budget is assumed to be balance at each period, and Richard
equivalence holds. Government budget constraint is given by













= (1− ρG) log(gy) + ρG log (ξGt−1)
+ρAG log(ξAt )− ρAG log(ξAt−1)εGt (A.190)
εGt is white noise following N(0,σ
2
g). where g
y denotes the steady state govern-
ment spending to GDP ratio. Now, government spending shock also depends
on technology shock. Again, the monetary policy will be dropped at the time
of characterising optimal policy or targeting rule.
Resources Constraint
Capital market clearing Capital markets clear if
Kst = ZtK¯t−1. (A.191)
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This expression states the relation between homogeneous labor supply and
aggregate labor demand. It can be shown that Ωwlt " 1 due to the concav-
ity of Kimball labor packaging technology. When price dispersion is absent,
Ωwt = 1, there is no labor resources wasting, labor supply can be transformed
into aggregate package labor perfectly with each intermediate firm supplying
equalised amount of variety. However, as long as there is some wage disper-
sion, Ωwlt > 1, some of labor diﬀerentiates tends to relatively expensive while
relatively cheap for others, which leads to over demand of relatively cheap dif-
ferentiated but less demand of comparatively expensive diﬀerentiates. Labor
supply are only be able to transformed into aggregate labor package by less
than one to one under Kimball technology. Indeed, labor resources can not be
fully utilised due to wage dispersion. Moreover, since Kimball aggregator leads
to quasi-kinked demand curve for intermediate good producer, labor resources
ineﬃcient is even worse relative to the case under CES aggregator.
Final product clearing Demand of aggregate output is given:
Yt = Ct + It +Gt + a(Zt)Kt−1 (A.193)
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Final product will be consumed by household consumption, household in-
vestment, government spending, and also the capital utilisation cost.
Supply of aggregate output is given:









Similar to the interpretation for the situation under wage stickiness, Ωpyt "
1 due to the concavity of Kimball labor packaging technology. When price
dispersion is absent, Ωpyt = 1, there is no production resources wasting, in-
termediate good can be transformed into final product perfectly with each
intermediate firm supplying equalized amount of variety. However, as long
as there is some price dispersion, Ωpyt > 1, some of intermediate diﬀerenti-
ates tend to be relatively expensive while others relatively cheap. This leads
to over demand of relatively cheap diﬀerentiated but less demand of com-
paratively expensive diﬀerentiates.Intermediate varieties are only be able to
transformed into final product by less than one to one under Kimball aggre-
gator technology. Moreover, since Kimball aggregator leads to quasi-kinked
demand curve, aggregation ineﬃcient is even worse relative to the case under
CES aggregator.
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Table A.2: Parameter values for Smets and Wouters (2007)
a:Calibrated and Estimated Parameters
Parameter Description Value Parameter Description Value
δ Depreciation Rate 0.025 κ Invest Adjusted Cost 5.48
ϵp Kimball Elas. Goods 10 ϵw Kimball Elas. Labor 10
gy Govern Spending 0.18 l1,ss SS Hours Worked 0.25
γ Tech Progress 1.0043 π∗ SS Inflation Rate 1.0081
σC Inv. elasticity cons 1.39 σL Inverse Frisch 1.92
θw SS Wage Markup 0.5 θp SS Price Markup 0.61
h Habit Persistence 0.71 ψ Capt Util cost 0.54
ξp Price Stickiness 0.65 ξw Wage Stickiness 0.73
ιp Price Indexation 0.22 ιw Wage Indexation 0.59
ωk Capital Share 0.19 ωl Labor Share 0.81
β Discount Factor 0.9984 n Population Size 0.5
τ¯p Price Subsidies 0 τ¯w Wage Subsidies 0
b:Parameters for Shock Process
Shock AR(1) MA(1) Standard deviation (%) Value
Technology ρA 0.95 - - σA 0.45
Risk Premium ρR 0.18 - - σR 0.24
Gove Spending ρG 0.97 ρga 0.52 σG 0.52
Invest Specific ρI 0.71 - - σI 0.45
Price Markup ρp 0.90 ρpε 0.74 σp 0.14
Wage Markup ρw 0.97 ρwε 0.88 σw 0.24
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Appendix B
Appendices for Chapter Two
B.1 Two reference models with labor market
frictions
This Appendix provides more details on the two models laid out in the main
text.
B.1.1 NK model with search and matching frictions
Household
Each household consists a continuum of agents with measure 1. nt agents of the
household are employed and (1 − nt) agents are unemployed. The Household
maximizes the weighted utility of employed and unemployed agents. The inter-








t ) + (1− nt)U(cut , hut )] . (B.1)
E0 is the expectations operator conditional on all the information available up
to period 0. β is time discount factor. The variable cwt stands for consumption
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of employed agents at time t, and cut represents consumption of unemployed
agents at time t. Similarly, hwt is the number of hours worked by employed
agents, and hut is the number of hours worked by unemployed agents.
Employed agents derive utility from consumption cwt , but also incur disu-










σ captures the intertemporal elasticity of consumption, h measures the de-
gree of habit persistence, and φ is the inverse Frisch labor supply elasticity.






1− σ . (B.3)
Total consumption for the household is defined as
ct = ntc
w
t + (1− nt)cut . (B.4)
The inter-temporal budget constraint of the household satisfies
ntc
w
t + (1− nt)cut +
Bt+1
Pt










The household earns labor income Wtnthwt from labor services supplied by em-
ployed agents, and bu(1 − nt) in terms of unemployment benefits (generated
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through home production) from the unemployed agents. Furthermore, the
household receives payments from last period’s bond holdings Rt−1Bt, govern-
ment transfers Tt, and an aliquot share of profits Prt. Pt is the price of the
final consumption good, and Rt denotes the gross return on the one period
risk free bond Bt. Each period t, the household chooses consumption, bond
holdings to maximise the expected discounted value of lifetime utility, taking
prices and transfers as given. The household is not choosing the level of total
employment, wages, or hours worked. Hours and wages are set in a bargain-
ing game between the individual worker and the firm, to which the worker
is matched, over the surplus of the match. However, the marginal value of
employment to the household is a key component in determining the surplus
of the match, see below.













where λt denotes the Lagrange multiplier associated with equation (B.5),
household’s budget constraint. Equations (B.6) and (B.7) imply that con-
sumption risk is fully shared
cwt = c
u
t = ct. (B.8)
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Employment and the labor market
The labor market is characterized by search and matching frictions. In this
economy, the presence of search and matching frictions impedes people who are
seeking jobs from finding one and wholesale firms that are posting vacancies
from filling them. At the beginning of each period, a share ρ of matches that
existed in the last period nt−1 break up. The share (1 − ρ) of matches survives.
With the labor force normalised to unity, the total number of job seekers in
period t is the sum of unemployed workers in period t− 1 and the newly fired
workers. Let ut denote the total number of job seekers,
ut = 1− nt−1 + ρnt−1 = 1− (1− ρ)nt−1 (B.11)
The unemployment rate diﬀers from ut as some job seekers may be matched
and become employed. We define the unemployment rate
u˜t = 1− nt. (B.12)
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Firms post vacancies vt to be filled with job-seeking workers. Unemployed







χ determines the degree of matching eﬃciency, ζ captures the curvature of
Beveridge curve, indicating the substitutability between vacancies and job
seekers. Newly formed matches mt result immediately in employment. The
latter evolves according to
nt = (1− ρ)nt−1 +mt. (B.14)
Finally, we define the job finding rate st as the probability of an unemployed




= χθ1−ζ . (B.15)




= χθ−ζ . (B.16)






We are now in a position to define the marginal value of employment to













Moving one household member into employment aﬀects the household in three
ways. First, total household resources rise by the diﬀerence between wages and
unemployment benefits. Second, the utility of the agent changing employment
status falls by the disutility from labor (divided by the marginal utility of
wealth λt to turn it into monetary terms). Finally, the gains from matching a
household member with a firm also occur in future periods.
Wholesale firms
Wholesale firms employ labor as the only factor of production. Their output
is sold at the competitive market price Pwt . Firms post vacancies at the flow















s.t. nt = (1− ρ)nt−1 + qtvt
ywt = atntht. (B.19)
The technology shock at follows an exogenous AR(1) process




with εat given by N(0,σ
2
a).
Let Jt denote the marginal value of employment to the wholesale firm
(the lagrange multiplier associated with the first constraint). The first order
condition with respect to vacancy postings implies
qtJt = κ
v. (B.21)












Employing one additional worker raises the firm’s profits in the current pe-
riod by the increment between marginal product of labor and wage payment.
Furthermore, if the match survives future the firm also enjoys a continuation
value.
Combining equations, the wholesale firm’s vacancy posting condition equa-












The wholesale firms’ real revenue
Pwt
Pt
is in eﬀect the intermediate firms’ real
marginal costmct. The left hand side of equation (B.23) indicates the marginal
benefit of hiring an additional worker. The right hand side of equation (B.23)
captures the marginal cost of hiring a new worker, involving wage payments
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for hours worked, vacancy posting costs associated with a new match, and the
present value of saved future vacancy posting costs if the match survives in
following periods.
Notice that the search and matching frictions work through the presence
of vacancy posting costs. Absent vacancy posting costs, wholesale firms would
post infinitely many vacancies. All the unemployed workers seeking jobs will
find one. The NK model with search and matching frictions reduces to the





The real wage wt and hours worked are determined by Nash bargaining be-
tween the worker and the firm after forming a match. The total surplus of the
match is given by
Jt +Ht. (B.24)






subject to equations (B.22) and (B.18). ξ stands for the bargaining power of
the household, and 1 − ξ indicates the bargaining power of the firm.
The sharing rule for this Nash bargaining mechanism as derived from the
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first order condition with respect to wt implies
ξJt = (1− ξ)Ht. (B.26)





















Combining equation (B.23) and equation (B.27), we obtain the equilibrium

















The first order condition associated with hours worked in the Nash bar-







Retail good producers purchase wholesale goods to produce diﬀerentiated in-
termediate good varieties. The retailers have monopoly power over their vari-
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s.t. Yt(i) = y
w
t (i) (B.30)
with the first order condition for ywt (i) being
Pwt − λwt = 0 (B.31)
where λwt is the Lagrange multiplier for the production function and thus




The prices of intermediate goods Pt(i) are determined by Calvo-style stag-
gered contracts, see Calvo (1983). Each period, a firm faces a constant prob-
ability 1 − ξp to re-optimize its price Pt(i). The probability is independent
across firms and across time. For those firms that do not re-optimize their
price, prices will be updated as a weighted average of Πt =
Pt
Pt−1 the nominal
price inflation in the last period and Π¯ the steady state inflation rate. The








1This price updating scheme avoids price dispersions in steady state if the steady state
inflation rate is not zero.
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τ¯ p is the subsidy to intermediate firms. We assume τ¯ p = λp− 1 to remove the
distortions arising from monopolistic competition between the retailers. We
introduce markup shocks in the first order conditions for intermediate firms.
We define θp = λp − 1.
Final good producer
Diﬀerentiated intermediate products are combined to form the composite goods
by a continuum of representative bundlers in a perfectly competitive environ-












λp−1 refers to the elasticity of substitution between intermediate vari-















The first order conditions can be recombined to obtain the demand function















B.1.2 NK model with Calvo sticky wage
We only describe the parts of the model that are diﬀerent from the search and
matching model. More details are provided in Erceg et al. (2000).
Household















subject to the budget constraint
Ptct(j) + Bt+1(j)
= (1 + τ¯w)Wt(j)ht(j) + Rt−1Bt(j) + Prt(j) + Tt(j). (B.40)
E0 is the expectations operator conditional on all the information available
up to period 0. β is the time discount factor. The variable ct(j) stands for
household consumption. h indicates the degree of internal consumption habits.
Pt is the price of consumption goods, and Rt denotes the gross return for the
one period risk free bond Bt(j). The Household earns income by supplying
labor services Wt(j)ht(j), receives payments from last period bond holding
Rt−1Bt(j), and Prt(j) which consists of an aliquot share of profits distributed.
Finally, the household receives the government transfer Tt(j). φ represents the
inverse Frisch labor supply elasticity. Labor income Wt(j)ht(j) is subsidized
at a fix rate τ¯w.
Labor bundler
Labor bundlers package diﬀerentiated labor services supplied by each individ-
ual into an aggregate labor service with a CES technology resold to the inter-
mediate good producers in perfectly competitive markets. The labor bundling












λw−1 refers to the elasticity of substitution between diﬀerentiated labor
types. We define θw = λw − 1.
Labor bundlers maximize profits in a perfectly competitive environment.
































Households supply their diﬀerentiated labor services to the labor bundlers.
There is a continuum of households, index by j ∈ (0, 1). The imperfect sub-
stitutability of diﬀerentiated labor gives each individual household certain de-
gree of market power in setting a nominal wage. Each monopolistic household
chooses labor supply ht(j) and wage setting Wt(j). In addition, wage setting
is subject to nominal rigidities as in Calvo (1983). As in Erceg et al. (2000),
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households can readjust nominal wages with probability 1 − ξw in each pe-
riod. For those that cannot adjust wages, wages will increase by the weighted







For those that can re-optimize, the problem is to choose a wage W˜t(j) that
maximizes its utility in all states of nature where the household has to maintain















s.t. Pt+sct+s +Bt+s+1 = (1 + τ¯
w)Wt+s(j)ht+s(j)

















Where τ¯w is the subsidy to households who supply diﬀerentiated labor vari-
eties. We assume τ¯w = λw−1 to eliminate the distortions due to monopolistic
competition among households.
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B.2 NK model with search and matching fric-
tions: linear model
This section derives the linear model that approximates the NK model with
search and matching model. We first derive the elasticity of labor market
tightness with respect to shocks to understand the amplification of shocks in
the presence of search and matching frictions. Subsequently, we show that
the linear system of the NK model with search and matching frictions can
be stated in terms of three equations. For simplicity, we abstract from price
indexation and consumption habits from here on.
B.2.1 Simple analytics
To learn about the amplification of shocks in the framework with endogenous
labor supply, we combine the wage bargaining equations to derive an expression
for labor market tightness, θt.
Substituting the surplus sharing rule, Jt =
1−ξ
ξ Ht into the definition of the
household’s marginal value of employment





+ (1− ξ) (wtht − bu)







Combining with the marginal value of employment to the firm to eliminate
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the wage rate





+ (1− ξ) bu








or recognizing that eﬃcient bargaining over hours worked implies that the
marginal product of labor is equal to the marginal rate of substitution between
labor and consumption
















we finally summarize the equations characterizing the wage bargaining process
in a single equation
κv
χ
θζt + (1− ξ) bu















thereby eliminating Ht, Jt, wt from the system of relevant equations.
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m̂plt + hˆt + mˆct
)










To simplify the expression in equation (B.52), note that in the steady state












Using the conditions involving the marginal value of employment to the firm
Jt evaluated in the steady state and defining the replacement ratio as bu =
ruwsshss
bu = ruwsshss = r
u
(






Combining equations (B.53) and (B.54) defines the bargaining weight ξ in


















Assuming that changes in variables are small between two periods, we can



















Υ = ζ +
(1− ρ)βξqssθss (1− ζ)
[1− (1− ρ)β (1− ξqssθss)] . (B.57)
B.2.2 Implications of negotiating over hours worked
In NK model with search and matching frictions and flexible hours worked,
equation (B.29) resembles its counterpart in the standard NK model with
flexible wages. Noticing that
ct = yt − κvvt + bu(1− nt) (B.58)
Ωyt yt = atntht (B.59)
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In the model with a Walrasian labor market (as in the standard NK model),









Relative to the standard NK model, we need to take into account the dynamics
of nt, vt, and qt. Or after log-linearizing, the two diﬀerent models imply










yss + bu(1− nss)
1− κvvssyss+bu(1−nss)




+ (1 + φ) aˆt (B.63)




yss + bu(1− nss)
1− κvvssyss+bu(1−nss)






The variables vˆt and qˆt can be expressed in terms of nˆt using the (log-linearized)
equations that describe the labor market
vˆt = θˆt + uˆt (B.65)
qˆt = −ζθˆt (B.66)
uˆt = − (1− ρ)nss
1− (1− ρ)nss nˆt−1 (B.67)
nˆt = (1− ρ)nˆt−1 + ρmˆt (B.68)
mˆt = uˆt + (1− ζ)θˆt (B.69)
and therefore







qˆt = −ζν1nˆt + ζν1ν2nˆt−1 (B.71)
θˆt =
1




1− (1− ρ)nss nˆt−1































1− (1− ρ)nss (B.75)
κc =
κvvss





yss + bu(1− nss) (B.77)
ϖyss =
yss



































yˆt − (1 + φ) aˆt − (θ1nˆt + θ2nˆt−1) . (B.81)
B.2.3 Implications of negotiating over the real wage
Combining the first order conditions of the firm with the bargaining outcome
over wages, we arrive at the following relationship between real marginal costs























Log-linearizing therefore delivers the following relationship between real marginal



























Et [it − πt+1] (B.83)
where we have used the fact that yˆt − nˆt = aˆt + hˆt and we defined








Absent flexible hours worked, i.e., hˆt = 0, the above expression is used to
substitute out for real marginal costs in the New Keynesian Phillips Curve,
see Ravenna and Walsh (2011). Given the movements in marginal costs and
the real interests rate, labor market tightness and therefore employment are
pinned down.
In the case of flexible hours worked, we can combine equations (B.63) and
(B.83) to





1− κc + 1
)





















Et [it − πt+1] . (B.85)
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1− κc + 1
)








Et [it − πt+1] . (B.86)
B.2.4 Aggregate demand equation
By taking account home production (i.e. unemployment benefits are not fi-
nanced from any resources), the resource constraint in the economy is











combined with log-linearized Euler equation for holding bonds
−σ (cˆt − cˆt+1) = it − Etπt+1 (B.89)
we have the log-linearized aggregate demand equation









[(θ1 − φ) (Etnˆt+1 − nˆt) + θ2 (nˆt − nˆt−1)] . (B.90)
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B.2.5 Linear model
The policy rule not withstanding, the linear NK model with search and match-
ing frictions is summarized by the following three equations









− (1 + φ) aˆt − (θ1nˆt + θ2nˆt−1)
]
+ θˆp,t (B.91)









[(θ1 − φ) (Etnˆt+1 − nˆt) + θ2 (nˆt − nˆt−1)] (B.92)




1− κc + 1
)








Et [it − πt+1] (B.93)
with the coeﬃcients







































According to the NKPC (B.91), similar to the standard NK model, price infla-
tion dynamics in search and matching models are determined by current and
future real marginal costs which in turn are related to the ratio of real wage
to marginal product of labor. However, the real wage in search and matching
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models is determined through a bargaining process rather than simply equal
to marginal rate of substitution between leisure and consumption. Thus, labor
market variables aﬀect inflation dynamics directly through the NKPC. Fur-
thermore, the real interest rate aﬀects inflation dynamics the third equation
(B.93). Ravenna and Walsh (2011) refers to this channel, which is absent in
standard NK model, as the “cost-channel”. In contrast to standard NK model,
the aggregate demand equation (B.92) in search and matching models features
not only forward looking behavior but also backward looking behavior even
with standard household preferences that exhibit no habit persistence.
The standard NK model and the model in Ravenna and Walsh (2011) arise
as special cases:
• Absent labor market frictions, nˆt = 0, κc = 0, ϖyss = 1 and equation













yˆt = Etyˆt+1 − 1
σ
(it − Etπt+1) . (B.99)
• If there exists labor market frictions, but the individual labor supply
is completely inelastic as in Ravenna and Walsh (2011), i.e. φ = ∞,
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equation (B.93) reduces to yˆt = aˆt + nˆt. After substituting out for yˆt by






γ1Etnˆt+1 + (γ2 − θ1) nˆt + (γ3 − θ2) nˆt−1







Et (it − πt+1)
]
(B.100)






(it − Etπt+1) + γdn (ρa − 1) aˆt (B.101)
where
γn =
ϖyssσ − (1− κc) (θ1 − φ)
ϖyssσ + (1− κc) (θ2 − θ1 + φ) (B.102)
γdn =
ϖyssσ
ϖyssσ + (1− κc) (θ2 − θ1 + φ) (B.103)
B.3 Optimal targeting rule for NKmodel with
search and matching frictions
Having obtained the (linear) equations that describe the behavior of the pri-
vate sector, we still need to derive the objective function of the policymaker
as a purely quadratic approximation to the preferences of the representative
household to formulate the linear-quadratic problem from which we derive the
optimal targeting rule in the NK model with search and matching frictions. In
this section, we first derive the correct quadratic loss function as the approxi-
303
mation to the preferences of the representative household. Then we obtain the
first order conditions associated with the policymaker’s problem of optimizing
the (quadratic) objective function subject to the (linear) equations that de-
scribe the behavior of the private sector. Finally, the optimal targeting rule
is then derived by combining the first order conditions to the policymaker’s
problem into a single equation without Lagrange multipliers.
B.3.1 Simplified nonlinear optimality conditions
Before retrieving a numerical representation of the quadratic loss function, we
















The number of job seekers is already expressed in terms of employment
only
ut = 1− (1− ρ)nt−1 (B.104)
and matches evolve thus according to
mt = nt − (1− ρ)nt−1. (B.105)
















1− ζ (nt − (1− ρ)nt−1)
1












1− ζ (nt − (1− ρ)nt−1)
1











1− ζ (nt − (1− ρ)nt−1)
−
ζ









nt − (1− ρ)nt−1
1− (1− ρ)nt−1 . (B.109)






The resource constraint implies for consumption that
ct = yt − κvvt + bu(1− nt). (B.111)







































Finally, the nonlinear equations governing the evolution of prices in equi-





























θp V pt+1. (B.116)
The definition of the price level implies
1 = ξp (Πt)
1













Recall, that we continue to abstract from price indexation and consumption
habits.
B.3.2 Correct quadratic loss function
Following a large body of the literature, we compute the optimal monetary
policy under commitment from the timeless perspective as the reference point
to evaluate the performance of diﬀerent policies. Optimality from the timeless
perspective assumes that the policymaker can “pre-commit” at the beginning
of time. This assumption converts the optimal policy problem into a recur-
sive problem with time invariant functions as shown in detail in Benigno and
Woodford (2012). As shown in Bodenstein et al. (2014), the first-order ap-
proximation to the system of first order conditions associated with original















EtC(L)xˆt+1 +D(L)ζt = 0
C(L)xˆt0 = dt0
ζt = Γζt−1 +Υξt (B.119)
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where xˆt0 measures the (log-) deviation of variable “x” from its value as-
sumed in deterministic steady state. The matrices (A(L), B(L)) capture the
second-order approximation of the welfare function, where “L” denotes the
lag-operator. The matrices C(L) and D(L) capture the linear approximation
of the constraints. The linear constraints C(L)xˆt0 = dt0 implement the time-
less perspective through the appropriate choice of dt0 . The model description
is completed by the evolution of the exogenous variables, the last equation in
(B.119). The innovations ξt follow iid standard normal distributions.
All welfare relevant matrices in the above LQ problem can be retrieved
using the numerical approach in Bodenstein et al. (2014). After retrieving
the welfare matrices A(L) and B(L) and accounting for all zero elements, the











































+b8,3yˆtnˆt−1 + c3,1nˆtaˆt + c3,2nˆtθˆp,t
+c8,1yˆtaˆt + c8,2yˆtθˆp,t (B.120)
where yˆt is output, πt refers to price inflation, and nˆt stands for employment.






versions of the variables Uˆt and V
p
t . aˆt is technology shock and θˆp,t is price
markup shock. ai,j = A0(i, j), bi,j = A1(i, j), and ci,j = B1(i, j) for corre-
sponding index (i, j) are the entries in A(L) and B(L). Besides terms that
are already present in the standard NK model, labor market variables aﬀect
the loss function in the search and matching framework. Current and lagged
employment enter the approximation.
When using a first order approximation, the nonlinear equations associated
with Calvo sticky prices can be summarized in the NKPC for price inflation.
Therefore, sticky price variables { ˆ˜poptt , Uˆpt , Vˆ pt , Ωˆpt} will only show up in the non-
linear system but not in the log-linearized system. To make the loss function
work correspond to the linear structural equations, these sticky price variables
have to be substituted out.




Equation (B.121) can be used to substitute out ˆ˜poptt in the loss function.













Thus, price dispersion can be ignored to the first order.

























































































t ; the third identity
is true as a6,7 +
1
2
a7,7 = 0; plugging in equation (B.121) gives us the fourth
identity; the fifth identity holds as a2,6 + a2,7 + a6,7
ξp
1− ξp = 0.
We convert the approximation to household preferences, L˜s&mt , into a loss
function by defining Ls&mt = −L˜s&mt . The loss function in the search and
matching model is therefore written as
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Ls&mt = Pπ,ππ2t + Py,yyˆ2t + Pn,nnˆ2t + Pn−,n−nˆ2t−1
+Py,nnˆtyˆt + Py,n− yˆtnˆt−1 + Pn,n−nˆtnˆt−1

























Py,n− = − (a8,11 + b8,3)





To sum up, the procedure for deriving the correct loss function in the search
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and matching models involves:
1. deriving the nonlinear equilibrium conditions for the original model;
2. simplifying the nonlinear system of equations such that it only involves
variables that show up in the log-linearized model, together with sticky
price variables {Up, V p, p˜optt ,Ωy};
3. applying the numerical approach to retrieve welfare matrices based on
the simplified equation system;
4. writing out the loss function by plugging in retrieved welfare matrices;
5. using the log-linearized structural equations to eliminate the sticky price
variables {Up, V p, p˜optt ,Ωy} in the loss function.
6. obtaining the correct quadratic loss function, even though we can only
know numerically the values of the coeﬃcients which in turn depend on
the model’s structural parameters.
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B.3.3 First order conditions of the LQ problem

















t−1 + Py,nnˆtyˆt + Py,n− yˆtnˆt−1 + Pn,n−nˆtnˆt−1
+Pn,anˆtaˆt + Pn,pnˆtθˆp,t + Py,ayˆtaˆt + Py,pyˆtθˆp,t
}
s.t.









− (1 + φ) aˆt − (θ1nˆt + θ2nˆt−1)
]
+ θˆp,t









[(θ1 − φ) (Etnˆt+1 − nˆt) + θ2 (nˆt − nˆt−1)]





1− κc + 1
)








Et [it − πt+1] . (B.125)
The problem is to minimize the quadratic objective function subject to linear
structural equations.















Λ3,t = 0 (B.126)
















Λ3,t−1 = 0 (B.127)
















1− κc + 1
)
Λ3,t = 0 (B.128)
(nˆt) : 2Pn,nnˆt + 2βPn−,n−nˆt + Py,nyˆt + βPy,n−Etyˆt+1 + Pn,n−nˆt−1

































γ1Λ3,t−1 + γ2Λ3,t + βγ3EtΛ3,t+1 = 0 (B.129)
314
B.3.4 Substituting out Lagrange multipliers and the op-
timal targeting rule


















GΛt = 2Py,yyˆt + Py,nnˆt + Py,n−nˆt−1 + Py,aaˆt + Py,pθˆp,t
HΛt = 2Pn,nnˆt + 2βPn−,n−nˆt + Py,nyˆt + βPy,n−Etyˆt+1
+Pn,n−nˆt−1 + βPn,n−Etnˆt+1
+Pn,aaˆt + Pn,pθˆp,t.
Then the set of first order conditions simplifies to
(it) : Λ3,t = ν
ΛΛ2,t (B.130)
(πt) : 2Pπ,ππt + Λ1,t − Λ1,t−1 = 0 (B.131)
(yˆt) : G
Λ
t − κpø1Λ1,t + Λ2,t −
1
β











(θ1 − φ)Λ2,t−1 + 1
ø1 − φ (θ2 + φ− θ1)Λ2,t
− 1




+βγ3EtΛ3,t+1 = 0. (B.133)
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Substituting out Λ3,t in equation (B.132) and (B.133) by using equation (B.130),
GΛt − κpø1Λ1,t +
[














(θ1 − φ)Λ2,t−1 + 1
ø1 − φ (θ2 + φ− θ1)Λ2,t
− 1






































Since price inflation is defined as the change in the price level (in terms of
deviation from steady state) πt = Pˆt − Pˆt−1, we can then express Λ1,t as
proportional to the price level Pˆt from equation (B.131). At the same time,
the equation πt = Pˆt − Pˆt−1 has to be added into the model system. It is
straightforward to show
Λ1,t = −2Pπ,πPˆt. (B.136)
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Plugging the expression of Λ1,t into equation (B.134) and (B.135),
GΛt − κpø1Λ1,t +
[





= GΛt + 2κ
pø1Pπ,πPˆt +
[





































































































From equation (B.137), we get
Λ2,t − 1
β [1− (1 + ø1) νΛ]Λ2,t−1
= − 1































2Py,yyˆt−s + Py,nnˆt−s + Py,n−nˆt−1−s





























= −ββδ2Py,yyˆWAt − ββδPy,nnˆWAt − ββδPy,n−nˆWAt−1
























































p,t , and Pˆ
WA































t−1 + yˆt (B.147)
nˆWAt = βδnˆ
WA
t−1 + nˆt (B.148)
aˆWAt = βδaˆ
WA
t−1 + aˆt (B.149)
θˆWAp,t = βδθˆ
WA
p,t−1 + θˆp.t (B.150)
PˆWAt = βδPˆ
WA
t−1 + Pˆt. (B.151)
Substituting equation (B.140) into equation (B.138) and using the newly de-
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fined coeﬃcients,
















































































− (2κpβθ2Pπ,π + χΛ1 ββδ2κpø1Pπ,π)EtPˆt+1 + χΛ2Λ2,t
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=(
2Pn,n + 2βPn−,n− + χ
Λ
−1βPy,n







































































If the technology shock and the markup shock follow AR(1) process, then
Etaˆt+1 = ρaaˆt (B.153)
Etθˆp,t+1 = ρpθˆp,t. (B.154)
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2Pn,n + 2βPn−,n− + χ
Λ
−1βPy,n















































− (2κpβθ2Pπ,π + χΛ1 ββδ2κpø1Pπ,π)
]
Pˆt























2Pn,n + 2βPn−,n− + χ
Λ
−1βPy,n

















































− (2κpβθ2Pπ,π + χΛ1 ββδ2κpø1Pπ,π)
]
πt































Hence, the optimal targeting rule is given by,
ϖ1nˆt +ϖ2nˆt−1 +ϖ3nˆt+1 +ϖ4yˆt +ϖ5yˆt+1 +ϖ6aˆt









t = 0 (B.156)
where we define
πt = Pˆt − Pˆt−1 (B.157)
yˆWAt = βδyˆ
WA
t−1 + yˆt (B.158)
nˆWAt = βδnˆ
WA
t−1 + nˆt (B.159)
aˆWAt = βδaˆ
WA
t−1 + aˆt (B.160)
θˆWAp,t = βδθˆ
WA
p,t−1 + θˆp.t (B.161)
PˆWAt = βδPˆ
WA





2Pn,n + 2βPn−,n− + χ
Λ
−1βPy,n



























































































































B.4 Optimal targeting rule for NKmodel with
sticky nominal wages
To find the optimal targeting rule in the sticky wage model, we follow Giannoni



















s.t. xt = Etxt+1 − 1
σ
(it − Etπt+1 − rˆ∗t ) (Λ1,t)
πt = βEtπt+1 + κ




w (σ + φ)xt − κw (wˆt − aˆt) (Λ3,t)
wˆt = wˆt−1 + πwt − πt (Λ4,t)
(B.163)
where
θp = λp − 1 (B.164)

























(πwt ) + Λ3,t−1 − Λ3,t + Λ4,t = 0 (B.169)
(xt) : (σ + φ)xt + β




Λ1,t = 0 (B.171)
(wt) : κ
pΛ2,t − κwΛ3,t + βΛ4,t+1 − Λ4,t = 0. (B.172)
From equation (B.171), we obtain
Λ1,t = 0 ∀t. (B.173)








(πwt ) + Λ3,t−1 − Λ3,t + Λ4,t = 0 (B.175)
(xt) : (σ + φ)xt + κ
w (σ + φ)Λ3,t = 0 (B.176)
(wt) : κ
pΛ2,t − κwΛ3,t + βΛ4,t+1 − Λ4,t = 0. (B.177)
From equation (B.176),
Λ3,t = − 1
κw
xt. (B.178)
Then substituting Λ3,t into equation (B.175), we get an expression of Λ4,t





































After substituting the expressions for Λ2,t and Λ4,t into equation (B.174) and
using the definition of the output gap (xt = yˆt − 1+φσ+φ aˆt), the optimal targeting









































































Appendices for Chapter Three
C.1 Search and matching model with both in-
tensive and extensive labor
Please refer to section B.1.1, B.2, and B.3 for details.
C.2 Search and matching model with only ex-
tensive labor supply
C.2.1 Simplified nonlinear model equations
To obtain the coeﬃcient values for the quadratic loss function, we have to
retrieve relevant welfare matrices in the simplified nonlinear model, which
contains only variables that also show up in log-linearized equations as well










. In this regard, all the other model
variables need to be expressed in terms of nt and yt, except for sticky price
variables.
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The number of job seekers is already expressed in terms of employment
only:
ut = 1− (1− ρ)nt−1 (C.1)
and matches evolve thus according to:
mt = nt − (1− ρ)nt−1 (C.2)















1− ζ (nt − (1− ρ)nt−1)
1











1− ζ (nt − (1− ρ)nt−1)
1










1− ζ (nt − (1− ρ)nt−1)
−
ζ









nt − (1− ρ)nt−1
1− (1− ρ)nt−1 (C.6)
The production function:
Ωyt yt = atnt (C.7)
The resource constraint implies for consumption that
ct = yt − κvvt + bu(1− nt) (C.8)
















whereas the wage bargaining equation is :
wt = ξ
(







+ (1− ξ)bu (C.10)
Finally, the nonlinear equations governing the evolution of prices in equilibrium























t + ξpβEt (πt+1)
1
θp V pt+1 (C.13)
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The definition of the price level implies
1 = ξp (πt)
1




and price dispersion evolves according to
Ωpt = ξp (πt)
1 + θp





The policy rule not withstanding, the linear NKM with search and matching
frictions is summarized by the equations
πˆt = βEtπˆt+1 + κp
(



















[θ1 (Etnˆt+1 − nˆt) + θ2 (nˆt − nˆt−1)] (C.17)
yˆt = aˆt + nˆt (C.18)
or
πˆt = βEtπˆt+1 + κ
p
(

























1− (1− ρ)nss (C.22)
κc =
κvvss





yss + bu(1− nss) (C.24)
ϖyss =
yss






























































































When we eliminate the last equation, i.e., treating employment as fixed with
nˆt = 0 and set κc = 0 and ϖyss = 1, the standard NKM reemerges.
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C.2.3 Deriving optimal targeting rule
LQ problem

















t−1 + Py,nnˆtyˆt + Py,n− yˆtnˆt−1
+Pn,n−nˆtnˆt−1 + Pn,y−nˆtyˆt−1 + Py,y− yˆtyˆt−1
+Pn,anˆtat + Pn,pnˆtθp,t + Py,ayˆtat + Py,pyˆtθp,t
+Pn−,anˆt−1at + Pn−,pnˆt−1θt + Pn,a−nˆtat−1
+Pn,p−nˆtθp,t−1 + Py,a− yˆtat−1 + Py,p− yˆtθp,t−1
}
s.t. πˆt = βEtπˆt+1 + κp
(
γ1nˆt+1 + (γ2 − θ1) nˆt

















[θ1 (Etnˆt+1 − nˆt) + θ2 (nˆt − nˆt−1)]

































Py,n− = (a8,11 + b8,3)































(yˆt) : 2Py,yyˆt + Py,nnˆt + Py,n−nˆt−1 + Py,aat + Py,pθp,t
+βPn,y−Etnˆt+1 + Py,y− yˆt−1 + βPy,y−Etyˆt+1 + Py,a−at−1
+Py,p−θp,t−1 + Λ2,t − 1βΛ2,t−1 + Λ3,t = 0
(nˆt) : 2Pn,nnˆt + 2βPn−,n−nˆt + Py,nyˆt + βPy,n−Etyˆt+1 + Pn,n−nˆt−1
+βPn,n−Etnˆt+1 + Pn,aat + Pn,pθp,tPn,y− yˆt−1



















Substituting out lagrange multiplier








GΛt = 2Py,yyˆt + Py,nnˆt + Py,n−nˆt−1 + Py,aat + Py,pθp,t
+βPn,y−Etnˆt+1 + Py,y− yˆt−1 + βPy,y−Etyˆt+1
+Py,a−at−1 + Py,p−θp,t−1
HΛt = 2Pn,nnˆt + 2βPn−,n−nˆt + Py,nyˆt + βPy,n−Etyˆt+1
+Pn,n−nˆt−1 + βPn,n−Etnˆt+1 + Pn,aat + Pn,pθp,t
Pn,y− yˆt−1 + βPn−,aat+1 + βPn−,pθp,t+1
+Pn,a−at−1 + Pn,p−θp,t−1
Then the FOC equation system is simplified to be:
(ˆit) : Λ1,t = ν
ΛΛ2,t (C.35)
(πˆt) : 2Pπ,ππˆt + Λ1,t − Λ1,t−1 = 0 (C.36)
(yˆt) : G
Λ
t + Λ2,t −
1
β

















γ1Λ1,t−1 + (γ2 − θ1)Λ1,t + β (γ3 − θ2)EtΛ1,t+1
)
−Λ3,t = 0 (C.38)
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Λ3,t can be eliminated through combining equation (C.37) and equation (C.38).
We then have


















θ1Λ2,t−1 + (θ2 − θ1)Λ2,t − βθ2EtΛ2,t+1
]
= 0 (C.39)


















































































































Λ1,t−1 = 0 (C.44)
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By using equation (C.36),
GΛt +H
Λ















Λ1,t−1 = 0 (C.45)
Since price inflation is defined as the diﬀerence of price level (in terms of
deviation from steady state) πˆt = Pˆt − Pˆt−1, we can then express Λ1,t as
proportional to price level Pˆt from equation (C.36). At the same time, equation
πˆt = Pˆt − Pˆt−1 has to be added into model system. Then it is straightforward
to obtain



















Pˆt−1 = 0 (C.47)
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As such, optimal targeting rule for search and matching model without
intensive labor supply can be summarized as:
0 = GΛt +H
Λ
















GΛt = 2Py,yyˆt + Py,nnˆt + Py,n−nˆt−1 + Py,aat + Py,pθp,t
+βPn,y−Etnˆt+1 + Py,y− yˆt−1 + βPy,y−Etyˆt+1
+Py,a−at−1 + Py,p−θp,t−1 (C.49)
HΛt = 2Pn,nnˆt + 2βPn−,n−nˆt + Py,nyˆt + βPy,n−Etyˆt+1
+Pn,n−nˆt−1 + βPn,n−Etnˆt+1 + Pn,aat
+Pn,pθp,t + Pn,y− yˆt−1 + βPn−,aat+1
+βPn−,pθp,t+1 + Pn,a−at−1 + Pn,p−θp,t−1 (C.50)
πˆt = Pˆt − Pˆt−1 (C.51)
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If we express optimal targeting rule in terms of only model variables,
(βPy,y− + βPy,n−)Etyˆt+1 + (2Py,y + Py,n) yˆt
+(Py,y− + Pn,y−) yˆt−1 + (βPn,y− + βPn,n−)Etnˆt+1
+(Py,n + 2Pn,n + 2βPn−,n−) nˆt + (Py,n− + Pn,n−) nˆt−1
+(Py,a + Pn,a) at + (Py,p + Pn,p) θp,t + βPn−,aat+1
+βPn−,pθp,t+1 + (Py,a− + Pn,a−) at−1 + (Py,p− + Pn,p−) θp,t−1















Pˆt−1 = 0 (C.52)
Assuming technology shock and cost push shock follow AR(1) process, then
Etat+1 = ρaat (C.53)
Etθp,t+1 = ρpθp,t (C.54)
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Optimal targeting rule becomes:
(βPy,y− + βPy,n−)Etyˆt+1 + (2Py,y + Py,n) yˆt
+(Py,y− + Pn,y−) yˆt−1 + (βPn,y− + βPn,n−)Etnˆt+1
+(Py,n + 2Pn,n + 2βPn−,n−) nˆt + (Py,n− + Pn,n−) nˆt−1
+(Py,a + Pn,a) at + (Py,p + Pn,p) θp,t + βPn−,aat+1
+βPn−,pθp,t+1 + (Py,a− + Pn,a−) at−1 + (Py,p− + Pn,p−) θp,t−1















Pˆt−1 = 0 (C.55)
or after simplifying notations,










+ϖNI11 Etπˆt+1 +ϖNI12 πˆt +ϖNI13 Pˆt−1 = 0 (C.56)
and
πˆt = Pˆt − Pˆt−1 (C.57)
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Where
ϖNI1 = (βPy,y− + βPy,n−)
ϖNI2 = (2Py,y + Py,n)
ϖNI3 = (Py,y− + Pn,y−)
ϖNI4 = (βPn,y− + βPn,n−)
ϖNI5 = (Py,n + 2Pn,n + 2βPn−,n−)
ϖNI6 = (Py,n− + Pn,n−)
ϖNI7 = (Py,a + Pn,a + ρaβPn−,a)
ϖNI8 = (Py,p + Pn,p + ρpβPn−,p)
ϖNI9 = (Py,a− + Pn,a−)
















C.3 Optimal targeting rule in standard NKM
























− (1 + σL)
σC + σL
(1− ρa) at
πˆt = βEtπˆt+1 + κp (σL + σC) xˆt + upt (C.58)




πˆt + (xˆt − xˆt−1) = 0 (C.59)
Where




















at−1 = 0 (C.61)
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